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SUh'LlARY
This study presents a detailed examination of the postwar
strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union in an attempt to determine the degree to which the
competitive process can be described as an 'arms race1 fuelled
by the so-called 'action-reaction' process. The role of
•action-reaction1 is assessed through an investigation into the
factors responsible for the initiation and development of each
of the major advances in the evolution of Soviet and American
strategic doctrines and weapons deployments.
This inquiry concludes that a consideration of those
factors which have obstructed the effective exercise of 'action-
reaction', the numerous internal or otherwise non-responsive
influences and constraints which have affected the formation of
defence policy and the various processes through which strategic
doctrines and weapons programmes have been developed, clearly
establishes that any analysis which depicts the arms competition
as a two-party 'race' powered by 'action-reaction*, grossly
over-simplifies the nature of the contest.
It is proposed that the origins and development of the
Soviet-American strategic relationship are more accurately
characterised as the product of a highly complex 'chemical
process' which had as its catalyst the early postwar perceptions
of each competitor as an adversary by the other. Since the
late 1940s, this catalyst of competition has stimulated the
development of strategic doctrines and force structure in two
very dissimilar domestic environments, yielding two distinctly
different strategic compounds, which have consistently
retained their respective elements and properties while
continuing some degree of interaction. The significance of
certain of these intrinsic elements for arms limitation is
considered in a final shapter dealing with the agreements
reached at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972 (SALT I).
These conclusions rest upon source materials which include
official documents, the public statements and writings of
political leaders and military commanders, periodical literature
and an extensive bibliography covering the history and theory
of 'arms race' development and the strategic doctrines, foreign
and defence policies of the United States and the Soviet Union.
INTRODUCTION
THE CHEMISTRY of COMPETITIOM
rT; .\T!GIC CC''! hTITICN :
THE REAL. THE PUBLIC AN': THE PRETKhDED
The United States and the Soviet Union are currently
struggling to define the terras of a treaty intended to limit
the overall level of their nuclear forces, to establish the
character of their deployments and generally to bring some
measure of order to their strategic relationship. Already
under critical fire even before a final draft is agreed, the
present round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks follows an
earlier series of discussions which have been forcefully
attacked for their failure to restrain the 'arms rice* or to
establish an equitable nuclear balance.
V»'hile the momentum of technology alone might be expected
to frustrate the construction of an effective arms control
system, the problems of American and Soviet negotiators and
strategic planners are made immeasurably mure difficult by a
persistent failure to develop a wholly pertinent conception
of the process of arms competition beyond a collection ol worn
and excessively simplistic models.
Modellers of the past have described the competitive
process in terms of the relentless pressure of technology, an
analysis ir. which strategic doctrine and deJence policy are the
helpless captives of weapons designers, while others have cast
self-seeking cabals of bureaucrats, beard chairmen and 'old
soldiers' as the driving force of the postwar strategic contest.
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A third conception, perhaps the most widespread metaphor of
competition, describes a sparingly uncomplicated Soviet-
American 'race' powered by a sharply sensitive process of
•action and reaction'. This frenzied dash to stay even or
pull ahead is thought to produce an intricately harmonised
performance of strategic counterpoint in which doctrine and
deployment are matched by counter-doctrine and counter-
deployment*
Unfortunately for those committed to arms control through
a 'freeze' on all but benign technology, or by constraints
upon a number of corporate and uniformed conspirators, or
by an interruption in the performance of 'action-reaction*
which slows the tempo, none of these misshapen models
adequately explains Soviet-American strategic development.
Indeed, the authority assigned to each of these analyses as
the key to understanding the 'arms race' process may have
retarded the progress of arms control in the past and is
symptomatic of the bemused state in which policy-making has
been conducted throughout the postwar period.
If many political leaders and private analysts are to be
believed, the Soviet Union and the United States have been
matched for more than a generation in an 'arms race' fuelled
by 'action-reaction'. The development of both weapons systems
and strategic doctrine is accordingly seen as the product of a
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contest in which the speed and course of each competitor are
fixed by the pace and direction of the other. However, even
the most cursory review of postwar history and the lenpthy
catalogue of influence, pressures and constraints affecting
Soviet and American policies, reveals that the 'arms race*
is, in fact, run by each contestant along a course predominantly
of his own design and at a rate significantly determined by each
competitor for himself.
In circumstances of such complexity, the impress of the
blunt instrument of 'action-reaction' crudely brutalises
reality, sheering off great slices of postwar history and
contemporary experience. 'fthile conceding that models of any
kind must by their very nature simplify and, to some degree,
distort, the burden of the argument here is to propose that the
Soviet-American strategic competition is more revealingly
characterised as a highly complex 'chemical process' in which
the early postwar 'reaction* of each side to the other as an
adversary acted as the catalyst of competition. Thereafter,
the policy-making process has operated in two very dissimilar
environments, yielding two distinctly different and somewhat
unstable strategic compounds which, while retaining their
individual elements and properties, continue some degree of
interaction.
4.
THE CHEfclSTRY OF COMPETITIONi TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY
The complex process of strategic competition is perhaps
best defined by an analogy with chemistry. From the end ef
the Second World War what might be termed the 'chemistry of
competition' has yielded a number of phases in the development
of the competitive process which form a rough typology of the
Soviet-American strategic relationship. As this typology
describes the range, character and sequence of the developments
marking the course of the 'arms race', it may be useful to
present the historical record in typological form before
proceeding to a detailed analysis.^
* 1945-1953: THE EMERGENCE OF DETERRENCE:
The First Asymmetry
The Truman presidency witnessed a very extensive
postwar demobilisation, the American perception of
the USSR as a dangerous adversary requiring 'containment'
and a gradual increase in the importance of air-nuclear
power in the 'containing' role. The early adversary
perception and the growing significance of nuclear
weapons eventually led to the first suggestion of
Nuclear deterrence' as the most effective and economical
means of restraining the Soviet Union.
(1) For one attempt at representing the evolution of
the Soviet-American strategic relationship, see
Roman Kolkowicz, 'Strategic Parity and Beyond*,
World Politics. April 1971, pp.429-451#
* This is not intended to simulate the format of
direct quotation, which it is demonstrably not,
but the argument does require some concise
presentation of themes in relation to chronology.
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The same period in the USSR covered the final
years of Stalin's leadership. In the Russian case
the discovery of a major new adversary was accompanied
by the beginning of a lengthy programme of Army
re-organisation and modernisation, an intensive
and highly successful effort to develop the full
ranges of modern weapons, and a 'freeze* on military
doctrine which cast Soviet strategy solidly in its
wartime form. This doctrinal 'freeze* resulted in a
virtual ban on any consideration of the significance
of atomic weapons for modern warfare, the absence of
any hint or suggestion of the 'deterrence* concept and
the emergence of a measurable 'lag' or 'gap' between
Soviet and American strategic doctrines over the
'deterrence* issue. This 'lag' introduced the first
major asymmetry into the Soviet-American relationship,
finally, the growing nuclear emphasis in US strategy
during this period contrasted with Russian reliance
upon large ground forces and a 'hostage Europe' strategy
as the bulwark of Soviet security.
BUDGETARY STABILITY vis-a-vis STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY!
i 1953-1955: Re-examination and Reform
The years 1953 to I960 are perhaps best divided into
two periods during each of which both Soviet and American
policies experienced roughly aligned phases in their
development. The first of President Eisenhower's terms
of office traced the continuing expansion of the role of
nuclear weapons in American strategy and the acceptance of
the principle of nuclear deterrence. Persuaded that the
United States required greater military strength for both
deterrence and defence but firmly committed to balanced
federal budgets, the Administration adopted the 'Kew Look'
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policy and a strategy of •massive retaliation1 as a
relatively thrifty alternative to a costly increase in
Americans overall military capability.
As the United States was taking its •new Look1,
the death of Stalin was followed by a •thaw* in the
postwar •freeze1 on military doctrine and a gradual
Soviet adjustment to the strategic implications of
nuclear power. The re-examination of doctrine and the
post-Stalin leadership crisis which accompanied it,
produced a very substantial improvement in the declaratory
statue of nuclear weapons and the first Soviet discussion
of •nuclear deterrence' (ultimately the equivalent of
•minimum deterrence1) in the pronouncements of Premier
Malenkov.
The first half of the 1950s also witnessed the
apparent rejection of •minimum deterrence1 with Malenkov1®
dismissal, a continuation of Stalin's intensive programme
of strategic weapons development, further modernisation
of the ground forces and the maintenance of an operational
doctrine which largely entrusted Soviet security to
ground armies gathered along the frontiers of western
Europe.
ii 1956-1960; Nuclear Solutions
During the second Eisenhower term the development
of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities, tied to the
USSR's long established conventional strength, prompted
a 'New New Look1 in whieb the United States formally
abandoned the long-term maintenance of strategic
superiority, declared •sufficiency' to be the objective
of American strategic planning, discounted the significance
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of the 'missile gap' and enlarged the responsibilities
of tactical nuclear weapons as an economical means of
eliminating the acknowledged inflexibility of the
earliest version of 'massive retaliation'.
The period from 1956 to I960 in the USSR witnessed
Khrushchev's assumption of full political leadership,
a growing emphasis on missile-nuclear power during the
1950s, the establishment of the ICBM as the decisive
weapon of modern warfare in I960, and the modification
of Khrushchev's strongly negative views on 'deterrence'.
This reversal led, in the broadest terms, to a closing
of the conceptual 'lag* between the United States and
the USSR over the 'deterrence' principle. There was
also public expression of Khrushchev's desire to reduce
defence spending, as well as to increase investment in
the light industrial sector of the national economy.
Declaratory doctrine in this period attempted to exploit
the Soviet advantage in missile technology, first through
assertions of strategic 'parity' with the United States
and then through claims of 'superiority' and a 'war-
waging', even a 'war-winning' capability.
This declaratory position differed dramatically from
the operational picture, with its very low level of
ICBM deployments and the apparent acceptance of Malenkov's
discredited concept of 'minimum deterrence*. Soviet
policy failed to conform to American expectations by
abstaining from a massive ICBM deployment and producing
only a small force of long-range bombers, while accumulating
& large arsenal of MRBk/IRBMs.* Soviet ground forces,
suffering from a decline in doctrinal status as well as in
manpower, nevertheless continued to account for a major
part of the USSR's effective capacity to wage war.
* Medium Range Ballistic Missile/Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missile.
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THE STRATEGIC 'CROSS-OVER': 'WAR-WAQIKO or *?>AR AVOIDAKCB' ?
i 196l-1963/64» 'Usable* Military Power v
'Minimum Deterrence'
The Soviet-American strategic relationship during
the 1960s also divides into two periods. The Kennedy
years brought an American commitment to credible
deterrence and effective defence through 'usable* fully
flexible, military power. The United States was to
stand ready to 'wage war' on any level of conflict,
meeting any Soviet challenge with the appropriate
'controlled* or 'flexible response'. There was also an
effort to prepare for the breakdown of deterrence through
a proposal for Soviet-American acceptance of limitations
on the scope of a future conflict, restricting nuclear
strikes to military targets. All of these policy
objectives inspired a massive nuclear and conventional
build-up which brought the United States to at least the
approaches of a first-strike capability.
In the early 1960s the Soviet Union remained attached
to a strategy of 'minimum deterrence* or 'war-avoidance'.
Khrushchev apparently accepted a position of strategic
inferiority for the foreseeable future, despite the still
bold assertions of the USSR's declaratory doctrine, the
Cuban missile initiative of 1962, and the beginning of
the USSR's first major ICBM deployment in the same year.
The first half of the 1960s also brought a firm Soviet
rejection of American 'rules' on the limitation of nuclear
warfare and a pledge that any attack upon the USSR would
trigger a full scale response. The Russians thereby
derived maximum deterrent effect from still 'minimal'
nuclear deployments. Soviet ground forces, now openly
protesting against the decline in their resources and
doctrinal status, were maintained in strength in the
European theatre.
ii 1963/64-1967/68: * Stable deterrence*
v 'War-'ftaging'
After several yearB in which the United States had
amassed nuclear forces without any useful measurement
of its strategic requirements, in the early and mid-1960s
American doctrine turned to *mesured destruction', along
with 'damage limitation', as the solution to the problem,
'How much is enough?' After the succession of Lyndon
Johnson to the Presidency, the 'assured destruction'
mission loomed ever larger at the expense of 'damage
limitation*. In the second half of the 1960s, the
United States gradually 'crossed over' from the 'war-
waging' posture of the early Kennedy years to a doctrine
of 'war-avoidance' based upon the mutual vulnerability
of Soviet and American urban areas to nuclear attack
(•Mutual Assured Destruction' - MAD). MAD, originally
stemming from the need for some measurement of
strategic requirements, eventually became a fundamental
precept of American doctrine. Its acceptance obliged
both the United States and the Soviet Union to abandon
any pretentions to strategic superiority, renounce the
development of a first-strike capability and abstain
from the deployment of ballistic missile defences.
'Stable deterrence' was henceforth to rest upon 'parity*
in offensive systems and a countercity emphasis in
targeting doctrine. However, 'stable deterrence* was
not apparently seen to require an end to the development
of multiple warheads, a project intensively underway
during this period.
As the United States under President Johnson was
proceeding to a position not unlike that of the USSR
under Khrushchev in its all but exclusive emphasis on
deterrence or 'war-avoidance*, the USSR gradually
•crossed over* to a position resembling that of the USA
in the early 1960s. 'Credible deterrence* and
effective defence were sought through something like
•usable force* and a genuine 'war-waging* capability.
In contract with America's emerging concept of *Mutual
Assured Destruction*, Soviet doctrine in the late 1960s
apparently required a major expansion of nuclear forces
leading to the achievement of some variety of strategic
advantage, a significant counterforce element in
targeting and an effective system of ballistic missile
defence. Onoe again the Soviet Union refused to
order its strategic relationship with the United States
on the basis of American 'rules*.
1967/68 - May 1972t COVEr.TITIOH AND ACCOMMODATION
In 1967 President Johnson approved a significant
revision in American policy with the announcement that
the United States was to deploy the Sentinel ABM*
system as a shield againet a Chinese nuclear attack on
US cities. In 1969 the Nixon Administration replaced
plane for Sentinel with a proposal for Safeguard, a
system designed to defend the US Minuteman deterrent
against a Soviet first-strike. This sudden reversal of
US ABM policy was encouraged by Soviet violation of
American *rules* on strategic 'parity* and missile
defence. The first term of the Nixon presidency also
brought the adoption of 'sufficiency* as the standard
of America's offensive force levels. However, the
acceptance of •sufficiency• did not imply the
cancellation of deployment plans for multiple
independently targeted warheads.
Towards the close of the 1960s and in the early
1970s, the USSR remained attached to the strategy under
* Anti-Ballistic Missile
development since the retirement of Khrushchev. The
policy of the •collective leadership* in this period
achieved Soviet superiority in ICBMs, the continuing
expansion of a force of missile launching submarines
equal in quality to that of the United States and the
improvement of Soviet ballistic missile defences.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s both the United
States and the Soviet Union had. in large part, fulfilled
their respective definitions of strategic effectiveness
or •sufficiency*. However, each had also initiated new
deployments which threatened to compromise the position
of the other. Facing the prospect of a hazardous and
vastly expensive escalation of the competitive process,
they were persuaded to attempt the achievement of some
degree of control over their relationship through the
Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT I). In 1972
these negotiations resulted in the treaty on the
limitation of anti-ballistic missiles, an interim
agreement affecting offensive systems and a commitment





After four years of war in the Facific the United States
delivered its final blow against Japan with only two aircraft,
each carrying a single bomb. The assertion that the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks in fact ended the war is open
to question; but it is surely true that the explosion of these
rudimentary bombs revealed a dramatic new development in
weapons technology, which would eventually transform the nature
of modern strategic thought. The Soviet Union ensured that
this transformation was not to bo an exclusively American
accomplishment when she detonated an atomic device in 1949,
entering into what was to become an Intensive arms
competition with the United States.
* • « • •
Since the end of the Second World War both the United
States and the Soviet Union have rapidly moved beyond the
crude beginnings of the 1940s, greatly increasing the potency
of their weapons, stretching the range and swelling the pay-
load of their bomber aircraft and producing several generations
of intercontinental ballistic missiles, (ICBM).
Along with the effort to improve the quality and enlarge
the quantity of their armaments they have also struggled with
the difficult task of rethinking established strategy within a
nuclear context* The process of forming and reforming strategic
doctrine, as well as the development and deployment of weapons
systerna, is often assumed to involve a high degree of Soviet-
American interaction, with each country supposedly taking
careful and constant note of the other's development in the
design of its own strategic posture. This intimate relation¬
ship has allegedly resulted in either a kind of doctrinal
plagiarism, with one side acting in imitation of some feature
of the other's strategy, or has at least stimulated the
adoption of countermeasures by each competitor intended to
neutralise the latest modification in the strategy or force
(2)
structure of the other.
(2) On the 'action-reaction' process, see Kenneth R.
Whiting, 'Soviet Reactions to American Strategy',
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University,
1965s James R. Schlessinger, Arma Interaction
and Arms Control. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand
Corporation, p-3881, September 1968| Walter H.
Corson, United Statee-Soviet Interaction. 1945-
1965: A Quantitative Analysis. Ph.D. dissertation,
harvard University, 1968| George W. Rathjens,
•The Dynamic® of the Arms Race', Scientific American.
April 1969{ Joseph G. Whelen, 'The Soviet Strategic
Build-up and the American Reaction, 1967-1969?
A Survey and Analysis', Legislative Reference Service.
US Library of Congress, July9, 1969} Chalmers M.
Robert®, The luelear Years; The Arms Race and Arms
Control. 1945-1970. Hew fork: P.A. Praeger, 1970j
George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy} The First
Twenty-Five Years. Dew fork: Dunellen, 1970j
Herbert l'erk, Race to Oblivion. Hew York j Simon and
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Schuster, 1970; Kolkowica, op. oit.t Colin S.
Cray, 'The Arms Race Phenomenon*, World Polltloa.
XXIV, October 1971, pp.39-79; Samuel F. Huntington,
'Arms Race; Pre-requisites and Results* in R.J. Art
and K.N. Waltz, el., The Use of Force; International
Politics and Foreign Policy. Boston; Little, Brown,
1971, pp.391-392; Abram Chayes, 'An Inquiry into the
Workings of An; Control Agreements', Harvard Law
Review. March 1972, pp.910-9191 Colin S. Gray, 'The
Anas Race is About Politics*, Foreign Policy. So.9,
Winter 1972-73, pp.117-129; and by the same author,
'Social Science and the Anas Race', Bulfet in of the
Atomic Scientists, vol.XXIX, So.6, June 1973, pp.23-26;
Johan J. Hoist, 'Comparative US and Soviet Deployaents,
Doctrines and Arms Limitation*, in Norton A. Kaplan, ed.,
SALT; Problems and Prospects. Morristown, N.J.t
General Learning Press, 1973; Thomas W. Wolfe, 'Soviet
Naval Interaction with the United States and its
Influence on Soviet Naval Development', in Michael
McoGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments. Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhouaie University, Halifax,
Reva Scotia, 1973, pp.215-2*5; Colin S. Gray, 'The
Urge to Compete; Rationales for Arms Racing', World
Politico, January 1974, pp.207-233; and by the name
author, The . oviet-Aasorlcan Arms Race; Interactive
Patterns and Hew Technologies. Santa Monica, Cal.;
Rand Corporation, August 1974; Albert Wohlotetter,
'Is There a Strategic Arms Race?', Foreign Policy.
No.15, Summer 1974; and by the same author, 'Rivals
But No Race*, Foreign Policy. So.16, Fall 1974;
Colin S. Gray, 'Predicting Arms Race Behaviour*,
Futures. October 1974, pp.380-388; and by the same
author, 'The Racing "Syndrome" and the Strategic Balance',
Paper prepared for the International Seminar on 'The
Future Role of Soviet Military Power within the East-
Vest Political Complex', Stiftung fur Aisserischaft und
Politik, Kggenberg, West Germany; Albert Wohletetter,
♦Legends of th6 Strategic Arms Raoe, Part I; The
Driving Engine*, Strategic Review. Fall 1974; and by
the same author, 'Legends of the Strategic Arms Race,
Part II; Uncontrolled Spiral*, Strategic Review.
Winter 1975.
The hope has been expresses in the United States that
the Soviet Union would indeed emulate certain features
of American doctrine. Forks touching upon the
'educational* function of US doctrine include Edward
Klein and Robert Littell, *Shh! Lets Tell the Russians',
Uewgweek, May 5, 1969, p.47; Johan J. Hoist and
William Schneider, eds., Why ABK? Policy Issues in the
Missile Defence Controversy. New York; Fergamon
frees, 1969, pp.161-163; Xolkowicz. op. cit.;
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Military B &. D
of the Federation of American Scientists.
Is There »n fit D Gap? Key 6, 1971j Andrew J.
Pierre, •America Down, Russia Upj The Changing
Political Role of Military Power*, Foreign policy.
8o.4, Fall 1971, pp.163-187; Walter Darnell Jacobs
•Soviet Strategic Effectiveness*, Journal of
International Affaire, vol.26, Eo.l, 1972, pp.6o-
72; William T. Lee, 'The "Politico-Kilitary-
Induetrial Complex" cf the USSR*, Journal of
International Affairs, vol.26, Ho.l, 1972, pp.73-
86; Elizabeth Young, ^ Farewell to Arms Control?
Middlesex, England; Penguin Books, 1972, pp.210-
213| Hoist, •Comparative US and Soviet Deployments
Doctrines and Arms Limitation*, op, cit.. pp.53-95;
Gray, 'Predicting Arms Race Behaviour*, op. cit..
pp.383, 384-385; Gray, 'The Racing "Syndrome"
and the Strategic Balance*, op. cit.. pp.7-8.
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The imergence of 'Deterrence' and the
*Action-Reaction' Process
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States
rapidly demobilised its wartime armies but proceeded with the
development of Its nuclear capability. While many in civilian
life may have been profoundly impressed by the power of the
new weapons, the American armed services were not immediately
convinced of their revolutionary effect. They continued to
conceive of future wars largely in terms of their World tar II
experience. However, within official circles, including the
Department of State and the US Air Porco, tho consequences
of atomic and later thermonuclear power for the nation's
defence policy were under study. As a result of this
examination, as well as major changes in American foreign
policy centering around the perception of the Soviet Union
as a powerful adversary requiring 'containment*, American
(3)
strategic doctrine experienced very significant reform.y '
(3 ) On the development of the Cold War and the American
percaption of the Soviet Union as an adversary, see
Gabriel Almond, The American People and Porei -■ policy.
New fork, 1950} "h.F." Flessminj?, The Cold ar and its
Origins. Hew York: Doubleday, 19<j1 | Gar Alperovits,
Atomic Diplomacy> Hiroshima to lotrdaa. Hew Yorki
Vintage Press, 1965; Martin F. Hers, Beginnings of the
Cold War. 31oomirigton, Ind.» Indiana University Press,
1966j Louis Halle, The Cold War as History. New forks
Harper and Row, 1967; William A. Williams, The hoots of
Modern American Empire. New fork; Random House, 1969;
Herbert Pels, From Trust to Terror; The Onset of the Cold
War. 1945-1950. New York; W.W. Norton, 1970; The US
Army-Air Force identification of the USSR as an adversary
in 1945 is discussed in Perry MoCoy Smith, The Air Force
Plans for Peace. 1943-1945. Baltimore, : Johns ™"
Hopkins Press, 1970; Raymond Aron, The Imperial
Republic. Londonj Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973.
Following generations of military planning based upon a
mobilisation concept, with only a vague connection understood
to exist between foreign policy objectives and peacetime
military capabilities,^ by the end of the Truman Adminis¬
tration the concept of *nuclear deterrence• had emerged within
some of the nation*s highest policy-making bodies. It was
now argued by many in government that the United States
required the permanent maintenance of large combat-ready
nuclear forces, not simply to destroy an attacker, but
primarily to *deter* potential enemies from launching an
attack. After considerable scepticism about the significance
of nuclear weapons and the feasibility of deterrence,
America*# political and military leadership undor the so-
called *Bew Look* and 'massive retaliation* policies of the
1950s, largely accepted nuclear weaponry as the basis of both
the now officially adopted canoept of deterrence, as well as
(4) On the traditional American failure to associate
peacetime military capabilities with foreign policy
objectives, see Hans Morgenthau, In Defence of the
National Interest. Sew Yorkt Knopf, 1951;
George Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950. hew
York: New American Library, 1952» Reinhold Niebuhr,
fhe Irony of American History. Sew York; Scribner,952| Gordon 3. Turner, 'Classic and Modern
Strategic Concepts* in Gordon 3. Turner and Richard
D. Challener, eds., National Security in the Nuclear
Age. New York; F. A. Fraeger, I960, pp.3-30j
John Spanier, American Foreign I'ollcy Since World
War II. New York; P.A. Praeger, 1965.
(5)
the key to the successful defence of the United States. '
(5) On the emergence ©f deterrence in the United States and
the development of the Eisenhower *Eew Leek* policy,
see Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon; Atomic Power
and World Order. Sew York: Karcourt Brace, 1946j
John Foster Dulles, *The Evolution of Foreign Policy*,
Department of State Bulletin XXX, Ho.761, January 25,
1954, pp.107-110j Joseph and Stewart Alson, 'Sew
Look: Secret History*, Hew York Herald Tribune.
February 22, 1954} John Foster Dulles, *Foiicy for
Security and Peace*, Foreign Affairs. XXXII, Ko.3,
April 1954, pp.353-364; A.J. ffohletetter, F.S.
Hoffman, R.J. Luts and K.S. Itowen, Selection and
Use of Strategic Air Bases. Santa Monica, Cel.:
Rand Corporation, R-246, April 1954} Thomas K.
Finletter, Power and Policy. Hew York: Harcourt
Brace, 1954} *The Eisenhower Shift, Part I*,
Fortune. LIU, January 1956, pp.82-B7| Part II,
Ibid.. LIU, February 1956, p.110; Part III, Ibid.,
LIII, rarch 1956, p.110; Robert J. Donovan,
Eisenhower: The Inside Story. Eew York: Harper,
1956; Robert Osgood, .limited War. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957} Samuel P.
Huntington, The Concaon Defence. Hew York:
Columbia University Frees, 1961; Robert Gilpin,
American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy.
Princeton, E.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962}
Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H.
Snyder, Strategy Politics and Defence Budgets.
Kew York: Columbia University Press, 1962} Dwight
D. Eisenhower, The white Louse Years: Mandate for
Change 1953-195^. Garden City. H.Y.: Double;H.v.
1963} Bernard lirodle, Strategy in the y.lssile Age.
Princeton, H.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965}
Edward A. KolodsieJ, The Uncommon Defence and Congress.
1945-1963. Ohio State University Press, 1966}
Urs "ohwarss, American Strategy: A Kew Perspective.
Garden City, K.Y.: Boubleday, 1966} Quester, op. clt.i
Edgar U, Bottome, The Balance ef Terror. Boston,
Beacon Press, 1971.
In the early post war years the Soviet Union worked
energetically to end the US atomic monopoly and to acquire
/ gN
a long-range strike capability. However, like their
American counterparts, Soviet commanders were net at once
aware of the radical changes which atomic weapons were to
bring to modern strategic thought, preferring instead to
rely on the lessons learned in the USSR's great struggle -
basically land warfare - against Nasi Germany, The
conservatism of many senior soldiers, added to the rigid
enforcement of 'Stalinist Military Science* as the unquestion¬
able sum total of strategic wisdom, effectively forbade any
— • -r •
(6) On Soviet weapons research, see *X Design for Russia*,
RAF Flying Review, vol,12, November 1950, pp.17-18;
'Russia's Designers', Aviation Aao. vol.16, Lo.l,
July 1951* pp.6-18, 23-26| Chalmers H, Godlln,
'Evolution of Russia's Fighters', Aviation Age.
vol.16, August 1951, pp.15—20| 'Russia's A-bomber',
flying. vol.49, December 1951, pp.11-13, 60j
G.A. Takaev, Stalin aoans War. Londonj Weidelfeld
and Nicholson, 1951I Raynolds Phillips, •Russia*e
Intercontinental Bomber*, Boeing Kajeasine. vol.22,
fearch 1952, pp.3-5; J.R. Shepley and C. Blair, Jr.,
The Hydrogen Bomb. Hew fork: David McKay, 1954I
Andrew S. Haley, Rccketry and Space Exploration.
Princeton, N.J.; Van Nostr&nd, 1958; Arnold Kramish,
Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union. Stanford, Cal.t
Stanford University Press, 1959{ Aeher Lee, ed.,
The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. New York; F.A.
Praeger, 1959; Albert Parry, Russia's Rockets and
vlasilee. Londont .Jacmillan, I960; Asher Lee,
The Soviet Air torcc. Londonj „uckworth, 1961|
R.A. Kilrnarx, A History of Soviet Air lo^er. London;
Faber and Faber, 1962; Eugene F-aa&s. ed.. The history
of Rocket Technology. Detroit; Wayne State University
Press, 1963; Lansing Lamont, Jay of Trinity. New
York; Atheneu®, 19^5} G.A. Tokaty-Tokaev, 'Foundations
of Soviet Cosieonautics'. Spaceflight. October 1968,
pp.335-346; Robert Jackson, The Red Falcons. London;
Clifton Brodie, 1970; 'The Billion Dollar Bomber*, Parts
I and II, Air Enthusiast, vol.1, Nos. 2 and 3, July and
August, 1971; Nichael Stoiko, Soviet Rocketry. Newton
Abbots David and Charles, 1971.
reconsideration of strategic doctrine in the light of the
latest weapons developments and prevented the Soviet armed
(7)
forces from preparing for the conduct of nuclear warfare.
While strategic doctrine remained 'frozen' in its Stalinist
form* the early postwar years recorded significant changes
in Soviet foreign policy as the wartime alliance between east
and weat rapidly deteriorated and the United States was
(Q)
established as the Soviet Union's prime adversary.
(7) On Soviet strategic doctrine in the postwar Stalin
period, see R.L. Oarthoff, Bow Russia Makes tar.
Londonj George Unwin, 1954; and by the same author,
Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. Hew York: F.A.
Praeger, 1958, and The Soviet Image of Future War.
Washington! Publie Affairs Press, 1959; Kenneth
Whiting, 'Post-War Strategy' in Asher Lee, ad..
The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, op. cit.. pp.89-90;
H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union. New York:
P.A. Praegor, 1962; J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and
Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. London! Oxford
University Press, 1962; T.W.Wolfe, Soviet Strategy
at the CroeBroads. Cambridge, Kass.j Harvard
University Press, 1964; J.M. Mackintosh, 'The Develop¬
ment of Soviet Military Doctrina since 1918' in Michael
Howard, ed.. The Theory and Practice of 'var. London:
Caasell, 1965; and by the same author, Juggernaut,.
Londom Seeker and Warburg, 196/; T.W, Wolfe, Soviet
Power and Europe. 1945-1970. Baltimore, Md.i Johns
Hopkins, 1970.
(8) On Soviet foreign policy in the early postwar period,
see Ivo J. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy. New
York! Yale University Press, 1962; Mackintosh,
Strategy and Tactics of Soviet foreign Policy, op. cit.;
Marshall D. Schulman, Stalln'E Toriegn Policy
Re-appraised. Cambridge, Mass.! Harvard University
Press, 1963; Adam Ulara, Expansion and Co-exletence> The
History of Soviet Foreign Polioy. New Yorki F.A.
Praeger, 1968; Jan F. Triska and David D. Finely, Soviet
Foreign Policy. New Yorkj Macmillan, 1968; Adam 3.
Ulam, The Rivala. Hew Yorks The Viking Press, 1971.
Stalin's daatb opened the long overdue re-examination
of defence policy which eventually resulted in nuclear
weapons assuming a prominent place in Soviet strategy.
The post-Ftalln leadership contest between Party Chairman
Khruehchev and Premier Kalenkov touched upon a number of
important defence issues, including the relative significance
of nuclear weapons and conventional forces, mo well as the
adequacy of a strategy of 'mutual deterrence*.
Although still retaining a number of its traditional
features, by 1935 Soviet doctrine had undergone significant
modification. The uncompromising rigidity of the Stalin
period and the refusal to recognise the great significance of
nuclear weapons had been rejected. The Soviet Union had
achieved a more realistic understanding of air-nuclear power,
integrating the new technology into its armed forces and
strategic doctrine. Serious consideration had been given
to the need for a pre-emptive capability and the danger of
surprise attack, and a variety of the 'deterrence' concept
through nuclear forces-in-being, while failing to win
acceptance, had ©t least been formulated by Premier
(9)
J alenkov.
(9) On the post-Stalin strategic debate and the
development of Soviet doctrine during the years
in which the 'deterrence* concept first emerged,
see 'Hew Soviet Military Strategy*, Military
Review, vol.34, April 1954, p.89} *Marshal
Vasilevskii on the Atomic Problem*, Bulletin.
Institute for the Study of USSR. November 1954,
p.30j Jules Menken, *Seviet Policy and War*
in Brassey's Annual. The Armed Forces Yearbook.
1954. Rew' York":" yacslllan, 1954, pp.59-74}
R.L. Garthoff, *Significant Features of Soviet
Military Doctrine*, Military Review, vol.43,
March 1955, pp.3-13} F. Ieayev, *The "Small
Atomic Weapons" Myth*, Hew Times. March 26, 1955,
pp.7-10| Nikolai Galay, •Problems of Atomic Warfare
and the Soviet Armed Forces*, Bulletin. Institute
for the Study of USSR, vol.2, April 1955, pp.3-10}
R.L. Garthoff, 'Soviet Attitudes toward Modern
Air Power*, Military Affairs, vol.19. Sunnier 1955,
pp.76-80} Nikolai Gaiay, *!iew Trends in Soviet
Military Doctrine*, Bulletin. Institute for the
Study of USSR. June 1956, pp.3-12} G.I. Pokrovskil,
•Atomic Deadlock?*, oecot. Hews. Ho.6, 1956,
pp.13-14} Nikolai Galay, *Soviet Military
Thinking since Stalin*, Army, vol.7, September
1956, pp.59-61} Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the
Nuclear Age, op. cit.i Garthoff, The !eviet lira.,.e
of Future War. op. cit.i Dinerstein, op. cit.a
T.I. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964}
A. Horelick and X, Rush, Strategic lower and
Soviet Foreign Policy. Chicagoj University of
Chicago Press, 1966 j Wolfe, Soviet Power and
Europe. op, cit.
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'Time-Lag* and its Relevance
By the mid-1950s, both the United States and the Soviet
Union had recognised the formidable importance of nuclear
weapons. However, the Stalinist 'freeze' on strategic
thought had delayed the development of a Soviet nuclear
doctrine during the period in which the United States began
the evolution of a concept of 'nuclear deterrence'. This
delay - which can be measured and defined - imposed a
specific 'lag' on Soviet doctrinal development from the
outset.it might be said, therefore, that 'reaction'
was built into the Soviet-American relationship from the
start. The case can be made most easily with respect to
technology in general terms, and even in the initial approaches
to 'doctrine', but thereafter a deal of caution must be
exercised. For example, Soviet strategic forces were not
designed or structured upon principles wholly consonant with
US premises; the Soviet requirement to deal with local
(10) On the 'time-lag' issue, see Carthoff, Soviet
Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit.. pp.89-91;
Roman Kolkowicz, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Era.
Institute for Defence Analysis, IDA, N-789,
September 1970; and by the same author, The Soviet
Union and Arms Control. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1970; 'Strategic Parity and Beyond*, op. cit..
pp.439-440; 'Strategic Elites and Politics of Super¬
power', Journal of International Affairs, vol.26,
Eo.l, 1972, pp.42, 48-49, 53; Gray, 'Predicting
Arms Race Behaviour*, op. cit.. p.385.
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adversaries (In Europe, possibly in Asia) produced a
different force configuration. In short, the criteria for
Soviet strategic effectiveness (viewed from the Soviet side)
must and do diverge from those stipulated by the United
States; the question is - How far do they diverge?
In tr&eing the history of the postwar period, it ie
possible to identify a number of developments in the Soviet-
American strategic relationship which can be interpreted as
reactions by one side to some feature of the other's strategic
doctrine or force structure, with the Soviet Union apparently
continuing to 'lag* behind her major adversary in the
development of strategic ideas for several years. For
example, it is arguable that the first emergence of the
•deterrence* concept in the USSR, as well as the subsequent
adoption ef a Soviet version of an essentially 'Kew Look' -
•massive retaliation* posture in the late 1950s, were emulative
reactions to policies already established in the United States.
(11) On the development of Soviet defence policy under
Premier Khrushchev during the late 1950s and early
1960s, see Issac Deutscher, 'The Rew Soviet Strategy*,
The Reporter. October 3, 1957, pp.10-12; Kikolai
Ga'lay, 'Guided Missiles and Soviet Military Doctrine*,
Bulletin. Institute for the Study of USSR. October 1957,
pp.14-21; Dinerstein, *The Revolutien in Soviet
Strategic Thinking*, Foreign Affairs, vol.36, January
1958* pp.241-252; *Range of Our Missiles Worldwide,
Warns Marshal Malinovskii*, Air Force Times, vol.18,
March 8, 1958, p.6; Garthoff, *Miasileti In Soviet
Strategy*, Air Force, vol.41, July 1958, pp.91-92;
Dinerstein, On the Question of the Pre-emptive Blow
by General of the Army V. Kurasov. Santa Monica,
Cal.j Rand Corporation, 1958; Garthoff, Soviet
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Strategy In the Nuclear Age. or, clt.; Leon Goure,
Some Soviet Views on Air Strategy. Santa Monica,
Cal.s Hand Corporation, 1958; Kenneth R, Whiting,
•The Fast and Present of Soviet Military Doctrine1,
Air University Quarterly Review, vol.11, No.l,
Spring 1959, pp.38-60; J. Baritz, 'Soviet Military
Theory and Modern Warfare', Bulletin. Institute for
the Study of USSi.. May 1959, pp.12-20; Alvin J.
Cottrell, "The Strategy of Controlled Warfare -
Soviet Style*, Aray. vol.1, May 1959, pp.37-97;
Garthoff, 'Soviet Military Doctrine on the Decisive
Factors In Modern War', Military Review, vol.39,
July 1959, pp.3-22; and by the same author, 'Soviet
Strategy, Flexibility, Firepower, Follow-up*, Army.
vol.10, August 1959, pp.38-43; V. Larionov, 'The
Doctrine of Aggression in Doses', Survival, vol.1,
No.4, September-October 1959, pp.135-136; Garthoff,
♦Surprise and Blitzkrieg in Soviet Eyes', Royal
Canadian Air Force Staff College Journal. 1959,
pp.16-29; Thomas R. Phillips, 'Their "Raw* Looks
and Curs', Army, vol.10, March I960, pp.29-31;
J.F.L. Long, 'The Missile V6. the Bombers Khrushchev's
Choice*, Air Power, vol.7, Summer I960, pp.277-281;
Dinerstein, 'Current Soviet Strategic Ideas', Soviet
Survey. October-December I960, pp.74-79; A.L. Horelock,
'Deterrence and Surprise Attack in Soviet Strategic
Thought•, Royal Canadian Air Force Staff College
Journal. December I960, pp.21-58; Dinerstein, Soviet
Strategic Ideas. Santa Monica, Cal.j Rand Corporation,
I960; Kenneth R. Whiting, 'Soviet Military Doctrine
and the 22nd Party Congress', Air University Quarterly
Review, vol.13, Fall 1961, pp.99-103; 'Defence
Minister Dalinovskii tells Soviet Military Doctrine:
Nuclear-Rocket Warfare "Inescapable" *, Army. Raw.
Air Force Journal. vol.99» November 4, 1961, p.2;
Nikolai Calay, 'Khrushchev's Military Doctrine',
Bulletin. Institute for the Study of USSR, karch 1962,
pp.45-48; I. Sidelnikov, *0n Soviet Military Doctrine',
Air University Quarterly Review, vol.13, Summer 1962,
pp.142-150; J.F.L. Long, 'New Emphasis on the USSR's
Strategic Rocket Forces', Royal Air Force Quarterly.
vol.2, Winter 1962, pp.263-267; Dinerstein. War and
the Soviet Union, op. elt.t R.D. Crane, ed.( Soviet
Nuclear Strategy. Washington: Georgetown University
Centre for Strategic Studiee; Murray Green, Soviet
Military Strategy Brought Up to Date. Washington:
US Department of the Air Force, 1963; Mackintosh,
Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, op. elt.;
V.D. Sokolovakii, ed., Soviet military Strategy.
Santa Monica, Cal.i Rand Corporation, R-416-PR,
1963i Robert H. Ginsburgh, 'The ??ew Soviet
Military Strategy*, United Statee Raval Inatltute
Proceedings,vol.90. January 1964, pp.122-125}
T.*. Wolfe, *Seme Hew Developments in the Soviet
Military Debate*, Orbie, vol.8. Bo.3, Pall 1964,
pp.550-562} William Zimmerman, 'Sokolovskii and
Hi® Critics*, Journal of Conflict Resolution.
vol.8, September 1964, pp.322-328} William E. Odom,
•Sokolovskil's Strategy Revisited*, Military Review.
vol.44, October 1964* pp.49-53} Roman Kolkowicz,
Soviet Strategic Debatei An Important Repent
Addendum. Santa Monica, Cal.s Rand Corporation,
1964} lolfe, Soviet Military Strategy at the
Crossroads, op. oit.i Roman Kolkowicz, The soviet
Army and the Co muni8t Party: Institutions in Conflict
Santa Monica, Cal.t Rand Corporation, R-446-PR,
August 1966} Lincoln P. Bloomfield, loiter C. Clemens
and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race.
Cambridge, Mass.i The MIT Free®, 196*?} Hereliek
and Rush, op. clt.i Michael P. Oehlen, The Politics
of Co-existence. Bloemingten, Ind.i Indiana
University Press, 1967} William R. Klntner, and
Harriet Past Scott, eds.. The Nuclear Revolution in
Soviet Military Affairs. University of Oklahoma,
1968} Kolkowicz, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Era.
op. clt.i Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, op, cit.i
Kolkowicz, 'Strategic Parity and Beyond*, op. clt.
The much later Soviet commitment to a •war-waging1
capability and a kind of 'flexible response* might also be
explained as a reaction to the prior American development
(12)
of these concepts* ' Instances of US 'reaction' to the
Soviet Union might be said to include the American response
to the first major Russian ICBM deployment during the early
1960s which brought a gradual reduction in the American
commitment to strategic superiority, and nuclear 'war-winning'
and encouraged the acceptance of strategic 'parity* and 'stable
(12) On the period in which Soviet doctrine developed
a 'war-waging' objective, see T.W. Wolfe, 'Shifts
in Soviet Strategic Thought*, Foreign Affairs.
April 1964, pp.34-46} and by the same author.
The Soviet Union Six Months after Khrushchev's Fall.
Santa Monica, Cal. t Rand Corporation, 1964} "
Soviet Strategic Thought in Transition. Santa
Fonicla, Cal.i Rand Corporation, 19^4} Nikolai
Galay, 'The Soviet Armed Forces on the Threshold
of a Hew Era', Bulletin. Institute for the Study
of USSR, vol.12, April 1965» pp.13-20} John Erickeon,
•Detent#, Deterrence and "Military Superiority"!
A Soviet Dilemma*, World Today. August 1965, pp.337-
345} T.l. Wolfe, Soviet Military Theoryt An
Additional Source of Insight into Its Development.
Santa Monica, Cal.} Rand Corporation, P-325®, ~~
November 1965} and by the same author, 'Impact of
Khrushchev's Downfall on Soviet Military Policy
and Detente* in Eleanor Lansing Dulles, ed., Detente 1
Cold War Strategies In Transition. Hew forkt
F.A. Praeger, 1965} Problems of Soviet Defence
Policy under the Hew Regime. Santa Monica, Cal.!
Rand Corporation, 1965} Richard P. Staar, 'Current
Soviet Military Strategy*, Kaval War College War
Review, vol.18, January 1966, pp.1-23; Reman
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Kolkowicz., The Red 'Hawks' on the Nationality
of Buclear fear, Santa Monica, Cal.j Rand
Corporation, RM-4899-PR, March 1966j Horelick
and Rush, op. clt.t John Erickson, *Nuclear
Strategy: World Dilemma* in John Erickson, ed..
The Military Technical Devolution: Its Impact on
Strategy and Foreign Policy. Row York: F.A.
Praeger, 1966, pp.1-20t John R. Thomas, *Tho
Role of liissilo Defence in Soviet Strategy and
foreign Policy* in Ibid. | T.W. Wolfe, Soviet
Military Policy Under Khruahchev*s Successors.
Santa Monica, Cal.t Rand Corporation, 1966)
Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Argument for Superiority:
A ?iew Voice in the Soviet Strategic Debate.
Institute for Defence Analyses, N-419 R, January
1967} Kolkawicz, The Dilemma of Superpower:
Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition, op. cit.;
Kintner and Scott, op. cltTi Malcolm Mackintosh,
•Soviet Strategic Policy*, The World Today. July
1970, pp.269-276} Kolkowicz, Soviet Strategy
in the Ruclear Era, op. clt.j Kolkowicz, The
Union and Arms Control, op. clt.} Wolfe,
Soviet sower and rurope. op. cit.: John Erickson,
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Affairs Symposium held at the US Army Institute
for Advanced Russian and Last European Studies in
Garasiah-Partenkfrchen. Germany. 20-22 April. 1971.
A.P.O. Hew York: US Army Institute for
Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 1971}
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Superpower*, op. pit.: John Erickson, *Soviet
Military Power*, Strategic Review. Spring 1973,
pp.1-127.
(13)
deterrence* as ih® central objectives of US policy.
(13) On the development of American defence policy during
the 1960s, see Stewart Alsop, 'Kennedy's Grand Strategy*,
Saturday Evening Post, ttarch 31, 1962; Michael Brower,
'Controlled Nuclear War', New Republic. CXLVII, Ko.4,
July 30, 1962, pp.9-15; and by the same author, 'Nuclear
Strategy of the Kennedy Administration', Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists. XVXIX, October 1962, pp.35-41;
•McNamara Sees Gains in Defence But Cites Perils', Hew
York Times. January 31, 1963, p.l; **f«Ba®ara Tells
Defence Policy*, Hew York Timea. Kerch 30, 1963, p.4;
Alain Enthoven, 'American Deterrent Policy*, Survival.
vol.V, Ho.3, May-June 1963; 'McHamara Declares lest
Holds Strong Arras Lead', Hew York Times. November 19,
1963; Testimony of secretary McNamara in US House of
Representatives, Committee or. Armed Services. Hearin,r>
on Military Posture. Washington. D.C., US Government
Printing Office, 1963; US Department of Defence.
Statement by Secretary of .efence Robert S. RcNtmara
before the House Armed Services ; o,.-.-ittee on 3fr».n
1965-1969 Defence f ro/.ra" .-e and 1965 Defence Budget,
January 27, 19^4; ''MeNaraara Seeks Porces" Sufficient
to Crush Red Block', hew York Times. January 28, 1964
p.l; Harold B. foul ton, 'The licKam&ra General lar
Strategy', Crbis, VIII, No.2, Summer 1964, pp.235-254;
William ?<• Kaufman, The h cNs sara Strategy. New York;
Harper end Row, 1964; Hugh Sidney. John I'. Kennedy:
President. Pew York, Crest, 1964; US Department of
Defence. Statement by Secretary of Defence Pobert S.
EcNaaiara before the ouse Armed .ervleea Committee on
the FY 1966-1970 Defence Programme and the 1966 Defence
February 16. 1965, 'EcEaffiara I ears 220 Pillion
Toll', New York Times. februax*y 19, 1965, p.l.; 'Pentagon's
"New" Policy', Hew York Times. February 27, 1965, p.8;
Arthur Schleseinger, A Thousand Days. Boston, Houghton
Mifflin, 1965; Theodore Sorei.son, Kennedy. Hew York,
Harper and Row, 1965; Kolodasiej, op. cit.; Daniel Lang,
An Inquiry into inoughness. London, Seeker and Warburg,
1966;Schwars. op. cit., Brower Brock, 'McHamara Seen
Now, Full Length', Life. May 19, 1968, p.80; Robert S.
KcHaaara, The Eesenoe of Security. New York, Harper and
Row, 1968; Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond Ioubt. New York,
Cowles, 1970; Queeter, op. cit., Bottome, op. cit.,
Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How . uch is Enough?
New York, Harper and Row, 1971; Henry L. Trewitt, v,cVamara.
New York, Harper and Row, 1971; Desmond Ball, The
Strategic Missile Programme of the Kennedy Administration.
1961-1963', Ph.D. dioEertatlon, Australian National University,.
June 1972j Young, op, cit., Fred Charles Ikle, 'Can
Nuclear Deterrence Last Cut the Century', Foreign Affairs.
January 1973, pp.267-285; Kolst, 'Comparative US and Soviet
Deployments', op. cit.: Moulton, From Superiority to Parity.
Weetport, Conn., Greenwood Pressm 1973.
The reversal Id the American attitude to ballistic missile
defence during the late 1960s might also be identified as a
reaction to the heavy Soviet deployment of both offensive
and defensive systems following the retirement of Premier
Khrushchev.
(14) On the development of US policy on mieeile defence,
see Freeman J. Dyson, 'Defence Against Ballistic
Missiles', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. XX,
June 1964, pp.12-18; US Department of Defence.
Statement b,y Secretary of Defence. Robert S. VcNamara
before the House Armed Services Committee en the FY
1966-1970 Defence Programme and the 1966 Defence
Budget. February 16. 19651 US" Congress. Committee
on Armed Service. Hearings on Military Posture.
89th Congress, let session, 1965; US Congress.
Senate Sub-committee on Department of Defence
Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services.
Bearings on Department of defence Appropriations. 1966.
89th Congress, 1st session, 1965; US Congress. House.
Sub-committee of tho Committee on Appropriations.
Bearings on Department of Defence Appropriations for
1966. 69th Congress, 1st session, 1965. Part 3;
Statement of ■ ecretary of Defence Kobert P>, McKamara
before a Joint Session of the Sanate Armed Services
Committee and the Senate Sub-committee on Department
of Defence Appropriatlone on the FY 19&8-1972 Defence
Programme and 1966 Defence Budget. January 23, 1967;
Norman Moss, 'McBamara's ABM Policy 1 A Failure of
Communications'» The Reporter. February 23, 1967;
Richard J. Whalen, 'The Shifting Equation of Nuclear
Defence', Fortune. June 1, 1967; pp.85-87, 175-183?
D.G. Brennan and J.J. Hoist, Ballistic Missile Defence:
Two Views. Adelphi Paper, No.43. London* Institute
for Strategic Studies, November 1967; Daniel J. Fink,
•Strategic Warfare*, Science and Technology. October
1968, pp.54-68; Jeremy J. Stone, The Case Against
?<iiaslle Defence. Adelphi Paper No.47, London*
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968; C.F. Barnaby
and A. Boserup, ed.. Implications of Antiballlstlc
Missile Systems. lugwash Monograph II. London:
Souvenir Press, 1969; Donald G. Brennan, The Case for
fissile Defence*, loreign Affairs. XLVII, April
1969? Johan J. Hoist and fcilliam Schneider, Jr.
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Controversy. Sew York: Pergamon Press, 1969?
William Kleiner, ed., Safeguard: Why the ABM Wakes
Sense. Sew York: Hawthorne, 1969? Abram Chayes
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ABE System. Washington: American Enterprise
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Maemillan, 1970, pp.113-1191 Lapp, on. olt.. pp.35-
48] York, op. cit.. pp.188-1991 Bettoae, op. clt.,
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'The Language of the Process" i
Semantics and Linguistics
Despite evidence of some responsiveness in the Soviet-
American strategic relationship, any model of the •arms race*
which describe® the operation of •action-reaction* as an
acutely sensitive process of stimulus followed by directly
counter-balancing or emulative response is compromised by
several factors which clearly obstruct its sharply responsive
functioning. Among the complications impeding the effective
exercise of •action-reaction* is the semantic or linguistic
factor, for although the terminology of both the Soviet and
American strategic communities may appear to be rooted in
•deterrence* - this is net to suppose that the deterrence
necessarily means the gaze thing to both sides. There is,
indeed, a range of semantic-linguistic distinctions which are
important in Soviet usage (and the American usage is constantly
modified and adapted).
East-west strategic understanding is complicated by the
absence of any single word in the Russian language equivalent
to the English verb *to deter*, with of course consequent
difficulty in expressing either 'deterrent* or 'deterrence*,
in a manner which fully comprehends the English definitions.
The problem is not helped by the Soviet use of more than one
Russian word in place of the English * deterrence', each with
its own shade of meaning. While *sdarghivanie' or
Restraining* is widely used in the Soviet Union, at least
as regards Soviet deterrence of imperialist attack, the term
'ustrashenle* or 'intimidation* (with strong overtones of
'terrorising*) offers a far more forceful notion of deterrence,
*ustrasbenle* is understood to be the objective of the
imperialist powers, then the Russians would not likely accept
•being deterred' as a condition of safety or equity. Does
one *deter* or is not *being deterred* an important indicator
of position and stature on the world strategic stage?: The
Soviet preference would appear (for all the inherent distaste
which the Soviet military shows for the deterrent concept at
large) to be for an active *deterring* role as opposed to
•being deterred*.*15^
(15) The widespread usage of the word 'deterrence* in
western discussions of both Soviet and American
strategic doctrines must not lead to any assumption
of simple equivalency or lnterchangeability between
the English and Russian terms used to express the
concept. On the contrary, the semantics, indeed
linguistics of deterrence present formidable
problems. There is no word in Russian which
conveys precisely the same meaning ee the English
word ^deterrence*, meaning *to frighten from', or
•frighten away*, stemming from the Latin *deterrere*.
The nearest Russian equivalent is, perhaps,
♦ustrashenle*. meaning * intimidation*. If
•intimidation' is taken as the essence of American
deterrence, it is unlikely that the USSR would ever
accept •being deterred* as a condition of either
safety or equity. The Russians themselves never
use 'ustrashenie'. with the emotive overtones, to
describe Soviet deterrence. Instead, the Soviet
deterrent effort is labelled as 'sderzhinanlye*.
meaning *restraining', or 'oborona' meaning 'defence*.
Carefully distinguishing between Russian and English
It is not enough to assort 'that the primary objective
of nuclear strategy is to avoid nuclear wars, not to fight
them'.^^ This is the hub of the matter: it cannot be
asserted with real confidence that that is the starting
point of the Soviet view. So to assert or to assume is to
beg the entire question.
terminology is net the pedantic exercise which it
may appear to be but, in fact, reflects fundamental
differences between the Soviet'and American inter¬
pretations of deterrence. For several years the
American version of deterrence has rested upon
little more than the ability of each of the super¬
powers to obliterate the other. In marked contract
the Russian concept is based upon the ability actually
to 'wage' nuclear war, not merely to exchange
equally devastating blows but to launch a powerful
offensive initial blow (possibly even pre-empting),
while also providing for the effective defence -
'oborona* - of the Soviet Union, limiting the degree
of damage inflicted upon the USSR and ensuring the
survival of Soviet society. In a sense, therefore,
deterrence and 'defence' can be co-terminouo in
Soviet usage and certainly this ie net infrequently
the case. The use of the term 'deterrence* in
other European languages includes the French
•dissuasion' and the German 'Abschreokung*, often
translated as 'deterrence', but, as with 'ustrashenle*.
also meaning 'intimidation*. "
(16) Barry Carter, 'Nuclear Strategy and Ruclear Weapons',
Scientific American. May 1974, pp.20-31;
35.
Strategic Doctrinal Declaratory and Operational
The smooth operation of 'action and reaction' has also
been inhibited by disparities between strategic doctrine as
publicly declared and operational doctrine as suggested by
deployments and capabilities. Careful distinction between
declaratory and operational doctrines is necessary as
declaratory doctrine is often intended to achieve objectives
other than the instruction ef commanders. It may be
designed primarily to affect the attitudes and policies of
several foreign and domestic audiences, rather than to reflect
(17)
operational intentions and capabilities. For example,
during the late 1950s and early 1960s Mr. Khrushchev put
forward a declaratory doctrine dramatically at odds with the
USSR's operational capabilities. In an effort to maximise
the potency of Soviet deterrence the Premier boasted of a -
devastating missile-nuclear capability, as well as of a
solution to the problem of missile defence. 'Received'
military doctrine spoke of the conduct of wars of considerable
duration. However, despite these bold assertions, the USSR
(17) On the relationship between declaratory doctrine
and operational doctrine, see George H. Quester,
•On the Identification ©f Real and Pretended
Communist Military Doctrine*, Conflict Resolution,
vol.X, No.24, June 1966, pp.172-179.
was, in fact, attached to a policy of •minimum deterrence*,
and disposed of only a very small quantity of offensive
nuclear armament. In reality, the Soviet Union had
deployed only a 'short-war' capability, apparently accepting
a position of long-term strategic inferiority in offensive
weapons, while failing to develop any effective defence
against ballistic missiles, Further, the forceful Soviet
rejection of American proposals on counterforce targeting
and the concept of limited nuclear warfare during the
Khrushchev period, may well have been determined by more than
the professional military judgement that the American 'rules*
for nuclear warfare were unworkable. It may also have been
inspired by the DSSK*s clear inability to launch a counterforco
strlko with its much inforior force of ICBMs.^18'
A number of disparities between declaratory and operational
doctrine also appear on the American side. There is some
basis for doubting whether the strategy of 'massive
retaliation', although sometimes described as effective against
a wide range of threats, was ever actually regarded as useful
in any but the most desperate circumstances. Indeed, the
entire *new Look' is open to question on a number of points.
(18) Khrushchev's minimal nuclear force levels noted
in Charles J.V., 'Khrushchev's Paper Sear*,
Fortune. December 1964} Cleg Penkovsky, The
Penkovsky Papers. London: Collins, 1965}
Korelick and Rush, op, clti Eolfe, Sovlot Power
and Europe, op. cit.. pp.181-183.
Considering the gradual shift to nuclear power in the final
days of the Truman Administration, the genuine originality
or •newness* of the *Wew Look* in American defence policy is
debatable, as is the strategic rationale publicly offered in
its support by an administration keenly interested in reduced
(19)
defence spending and a balanced national budget. ' In
the latter half of the 1950s, official assertions of a
broad range of military capabilities were questionable in
(20)
the light of existing conventional force levels.%
(19) El ie Abel, ,nFroaw in Pentagon Cool to Sew Look*,
New York Times. January 24, 1954, p.25» James
Reston, *Inde-China Events Stir Test of Row Strategy
in Senate*, Sew York Times. February 15, 1954, p.l$
•Ridgeway Has Reservations on Slash in Army Strength*,
Hew York Times, isarch 16, 1954# p.lj Hanson W. Baldwin,
'Capitol Debate Casts Hew Light an "Now Look"*, Hew
York Times. March 21, 1954, section IV, p.3$
William S. wMte, *DemecratB Brand Hew Look Defence
Unsafe for Nation*, Hew York Times, ^arch 31, 1954, p.l.
(20) Criticisms of American policy questioning
administration assertions of a broad range of
capabilities included HattbwuJRidgway, Soldier.
New Yorks Harper & Bros., 1956$ Osgood, Limited
War, op. cit.i and by the same author, 'Limited
Sar Strategy*, Army. IX, December 1958, pp.53-54$
James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age.
London: Hutchinson, 1959$ Maxwell Taylor,
The Uncertain Trumpet. New Yorks Harper k Bros.,
1959.
The American discussion of the virtues of counterforce
versus eountercity targeting strategies, involving the
formal adoption of one or other posture at various times,
may have reflected significant shifts in the targeting
assignments of US offensive ferces. On the other hand,
these public postures may have involved little more than
official labelling and re-labelling. The US Air Force
and Navy very likely retained a generously mixed targeting
plan regardless of the declaratory targeting vogue of the
moment, defending individual service interests and invest-
(21)
ments in established doctrines and force structures.
(21) Lapp, op. cit.. pp.21-22| Carter, op, clt.. pp.20-23
Doctrinal Requirements
Strategic doctrine, as well as degrading the efficient
performance of •action-reaction* through the effects of its
often conflicting operational and declaratory varieties,
has alse obstructed the exercise of •stimulus and response'
by inspiring the competitors to launch strategic initiatives
in response to the requirements of their own doctrines. In
other words, a decision to deploy or not to deploy a weapons
system may represent e 'reaction* to the demands of a
competitor's own definition of strategic effectiveness. The
massive build-up in the US ICBM arsenal during the early
1960s, a time ef minimal Soviet deployments, can be seen as
primarily a 'response* to the strategic objectives which the
United States had established for itself.^22^ The later
US ban on ballistic missile defence was also related to the
(23')
American commitment to 'stable deterrence'.
(22) Young, op. cit.. pp.172-173.
(23) Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy, pp.275-276.
Uncertainty
Perhaps on® of the most significant impediments to the
effective operation ©f *action-reaction* has been the ever-
present uncertainty of each competitor as to the capabilities
and intentions of the other. Lacking totally reliable
intelligence about the adversary*s existing capabilities -
particularly before the development of reconnaissance
satellites - and assisted by often unreliable forecasts of
future deployments, strategic planners have often been hard
put to fulfil their obligations under the action-reaction
thesis. Rather than deftly shaping doctrine and force
levels to those of the other side, thoy have often been
reduced to planning on the basis of erroneous estimates of
the competitor's future intentions, capabilities and
performance levels. This element of uncertainty has not
only produced unintentional over-reactions or, conversely,
strategic shortfalls through gross predictive errors, but
has also encouraged each side to allow for miscalculations in
its estimates of the other*s future strength through •worst-
case* planning. The 'worst-case* approach has resulted in
the deliberate deployment of forces larger than those
apparently required by the projected capabilities of the other
eld® in an effort to compensate for possible errors in
(24)
prediction.
fhile it is very difficult to acquire conclusive evidence
of Soviet predictive errors, the postwar histbry of American
strategic planning is replete with false prophecies. During
the late 1940s, the United States was distressed by the
Soviet conduct of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests several
years before American analysis had thought it possible for
the USSR to develop nuclear weapons. The United States was
similarly disturbed by the 'premature' Soviet development of
strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(24) On the problem of uncertainty in strategic planning
and the arms race, see A.'#. Marshall and H.W. Mecklicg,
Predictability of the Cost. lime and Success ef
„evelopaent. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation,
P-1821, scomber 1959| Charles J. Hitch and Roland K.
McKean, The Economics of Defence in tho Bucloar Ago.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I960,
pp.188-200; A.W. Marshall, Problem of Estimating
Military Power. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation,
P-3417, August 1966j Rile Orvik, 'The Threats Problems
of Analysis*, International Journal, vol.XXVI, Mo.4,
Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1971;
Colin S. Gray, * "Gap" Prediction and America's Defence:
Arms Race Behaviour in the Eisenhower Years', Orbie.
vol.XVI, fio.l, Spring 1972, pp.257-274} Ted Greenwood,
Reconnaissance. Surveillance and Arms Control. Adelphi
Faper Mo.86, London: Institute for Strategic Studies,
1972} Young, op. clt.. pp.169-172} Moulton, From
Superiority to Parity, op. clt.. pp.14-15, 280-281}
•Technological Change and the Strategic Arms Race* in
William R. Klntner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds.,
SALT. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973, pp.118-
122} Gray, 'Predicting Arms Race Behaviour', op. cit.
Washington also failed to anticipate a major deployment of
missiles of medium and intermediate ranges under
Mr. Khrushchev*a leadership. During the late 1960s,
American projections of Soviet strategic force levels for
the final years of the decade were also shown to be
significantly inaccurate, as was the projected date of the
USSR's first multiple warhead tests.425^
American errors have also included a number of over¬
estimates of Russian capabilities Including predictions of
massive Soviet bomber strength in the mid-1950s and
spiralling IC3K force levels later in the decade.^2^
(25) Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons
Policy, op. oit.. pp.75» 127| Gray, VPredicting
Arms Race Behaviour*, op. clt.. pp.382, 384.
(26) On western reports of Soviet air power in the mid-1950s
and the *bomber gap*, see *Red Air Power*, An Cosantolr.
vol.14, No.3, March 1954, pp.124-128} 'Russia's Long-
range Bombers: Truth or Fiction?*, Intersvia, ho.4,
1954, p.23$» * Long-range Bombing Force*, Interavla.
vol.9, 1954, pp.520-521; *Strategic Bombers in Bast
and West*, Intersvia, vol.9, No.6, 1954. p.519} *Red
Air Force: Our Equal?*, Air Training, vol.4, February
1955, pp.8-11| Bathan F. Twining, 'General Twining
Reports on Rod Airpewer - and Ours*, Air Force, vol.38,
No.5, May 1955, p.33} John W.R. Taylor, *Kow Good is
the Soviet Air Force?*, Air Power, vol.3. No.3, April
1956, pp.171-181} Curtis LoMay, 'Soviet Air Power may
be Capable of Devastating US by 1966*, American Aviation.
vol.20, June 4, 1956, p.14} 'Second Best Air Force is
Now Official*, Air Force, vol.39, June 1956, pp.34-35}
•Soviet Drive for Air Power*, Aeronautics, vol.34,
August 1956, pp.52-53} Nathan F. Twining, 'Report from
Moscow*, Air Force, vol.39, August 1956, pp.60-65;
Richard E. Steckwell, Soviet Air Power. Hew York:
Pageant Press, 1956; Bottome, op, clt.. pp.35-38;
fcoulton, Prom Superiority to Parity, op. clt. pp.17-18,
261; Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy, op. clt.. pp.126-139;
Gray, •Predicting Arras Race Behaviour*, op. cit.. pp.381,
384; Gray, 'The Racing "Syndrome** end the Strategic
Balance*, op. cit.. p.8.
On the 'missile gap', see Charles Murphy, 'The
Commenting in 1967 on American aseeseaents ©f Soviet strength
before the development of reconnaissance satellites, and the
US 'reactions* which they stimulated, President Johnson
observed:
We were doing things we didn't need te
do. We were building things we didn't
need to build. We were harbouring
fears we didn't need to harbour. (27)
Uncertainty as te the Soviet capabilities and intentions,
as well as some degree of doubt as to the performance of
American weapons, has clearly led the United States to 'worst-
case* planning and preparations te meet a 'greater-than-expected-
threat' on many occasions. 3y the late 1960s, conservative
planning assumptions had brought US nuclear forces to levels
far in excess of these demanded by the American theory of
requirements, the doctrine of 'assured destruction'.^8^
White Bouse since Sputnik*, Fortune, lvii, January
1958, pp.96-101; 'Defence: fhe Missile Cap flap',
Time, February 1961, p.l2| 'The Truth about the
Missile Gap*, US hews, and World Report. February 27,
1961, p.41; Stuart Symington, 'Where the Missile Gap
Went', The Reporter. XXVI, February 15, 1962, pp.21-23;
Edgar M. Jottome. The Missile Gap: A Study of the
formulation of Military and Public Policy. Cranbury,
K.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970;
Yorit« ep« cit.. pp.125-146; Setteme, The Balance of
Terror, op. cit.. pp.39-73; Meulton, From Superiority
te Parity, op. cit.. pp.60-68; Queeter, Ivuclear Diplomacy.
op. cit.. pp.145-197; Gray, 'Predicting Arras Race
Behavieur', op. cit., p.382; Gray, 'The Racing "Syndrome"
and the Strategic Balance', op. cit.. p.8.
(27) Rewheuse, op, cit.. p.71.
(28) On the over insurance fer MAD, see Enthoven and
Smith, op. cit.. pp. 178-179; iiewbouse, op. cit..
pp.71-77.
Domestic Pressures and Constraints
In addition to the effects of semantics, and strategic
doctrine, as well as the always considerable margin of
uncertainty involved in defence planning, any eatisfyingly
symmetrical analysis of the 'arms race* as a simple,
externally motivated two-party competition must withstand
the evidence of a host of domestic or non-responsive
influences, pressures and constraints which have affected the
policy of each competitor.
Geography
Any nation's assessment of its strategic requirements must
be influenced by its geographical position. The absence of
any major military threat on tho Korth American continent and
the protection of two oceans permitted the United States to
avoid the maintenance of large armed forces throughout most
of its history. America's geographical location still allows
planners to dismiss the danger of local attack. In contrast,
the Soviet Union, confronted by several major European powers
on her western border, as well as China in the east, must
prepare for local conflicts along frontiers stretching over
thousands of miles. The danger of local conflict has long
encouraged the support of large Russian ground armies and has
recently required preparations to meet air-nuclear attacks
from Europe and Asia*
In such circumstances, Soviet strategic doctrine and force
structure must attend to problems outside the context of the
•superpower* relationship, whether or net American planners
(29)
are always fully aware of this Soviet requirement* ' An
illustration of the constraining effeots of geography and the
danger of local attack on the effective operation of action-
reaction was provided by the massive Soviet deployment of medium
and intermediate range missiles which began during the later
half of the 1950s, a period in which the United States was
attempting to •react* to an anticipated build-up of Soviet
ICBMs which was not to take place for several years.
(29) P.O. Eikscbe, 'Geography and Strategy1 in B.K.
Liddell Hart, «d.. The Soviet Army. Londont
¥, eidenfeld and Nicholson, 1956, pp.242-253|
A.D. Nicholl, •Geography and Strategy* in G.M.
Saunders, od., The Soviet Kavy. London: Vseidenfeld
and Nicholson, 1958, pp.243-259| Jan Kowalewski,
•The Geopolitical Aspects of Soviet Imperialism* in
Ibid.: Garthoff, Soviet military Policy. Now fork:
f.A. Praeger, 1966, pp.98-100.
(30) On the failure of American analysts to anticipate
the Soviet deployment of missiles of less than
intercontinental range, see »©lfe, Soviet lower and
Europe. op. eit.. pp.178-184} York, op. cit.. p.95i
Lee, *The "Folitice-Military-Industrial Complex" of
the USSH*, op. cit.. pp.76-78j Gray, •Predicting
Arms Race Behaviour*, op. cit.. p.384.
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Historical Experience
Both American and Russian strategic planners have been
influenced by historical experience. the United States -
isolated both politically and geographically fer most of its
history - did net roadily accept the permanent maintenance ef
large forces-in-being for detorrent, war-waging or political
purposes.The USSR, on the other hand, after long
involvement in the political and military conflicts of
Europe and Asia, was perhaps better prepared to grasp the
necessity for large forces-la-being and the political
significance of military powor. Russian history also brought
the USSR to the postwar period with dooply ingrained ground
army traditions which firmly established ground forces as the
central feature of strategio planning. These traditions clearly
played some part in retarding the Soviet development of a
deterrence concept based upon nuclear weapons. Further, the
long established position ef the European theatre as the focus
of Soviet concern and interest ill-prepared the USSR for the
exclusive concentration on an intercontinental adversary which was
(32}
required for the fully effective performance ef action-reaction.
(31) Osgood, Limited War. op. cit.. pp.28-44.
(32) On the Soviet Union's European concentration, see
Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, op, cit..
pp.XII-XIV; Wolfe, Soviet Fewer and Europe.
op. cit.. pp.40-42, 110-113, 152-156.
Domestic Polltica
Domestic politics in both countries have also affected
the development of strategic doctrine and deployments,
repeatedly intruding into the 'action-reaction' process*
The 'defence issue1 is written large throughout the record of
modem US presidential campaigns and the ordinary course of
American political life* American Presidents have been
attacked either for their alleged failure to provide 'enough'
for the national defence or for the ruinously wasteful and
pointless accumulation of excessive military power.
Political attacks and electoral pressures upon the Sxecutive
launched from the nation as a whole, as well as the pressures
and Influences emanating from the US Congress in particular,
have affected the character of strategic doctrine, contributed
to the determination of overall levels of defence spending and
deployments, advanced er retarded the cause of Individual
weapons programmes and generally complicated the task of any
strategic planner attempting to react faithfully to Soviet
„ M (33)actions*
(33) On the role of domestic politics and the US Congress
in the development of American defence policy, see
Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword. Ithica, K.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1950; Harris Gordon,
'Wanted: Mere Politics in Defence', Harper*a Vagaslne.
CCXIII, September 1956, pp.50-55; Donald 0. Gums,
"The Bureau of the Budget and Defence Policy', United
States Kaval Institute Proceedings. vol.85, Bo.4,
April 1959", pp.8C-89; Samuel P. Huntington,
'Strategic Planning and the Political Process', Foreign
Affairs, XXXVIII, January I960, pp.285-2991 Edward L.
Katzenbach, 'Subud's Defence Policy', The Reporter.
June 30, 1%0, pp.25-30; Richard E. Deustadt,
Presidential Powert The politics of Leadership.
Few Yerkj Wiley, I960; Warner R. Schilling, 'The
K-Bomb Decision: Hew to Decide Without Actually
Choosing*, Political Science Quarterly. LIXVI, March
1961, pp.24-461 Bernard Garden, 'The Military
Budget: Congressional Phase*, Journal of Politics.
XXIII, Bo.3, August 1961, pp.689-710; Huntington,
The Uncoaron Defence, op. clt.i Raymond H. Dawson,
'Congressional Innovation and the Intervention in
Defence Policy: legislative Authorisation of Weapons
Systems', Ame-ioan Political Science Review. LVI,
No.1, rarch 1962, pp.42-57; Schilling, Hammond and
Snyder, ede.. Strategy. Politics and Defenoe Budgets.
op. cit.t Edward L. Kolodzie^, 'Congressional
Responsibility for the Comiron Defence, the Money
Problem', The Western political Quarterly, vol.XVI,
No.l, &arch 1963, pp.149-160; Aaron Wildavsky,
The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston:
Little Brown, 1964; Kolodziej, The Uncc^on
Defence, op. cit.: Demetrioe Caraley, The Politics
of"Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the
Policy Process. New York: Columbia Univereity
Press, 1966;Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of
Weapons Innovation. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969.
While it is more difficult to examine the role of domestic
politics upon Soviet defence policy, there have been clear
aigne of its influence during the past thirty years. For
example, the cries of strategic alarm sounded by Party
Chairman Khrushchev In the poet-Stalin leadership struggle
were largely inspired by the needs of Khrushchev* s campaign
against Premier Malenkov. After the retirement of
Kalenkov, the views of Mr. Khrushchev on strategic issues
continued to undergo adjustment in apparent sympathy with
( 34.}
his problems within the hierarchy of the Communist Party.*
Bureaucratic Pressures
Some measure of influence over strategic doctrine and
deployments must also be assigned to government bureaucracies
acting in accordance with their objective judgements as to
national need and interest, as well as in conformity with
narrower institutional or departmental interests. 'Bureaucracy•
is admittedly an awkward and ill-fitting term - *establishment*
is a mere fitting description - but the main point to emphasise
ia the internally generated pressure and momentum, which
(34) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Kucloar Ago.
op. cit.t Dlneretoin, War and the Soviet Union.
op. cit.i Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads.
op. clt.t Horellck and Rush. Strategic Power and
Soviet Poreian Policy, op. clt.i Kolkowioz, The
Soviet Army and the Communist Party, op. cit.t
Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. op. clt.
certainly undermines the simplistic notion of %ction-reactien'.
Indeed, there is an autonomy of activity here in which inter-
service and inter-departmental (oven inter-personal)
argument® and dissensions have demonstrably played a
significant role In both the Soviet Union and the United
(vsi
States. The development of the American doctrine of
•assured destruction* was, in part, the eensequence of Defence
Secretary Robert Sicfiaaara's need for some measurement of strategic
requirements with which te reeiet the demands of tho Pentagon
bureaucracy for continuous increases in US feree levels. It
was only with time that this highly utilitarian device emerged
(36)
as one ef the fundamental tenets ef American dectrine.
(35) vserks touching upon bureaucratic influences in the USA
include Timoth;' W. Stanley, American Defence and hatienal
Security. Washington: Public Affsirs Press, 1356j"' ""
Charles J.V. Murphy, 'Defence: The Converging Decisional
How Much for which Weapons for which Services for which
War"*» Fortune. LVI1I, October 1958, pp.H9-120j James
Kurth, 'Corporate and Bureaucratic Imporatlves in American
Weapons Procurement', R. Head and S.J. Eekke, eds.,
American Defence Policy III. Baltireere, Md,: The Jehns
Hopkins Presst Morten H. Halperin, 'The decision te Deploy
tho ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics In the Johnson
Administration', World Politics. XXV, Octaber 1972, pp.62-
95{ Graham T« Allison, 'Questions About the Aiwa Race and
Implications for Strategic Arms Limitation: A Bureaucratic
Perspective', Paper Prepared for the Sixth International
Arms Control Symposium. November 1-4. 1973. Philadelphia.
In the Soviet case, see Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scenei
Institutional and Defence Policy Consideration. Santa Monica,
Cal.i Rand Corporation, Rfc-4913-FB, June 1966| Marshal,
Problems of Estimating Military Power, op. cit.j Kathew P.
Gallagher, Karl F. Spielmann, The Politics of Power: Seviet
Decision-staking for Defence. Institute fer Defence Analyses,
P-774, October 1971.
(36) Ericksen, 'Soviet Military Power', ep. pit.. p.XI.
EconoBdc Objectives and Constraints
Throughout the postwar period economic priorities and
constraints have played a large part in determining the overall
quality and emphasis of defence policy, encouraging a nuclear
emphasis or a conventional bias, assigning an essentially 'war-
waging • or 'war-avoidance* mission, as well as strongly
influencing the quantity or level of forces which each competitor
has chosen to deploy in support of its strategic objectives.
m
The deep commitment of President Eisenhower to budgetary
stability during the 1950s played as great a part in shaping
US strategy as any other single factor, turning the Eisenhower
Administration to nuoloar weapons as the source of both economic
and military security. The later abandonment ef strategic
superiority for a policy of 'sufficiency* was publicly justified
by what was said to bo the unacceptable cest ef indefinitely
( 37}
maintaining American superiority.w '
(37) On the economic factor in the development of American
defence policy, see Jules Menken, The Economics of
Defence. London: Ampersand, 1955; James Tobin,
•Defence, Dollars and Doctrines', Yale Review. XLVII,
Spring 1956, pp.321-334; Murphy, 'Defencej The
Converging Decisions: Mow Much for which Weapons for
which Services fer which Wars?', so. olt.t Hitch and
McXean, Economics and Dsfsnce in the Kucloar Age, op. clt.t
Henry Rewen, National Security and the American Economy in
the 1960s. Study Paper So.18, Study of Employment, Growth
and Price Levels, prepared for the Joint Economic Committee,
86th Congress, 2nd session, January 30, I960; Huntingtsn,
Ths Common Defence, op. olt.t Morton J. Feck and Frederic
K. Scherer, The Weapons innovation Process: An Economic
Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1962; Alain Enthovsn, 'Defence and Disarmament: Economic
Analysis in the Department of Dofenee*, American Economic
Review. LIII, May 1963, pp.413-423; Frederic Scherer, The
Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives. Cambridge,
Mass.:Harvard University press, 1964; Wildavsky, The
Politics of the Budgetary Process, op. cit.i Kolodaiej,
The Uncommon Defence, op. cit.
Similarly, Mr. Khrushchev - committed to an expansion of
the light industrial sector of the Soviet economy - was, in
part, moved to an emphasis on nuclear power and a 'minimum
deterrence* philosophy by the prospect ©f relatively
inexpensive nuclear solutions to the USSR*s security problems.
As the Eisenhower Administration declared that America would be
unable to affort more than * sufficiency* in the future, Khrushchev
was prevented from attempting to acquire the superior capabilities
already asserted in Soviet declaratory doctrine by factors which
included the economic constraints imposed upon Soviet policy.
In place of superiority, the USSR settled for a hind of
•sufficiency*, reconciling the nation's strategic and economic
("58^
interests in a doctrine of 'minimum* nuclear deterrence.
(38) On the economic factor in the USSR, see Nikolai Galay,
•Soviet Economic Re-organisation: The Military
Significance*, Bulletin. Institute for the Study of USSR.
vol.4, Juno 195^, pp.2i-29| 0. Keeffding, 'Strategy and
Economics: A Soviet View', ftorld lolltics, vol.2, January
1959, pp.316-324; Nikolai Galay, *The Burden of Soviet
Military Expenditure*, Bulletin. Institute for the Study
ef USSR, vol.8, March 1961, pp.29-34; Timothy Sosnovy,
•The Soviet Military Budget*, Foreign Affairs, vol.42,
Ko.3, April 1964, pp.488-4941 Abrahan S. Becker, Soviet
Military Outlay since 1955. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand
Corporation, 1964} S. Bartenev, 'Economic Foundations of
Military Might*, Soviet Military Review. September 1966,
pp.3-6; 'Economic Factors in Soviet Military Policy* in
Bloomfield, Clemens and Griffiths, Khrushchev and the
Arms Race, op. clt.. pp.50-58; Garthoff, Soviet Military
Policy, op. eit.. pp.100-106; John P. Hardt, Economic
Insights on Current Soviet Policy and Strategy. Research
Analysis Corporation, Report RAC-R-92, EcLean Virginia,
1969; Stanley H. Cohn, *The Economic Burden of Soviet
Defence Outlayrf, in Economic Performance and the Military
Burden in the Soviet Union. Joint Economic Committee, US
Congress, September 1970; Herbert Block, 'Value and
Burden of Soviet Defence* in Soviet Economic Prospects




The vigorous efforts of American aims industries to
promote the sale of weapons systems have long been noted in
the United States. Their forceful and well financed campaigns
in pursuit of arms contracts and Congressional approval of
weapons programmes, as well as their elese relations with the
armed services, prompted President Eisenhower's often quoted
warning en the dangers of undue military-industrial influence
over the nation*s affaire. The precise role of the arms
industries in the development of American policy at any given
time is a matter for painstaking analysis. However, they have
undoubtedly played a substantial rola in shaping US force
structure since the Second World war, exerting the influence
motivated by commercial interest rather than any concern for
{39}
sensitive reaction to Soviet pelicy. Although the
(39) On the American arms industries and their influence,
see C. Wright Kills, The Causes ef World War III.
Sew York: Simon and Schuster, 19581 and by the same
author. The Pewer Elite. Hew Yorkj Oxford University
Press, 1959} Donald G. Brennan, Arms Control.
Disarmament and Rational Security. Hew York, 1961;
Fred J. Cask, The Warfare State. Hew York: Macraillan,
1962} Irving L. Horowitz, The War Game; Studios ef the
Hew Civilian Militarists. Hew York: Ballontine Books,
1962; Victor Perlo, Militarism and Industry: Arms
Profiteering in the feisalle Ago. Row York: International
Publisher, 19&3} Herman S. Walk, 'Vietnam and the Warfare
State Conplex*, Air Perce Magazine. April 1967, pp.39-43}
Richard J. Barnet, The Eccr-ocsy of Death. Hew York:
Atheneum, 1969} Ralph E. Lapp, The Weapons Culture,
Baltimore, fed.: Penguin, 1969} R.F. Kaufman, The War
Profiteers. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Kerrill, 1970}
Lapp, Arms Beyond, op. cit.i Sidney Lens, The Military-
Industrial Complex. Philadelphia; Pilgrim Press and
influence of the state arsis industries in the Soviet




the National Catholic Reporter, 1970j Seymour Molman,
Pentagon Capitalism; The Political Economy of War.
New York: 1970; Stephen A. Cimbala, 'New Myths and
Old Realities: Defence and its Critics*, World pelltics.
XXIV, October 1971, pp.127-157} Sanferd GDttlieb,
•A State Within a State: What is the Military-Industrial
Complex?*, Dissent. October 1971, pp.492-502; Arnold
Kantner and Stuart J. Thereon, 'The Logic of American
Weapons Procurement; Problems in the Construction and
Evaluation of Policy Theories*, Paper delivered at the
1972 Midwest Regional Peeting of the International
Studies Association and the Peace Research Society.
Toronto, Ontario, May 11-13, 1972; 'The Military
Industrial Complex*, Part II in Stephen E. Ambrose and
James Abden Barber, eds., The Military and American
Society. Hew York: Tho Free Press, 1972, pp.43-120.
(40) Works touching upon tho Soviet arms industries Include
Richard Armstrong, 'Military-Industrial Complex -
Russian Style', fortune. August 1, 1969; John P. Hardt,
Economic Insights on Current ovlet Policy and Strategy.
Research Analysis Corporation, Strategic Studies
Department Report, EAC-R-92, 1969; William T. Lee,
•Soviet Military Industrial Complex*, Armed Services
management. May and April 1970; Andrew Sheren,
•Structure and Organisation of the Defence-Related
Industries' in Economic Performance and the Military
Burden in the Soviet Union, Joint Committee, Congress of
the US, 1970; Konstantin K. Krylev, *Soviet Military-
Industrial Complex*, Military Review. vel.51» Me.11,
November 1971; Raymond Hutchings, Soviet Economic
Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971; f.W. Wolfe,
Soviet Interests in SALT: Political. Economic. Bureaucratic
and Strategic Contributions and Impediments te Arcs
Control. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, p-4702,
1971; Aspaturian, *Ihe Soviet Military-Industrial
Complex - Does it Exist?*, op. cit.t Loo, "The
"Polltico-Military-Industrial Complex" of the USSR*,
op. clt.
Armed Service Pressures
Pressure from the armed services on behalf of increased
defence expenditures, the deployment of nee weapons systems
and the preservation er expansion of their respective strategic
reles, are also involved in the policy-making process in both
tho USA and tho USSR and frequently results in policy decisions
which boar little relation to the actions of any external
competitor. Consistent US Air Force pressure has helped to
sustain an important role for long-range bombers in American
strategy, while Army influence has long been exerted in
support of tho continuing need for large general purpose
forces. During euoh controversies as those over the B-36
bomber and the Thor and Jupiter missiles, the conflicting
views of the armed services were a part of the interservice
competition for strategic nuclear missions, a contest
inspired by the awareness that only a nuclear role
guaranteed a first ranking strategic mission and ready access
to the Federal Treasury.
(41) On the American armed forcee in the policy-tasking
process, see Jerome G. Kerwin, ed», Civil-Military
Relationships in Aaerican life. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1948$ Burton M. Sapin and Richard
C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign
Policy. Garden City, K.Y.: Poubleday, 1954t
William T.R. Pox, 'Civilians, Soldiers and American
Military Policy*, World Politics. VI, April 1955,
pp.402-418j Michael Reward, ed., Soldiers and
Government. London: Eyre and Spettiswoode, 19571
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1957j Walter Millie,
Arms and the State. Kew York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1958$ Michael Howard, *Civil-Military Relatione
in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958*,
Political Science, March 1960$ Morris Janewitz,
The Professional and the State. Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press, 1960$ Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Military
Lobby: Its Impact ©n Cengrese, Satlon*, Congressional
Quarterly Review. March 24, 1961 $ Donald G. Brennan,
Arms Control Disarmament and national Security. Row
York, 1961$ Paul Y. Hammond. Organising for'Defence.
Princeton, B.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961$
Samuel P. Huntington, *Intorservice Competition and
tho Political Helos of the Services* in Harry X.
Celts, ed., Total War and Cold War. Columbus, Ohio:
Ohio University Press, 1962$ Samuel P. Huntington, ed.,
Changing Patterns of Military Politics. How York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962$ Harold Stein, ed.,
American Civil-Military Decisions. Birmingham, Ala.:
University of Alabama Press, 19&3$ Harry Howe Ransous,
Can American Democracy Survive Cold War? How York:
Deubleday, 1964$ John 1. Swemley, Jr., The Military
Establishment. Beaton: Beacon Press, i$64$
Armacest, op. cit.$ John K. Galbraith, Row to Control
the Military. Garden City, K.Y.: Deubleday, 1969$
James A. Penavan, ^illtarlgai PSA. Hew Yerk:
Scrlbner's, 1970$ Martin Oppenheinser, ed.. The
American Military. Transaction Books, 1971$
Adam Yansolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its
Impacts on American Ceclety. Hew Yerk: Harper and
Row, 1971$ Ambrose and Barber, ap. cit.
The opposition of the Soviet armed forces to the
growing emphasis on missile-nuclear systems in Soviet
doctrine under Premier Khrushchev contributed to a
modification in the Premier1s policy* Vocal expressions
of armed service dissatisfaction with Khrushchev*s defence
policies after the succession of the collective leadership
also influenced the direction of planning during the latter
half of the 1960s, and apparently reached a level ef intensity
which required public reassertiens ef the Communist Party*e
(42}
traditional place ef leaderehip in policy making.
(42) On the role ef the Soviet armed forces in the policy¬
making process, see Nikolai Galay* 'Domestic Policy
and tho Soviet Army* in USSR Today and Tomorrow.
Proceedings of the Conference of the Inetituto for
the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR.
Munich, August 15-17, 1953, pp«49-56; 'The Boria
Affair of tho Army*, Bulletin. Institute for the
Study ef USSR. March 1954, pp.35-36i *?he Army and
the Supreme Soviet*, Bulletin. Institute for the
Study of the USSR, vol.1, April 1954, pp.23-26;
Andre Pierre, *The Army and tho Party in the Soviet
Union*, Military Review, vol.35, September 1955,
pp.92-97; William R, Kintner, *fhe Military as an
Element ef Soviet State Power*, US Naval Institute
Proceedings, vol.61, July 1955, pp.771-763|
Nikolai Galay, The Role ef the Military in Pest-
otali.n Soviet i clitics. Santa Monica, Cal. :
Rand Corporation, 1956; and by the same author,
Tho Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics.
Santa Monica, Cal.j Rand Corporation, 1956;
R.L. Cartheff, 'The Role ef the Military in Recent
Soviet Politics*, Russian Review, vol.14, April 1957,
pp.15-25| Nikolai Galay, *Tha Role of the Seviet Army
in the Crisis ef the Collective Leadership*, Bulletin.
Institute for the Study ef USSR. August 1957, pp.13-20;
Harry Schwarts, 'World-wide Question} Zhukov*s Role*,
Row fork Times Magazine. October 6, 1957, pp.16-20;
Louis Fischer, *The Fatal Mistake of Marshal Zhukov*,
Haw Leader. February 10, 1958, pp.3-7?
John Srickson, 'Zhuksv, Khrushchev and the Rod
Army1, Marina Carps Gazette, val.42, liovember 1956,
pp.48-51? Leon Geure, The polltloal Pssltion of the
Soviet Army since Stalin. Santa Monica, Gal.; Rand
Csrpsratisn, 1958? 'Russia's Zhuksv, the General
who Saved Khrushchev's Job*, US Hews and World Report.
July 19, 1959, pp.42-44? Nikolai Oalay, 'The
Influence of Military Factors on Soviet Foreign Policy*,
Bulletin. Institute for the Study of USSR. September
1959» pp.34-37? Hans-Jurgen Eitner, 'Soviet Marshals
and The Khrushchev', Military 'Review, vol.40, April
I960, pp.101-108? Nikolai Galay, 'The Soviet Army
and Domestic Policy', Bulletin. Institute for the
Study of USSR. October I960, pp.3-15? R.L. Garthoff,
•The Marshals and the Party» Soviet Civil-Military
Relations in the postwar Period' in Harry L. Coles, ed..
Total War and Cold War. Columbus, Ohioi Ohio State
University Prere, 1962, pp.241-266? John Erickson,
•The "Military Factor" in Soviet policy', International
Affairs, vol.39, April 1963, pp.214-226? Roman
Kelkewlcs, Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations:
1962-1963. Santa Monica, Gal.* Rand Corporation, 1963?
T.W. Wolfe, Role of the Military in Decision Making and
Soviet Politics. Santa Monica, Cal.i Rand Corporation,
1963? V.P. Artemiev, 'The Communist Party and the
Sevlet Armed Ferces', Military Review, vol.44, February
1964, pp.29-37? Ernst Kux, *Tbs Hsd Army and Khrushchev',
Swiss Review of World Affairs, vol.14, July 1964, pp.11-
13? T.W. Wolfs, Signs sf Stress in Sevlet Volltical-
Military Relations. Santa Monica, Cal.i Rand Corporation,
1964? and by tho earns author, Some Keeent Signs of
Reaction Against the Prevailing Soviet Doctrinal Emphasis
on Missiles. Santa Monies, CalVV Rand Corporation, 1964?
Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, op, oit.i Kenneth R.
Whiting, 'The Debate between Khrushchev and His Marshals',
Air University Quarterly Review, vol.16, karch-April, 1965,
pp.68-79? R.L. Garthoff, 'Khrushchev and the Military*
in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. feestin, politics in the
Soviet Uniont 7 Cases. New York: Harcsurt Braes, 1966?
Kolkswica, Soviet Party military Relations: Contained
Conflict. Santa Monica, Cal.j Rand Corporation, 1966?
Xoikowica, Tho Soviet Army and tho Communist party, op. cit
Garthoff, 'Military Power in Soviet Policy* in Eriekeon, ed
The Mllltary-Teohnical Revolution, op. cit.? Kolkewics,
The Dilemma of Superpower? Soviet Policy and Strategy in
Transition, op. cit.? Gehlen, op. cit.? Wolfe, 'Are the
Generalo Taking Over?', Problems of Communism. July-
October 1969, pp.106-110? V.V. Aspaturian, Process and
Power in Soviet Foreign Policy. Boston: Little Brown,
1971? Kolkewicz, 'Strategic Parity and Beyond', op. cit.:
Malcolm Mackintosh, 'The Soviet Military: Influence on




Strategic doctrine and deployments have alee boon
greatly effected by the almost self-generating momentum of
technological development. New Weapons and refinements of
existing systems have been deployed for which there was no
critical need within the context of action-reaction either
at the time of their original conception or subsequent birth,
but which were nevertheless technologically feasible and were,
therefore, eventually accommodated within strategic doctrine.
The effect ef technology has been increased by military
•spin-off* from civilian research projects which has resulted
in the almost unwitting development ef new capabilities*
The multiple warhead is perhaps an example ef a refinement
which was the nearly inevitable and to some degree
unintentional consequence ef both military and non-military
r..«.rch.<«>
Further, any judgement as te the motives behind a 'major
weapons deployment is complicated by the considerable length
ef the weapons design, testing production and deployment cycle*
With the entire gestation period extending over several years,
design and deployment decisions are frequently made under very
(43) The Origins of MIHV. SIPRI Research Report lie.9,
August 1973; Herbert York, H'ultiple Warhead
Missiles*, Scientific American, vol.229, Ho.5,
November 1973, pp.16-27| Bowhouso, op. clt..
pp.28-31.
different International and domestic circumstances* The
progress of any given system through the full series of
developmental stages ia therefore affected by a centinueusly
f*r -• r-
changing mix of influences and pressures* In such
circumstances it is clearly injudicious to assume at the
time of a major deployment by either competitor that the
now system can bo entirely - or oven largely - credited to
the immediately contemporary actions and policies of the
other.
(44) On the role of technology in tho Soviet-American
strategic competition, see United States Foreign
Policyt Developments in Military Technology and
their Impact en US Strategy and Foreign Policy*
Washington Centre of Foreign Policy Research,
Prepared for the Committee en Foreign Relations,
US Senate 86th Congress, 2nd session, 1959;
Sir Charles P. Snow, Science and Government.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I960;
Hedley Bull* 'The problem of Continuous Innovation*
in tha Control of the Arms Race. Londoni
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961, pp.195-201j
Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb.
Few Yorkj Dell, 1962} Klaus Knerr and Oskar
Morgenstern, Science and Defence} Seme Critical
Thoughts en Military Research. Policy Memorandum
No.32, Princeton, Centre of International Studies,
1965} David W. Tarr, 'Military Technology and th#
Policy Process*, The Western Political Quarterly.
XVII, March 1965, pp.135-148; Brlckoen. edg, The
Military-Technical Revolution, op. eit.; Sir Solly
Zuckerman. Scientists and War. Londont Haraish
Hamilton, 1966; Harold Brown, *The Military
Planner*s Challengei Reconciling Technology with
Policy*, Air Farce Magazine« March 1967, pp.59-72;
Albert Wotalstetter, The Implications of Military
Technology In the 1970s. Adelphi No.46, London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
March 1968; Herbert York, •Military-Technology
and National Security*, Scientific American,
eel.221, No.2, August 1969, pp.17-29j
York, Race to Oblivion, op. cit.: B.T. Fold,
T. Greenwood, G.I. Rathjens and S. Weinberg, ede..
Impact of New Technologies en the Arsis Race.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971; Trevor
Cliffe, Military Technology and the Surepean Balance.
Adelphi Paper Ho.89, London: Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1972| George S. Brown, *Technologys
The Mould for Future Strategy* in US Strategic Review.
Spring 1973I *Technological Change and the Strategic
Arms Pace', in Kintner and Pffc/tsgrflff, SALT, op. clt..
pp.1C7-124| G.I. Pokrovakli, Science and Technology
in Contemporary War. New York: F.A. i raeger;
Roman Kelkowicz, The Impact of Technology on the
Soviet Military; A Challenge to Transitional Military
Professionalism. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand
Corporation, RM-4198-PR, Auguet 1964; Alexander G.
Kerol, Soviet Research and Development. Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964; Banjanim S. Lambeth,
The argument for Superiority; A New Voice in the
Soviet Strategic Debate. Institute for Defence
Analysis, N-419 R, January 1967; The Soviet Military
Technological Challenge. Washington: The Centre
for Strategic Studies, Special Report, series Ho.6,
September 1967; Robert Adamson, 'Mobilising Soviet
Science*, Scientific Research. v®1.3, Ho.2, January 22,
1968, pp.25-34; Barry and Davis Aman, 'Science and
Industry in the USSR* in Scionoe Policy In the USSR.
Paris; OECD, 1969; Michael Boretsky, 'The Technological
Base of Soviet Military Fewer* in Economic Performance
and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union, op. cit.:
Kolkowica, *Strategic Elites and Politics of Super
Power', op, cit.
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Third Party Conflicts and Alliance Commitments
The status of the •action-reaction* process as the
author of Soviet and American doctrines and the architect of
their force structures is also compromised by each
competitors preparations for conflicts outside the super¬
power context. As already noted, Soviet strategic planning
must allow for the possibility of local conflicts, taking
particular care to meet the danger ef a large-scale Chinese
aosault. American strategic planning has also been concerned
with the possibility of a Chinese attack, as well as with the
security of a long list of alliance partners in Asia, latin
America and ether regions outside the traditional areas of
(45)
direct Soviet-American confrontation.
(45) On American concern for conflicts outside the super¬
power context, see Henry A. Kissinger, *Kllitary
Policy and Defence of the "Gray Areas" *, Foreign
Affairs. XXXIII, K©.3, April 1955, pp.416-428*
John C. Campbell, Defence of the Kiddle East*
Problems of American Policy. New Yorks Harper
and Bros., 1958; A. Deak Barnot, Communist China
and Asia, Challenge to American Policy. New York*
Harper and Bros., I960; Princeten Hathan Lyman,
Alliances and the Defence ef loutheast Asia; A Study
of rtKi'e'rican" Policy in .Southeast Asia.' 1950-196C.
unpublished doctrinal dissertation. Harvard University,
feay 1961; Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for
Choice* Prospects ef American Foreign Policy.
Hew York* Harper and Bros., 1961; Ames A. Jordan,
Foreign Aid and the Defence ef Southeast Asia.
Hew York* Praeger, 1962; J.I. Coffey, *The Chinese
and Ballistic Missile Defence*, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, vol.10, Ke.2, December 1965|
Alaetair Buchan, ed.t China and the Peace ef Asia.
Sew ferki P.A. Fraeger, 1965} D.E. Kennedy,
the Security of Southern Asia. Sew York}
P.A. Praeger, 1965} Impact of Chinese Communist
liucieur I repress on US?"Rational Security. Report
©f Joint Committee of Atomic Energy, July 1967}
Alice L. Hoieh, Communist China*s »,1litary Policies.
Doctrine and Strategy. Santa Vonlca. Cai'.t
Rand Corporation, 1968} Harry G. Gelber, 'China
and SALT*, Survival. XII, So.4, April 1970}
Alice L. Belch, China's Duelear Strategy and a US
Anti-Chineso ABM, statement before the Sub-committee
en Arms Control, International Law and Organisation
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 9,
1970.
On the Soviet Union and China, seo Donald Zogoria,
The Slno-Seviot Conflict. Princeton, K.J.»
Princeton University Press. 1962; Malcolm Mackintosh,
*Tho Military Aepeate of the Sine-Soviet Dispute*,
3ulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.21, October
1965, pp.14-18} R.L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviot
Military Relations. Hew Ysrkj P.A. Praeger, 1966}
Malcolm Mackintosh, 'Implications of Sino-Soviet
Dispute*, in Srickson, ed., The Military-Technical
Revelutien. op. cit., pp.258-270} Walter C. Clemens, J
The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations. Stanford,
Cal.j The Hoover Institution Publications, 1968.
Academic Analysts
Sc.ne degree of i fluence ever the development ef American
strategy and the evolution ef strategic ideas in the United
States should, perhaps, be credited to academic analysts at
work in universities and private research organisations.
Throughout the postwar period, American and Soviet defence
policies have been subjected t© centinuous analysis and
criticism from these quarters. Seme ef the resulting
conclusions and recommendations have rested upen detailed
examination of Soviet capabilities, while ethers have been
based upen rarefied theorising about the nature ef nuclear
S \ \ /Jg\
deterrence or the conduct ef a future conflict.
(46) John McDonald, •The War ef Wits*, Fortune, vol.43,
March 1951, pp.99 ff; laarie Janowitz, •Military
Elites and tho Study of Journal of Conflict
Resolutien. vol.1, March 1957, pp.37-43; Joseph
Kraft, 'Hands Areenal for Ideas', Harper's Magazine,
CCXxI, July I960, pp.69-74; Edward L. Katzonbaeh,
•Iaeas: A Now Defence Industry1, The Reporter. March 2,
1961, pp.17-21; Gene M. Lyons, 'The Now Civil-Military
Relations1, American Political Science Review. March
1961; Gilpin, op. clt.: Arthur Horzeg, •Report on a
Think Factory1, Tho Row York Tiaea Fagazino. ho.10,
1963, pp.30 ff; General Thomas D. White, •Strategy and
tho Defence Intellectuals1, Saturday Evening Test. May 4,
1964, pp.10-12; „ Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, ode.,
Scientists and Rational Policy-Making. Kew York: Columbia
University Press, 1964; Bernard Brodie, 'The Scientific
Strategists* in Ibid.: Wesley W. Fesvar, fThe Impact of
Strategy Expertise on National Security Policy* in Public
Policy: Yearbook of the Harvard Graduate School of Public
Administration. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1964; Albert WMhlstetter, •Strategy and the
??atural Scientists' in Gilpin and Wright, »p. cit. pp.174-
239; Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy.
Kew York: F.A. Praeger, 1965; Bruce L.R. Smith, The
Rand Corporation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1966; Hedley Bull, •Strategic Studies and its
Critics1, World Politics. July 1968; Kelkewlcz, *Strat#gic
Elites and Politics ef Superpower', op. cit.
Marxist Ideology
Finally, the principles of Marxists-Leninism must be neted
as an influence en Soviet perceptions and policy. In the
final years of the Stalin period, the 'unique* insight
afforded by Marxist analysis allegedly favoured the USSR with
the only truly scientific appreciation of warfare, and provided
a guarantee of victory in any future conflict. Marxist
ideology may have, in fact, contributed te the Soviet
perception of tho United States as an adversary and may also
have encouraged the United States to regard the USSR as
intrinsically hostile. After the death ef Stalin, the dictum
on the inevitability of war between capitalist and communist
states was clearly one ef the obstacles which had t© be ever-
come before a strategy of deterrence could be publicly adopted.
(47) R.L. Garthoff, 'ideological Conceptions in Soviet
Foreign Policy*, Problems of Communists. vol.2. No.5,
1953, pp.1-8i Nikolai Galay, 'Influence of tha
Bolshevik Revolution and the Social Doctrine of the
USSR on Sedern Warfare•, Bulletin. Institute for the
Study ef USSR. March 1954, pp.20-28; and by the same
author, *Revisionism, Dogmatism and the Soviet Armed
Forces*, Bulletin, Institute for the Study ef USSR.
November 1958, pp.3-12; James D. Atkinson, *The Impact
of Soviet Theory on Warfare as a Continuation of Politics*,
Military Affairs, vol.24, Ko.l, Spring I960, pp.1-6;
N. Sushke, 'Marxism-Leninism on Warfare and the Army*,
Soviet Military Translation 272. Joint Publications
Research Service 35771/, vol.4, No.11, July 1965-Juno 1966;
Questor, *0n the Identification of Real and Protended
Communist Doctrine*, op. cit.i Ye. Kikitin, 'Lenin and
Soviet Military Science*, Soviet Military Review. No.4,
Summer 1972; Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Sources ef Soviet
Military Doctrine*, Conference on Comparative Defence
Policy. Department of Political Science, USA? Academy,
Colorado, 7-9 February 1973«
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Competitive processes ; Direct Reactions
Far fress confirming the central role of 'action-reaction'
or any other single process as the driving force ef the 'arms
race', postwar history and the wealth ef influences, pressures
and constraints acting upon each competitor reveals several
different processes by which policy has bsan dsvsleped and
individual weapons decisions determined. Among these is
the action-reaction process in all sf its classical
simplicity. The record sf the Soviet-American strategic
relationship includes examples of direct reactions by each
competitor te the actions ef the ether, producing closely
linked emulative or directly counterbalancing responses.
Improvements in Soviet air defence during the 1950s - a period
in which the United States was moving te a heavy reliance upon
its air-nuclear strike capability - can be reasonably identified
as a clear Soviet reaction to American actions. ' The
reversal ef United States pslioy en ballistic missile defence
in the late 1960s can also be fairly assessed ae an American
reaction to Soviet defensive and offensive deployments.
Hewever, such instances of direct reaction are uncommon events
in the history of the 'arms race' and have usually involved
specific technological developments rather than broader strategic
or doctrinal issues.
(48) Lee, The Soviet Air Force, eg. clt.. pp.109-125;
Wolfe, Soviet Powers and Europe, op. cit.. pp.184-186.
(49) Young, op. cit.. p.194, fn.51.
67
Delayed Reactions : Tlme-Lag Reconsidered
The hirtery of the 'arras race* has also recorded examples
of what might be termed 'delayed* reactions, instances in which
a competitor has chosen to adopt a policy which may net have
appeared to have been a direct reaction to the current policy
of its adversary, but which may have been an emulative
response by ene side to an earlier strategic posture of the
ether, a posture which its eriginator may have already
abandoned. The Stalinist 'freeze' en strategic thought and
the resulting 'time lag' between Soviet and American dectrines
may well have rendered Seviet doctrine especially prene te
such 'delayed reactions'. The development of a Seviet
nuclear strategy and the eventual emergence ef 'deterrence*
in the USSR after the death ef Stalin might be breadly
considered a Seviet emulation ef, or 'delayed' reaction te,
developments in US technology and doctrine. It is alee
arguable that the Seviet version ef a 'Row Leek' - essentially
'massive retaliation* posture - in the late 1950s, marked an
Imitative response te the earlier Eisenhower policy in a time
when American planners were having serious doubts about the
efficiency of the 'Sew Look - Massive Retaliation' strategy.
The later Soviet interest in a 'war-waging* capability and a
kind of 'flexible response* might alee be explained as a
•delayed* reactien to the prior American interest in these
concepts, again at a time when the United States was departing
from its 'war-waging' doctrine.
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Reactions Shaped by Internal Factors
Many modifications in th« strategy and force structure
ef each competitor have been achieved which, while fundamentally
stimulated by the actions ef the ether, produced responses ef
a hind determined largely by internal or otherwise non-responsive
factors. For example, the American perception ef a major
Soviet conventional threat prompted the Elsenhower Administration
to modify the heavy strategic nuclear emphasis ef the early
♦Kew Leek* doctrine. However, the stimulus for doctrinal
revision provided by the USSR*s ground strength, tied to her
growing nuclear capability, did net move the United States to a
build-up in its conventisnal forces en the Soviet model. As a
consequence ef several internal factors - chiefly the economic
or budgetary principles of the Eisenhower Administration - the
United States chose to ♦respond* to the alleged Soviet advantage
in conventional forces by placing greater stress on its growing
arsenal ef tactical nuclear weapons.
In the Soviet case, the major strategic threat posed by
the United States Ravy stimulated a large scale expansion
in the capabilities and operational sphere of the USSR's naval
forces during the 1960s. However, for a number of reasons
(50) Huntington, The Common Defence, op. oit..
pp.105-106.
unrelated te the actions of the United States, the USSR
did net choee te respond te the US seaborne challenge by
producing a •balanced* ocean-going havy of the American
type* The Soviet Union instead 'reacted* by producing a
fleet which emphasised relatively light surface vessels
and which continued to roflect a long-established bias
(51)
in favour of subsurface forces*
(51) Wolfe, *Soviet Naval Interaction with the United
States and its Influence on Soviet Naval
Developments*, op. clt*. pp.215-245#
Independent Initiatives
3syond the generative powers ef external stimuli, peliclea
and weapons systems have also originated from internal sources
and only later received additional impetus from the actions of
a competitor. Fer example, the origins of American multiple
warhead research can he traced to the requirements sf the
ceunterforee bias in US doctrine, as well as to the almost
self-propelling advance sf technology. Howovor, at tho time
of thoir doploymont in tho 1960a, the Soviet acquisition of an
ABSt capability provided an important responsive justification
(52)
for the multiple warhead programme.
Finally, both the United States and the Soviet Union havo
adhered to doctrines or approved weapons initiatives which
stemmed almost entirely from internal sources, with little or
no responsibility attaching to any external influence for their
development.* The breath-taking expansion ef American nuclear
forces during the early 1960s, largely represented an American
•reaction* to the requirements of its own newly elaborated
doctrine. The state of Soviet doctrine in the first few years
after the Second World War, rigidly •fromon* in its wartime
form, was essentially the product of domestic political factors.
As long as Stalin remained in power, it was entirely impossible to
suggest any modification or re-examination of the doctrine which
(53)
established bis personal reputation fer strategic genius.w '
(52) The Origins of KIRV. op. clt.. p.20.
(53) Dinerstoln, War and the Soviet Union, op. cit., pp.5-7.
* In the absence ef any newly perceived •threat*, strategic
doctrine and deployments have been decisively shaped at
various points by the domestic factors involved in policy¬
making, as well as by a desire to acquire greater diplomatic
leverage and international prestige through increased
military power.
Mlxsd Motive
H?hil© it is perhaps useful far purposes of discussion
to identify each of the several processes by which individual
policies and programmes have emerged and developed, it is
very often impossible to label a major strategic development
as solely the product of external er internal stimuli* The
emergence ef the 'Massive Assured Destruction* doctrine (MAD)
in the United States was clearly encouraged by the extensive
build-up in strategic armaments approved by Mr* Brezhnev*
nevertheless, the development of MAD was also prompted by tho
planning and domestic bargaining problems of the Secretary of
Defence* Tho long-held American opposition to missile dsfsnce
was suppsrtsd by ths conviction that tho Seviot Union had grown
too powerful for any defence to be effective* However, it was
also prompted by ths strong suspicion that the system under
development simply would not work and, in any case, would
{54.}
prove unacceptably expensive. '
(54) Jules Bergman, 'If Zeus Fails, Can Sprint Save
Us?*, Haw York Times* March 20, 1966, sect.IV,
p.26j Benjamin Welles, *Senate panel Adds Anti¬
missile Funds', Hew York Times. April 22, 1966,
p.lj Hanson W. Baldwin, *0n Missiles and Defences*,
ffsw York Times. November 27, 1966, sect.IV, p.3.
Similarly, tht Soviet move to 'minimum deterrence*
under Mr. Khrushchev was apparently based upon the belief
that even a email number of ICBSs targeted en US cities
would suffice to deter America from aggression. lieverthe-
less, 'minimum deterrence' was also recommended by the
technological and economic limitation imposed upon Soviet
policy, making the achievement of genuine superiority or
even parity - whether er net it was thought desirable - a
(55}
very difficult undertaking. '
In short, the origins and development of a great many
Soviet and American policies and programmes can be explained
only in terms of a mixture ef motives and influences, with
the exact blend ef factors Involved in the adoption ef any
single doctrine or the deployment ef any single weapons
system very difficult, indeed often impossible to determine
precisely.
(55) Bleomfield, Clemens and Griffiths, op. cit..
pp.106-115.
The Chemistry of Competition
A consideration of these factors which have obstructed
the effective exercise of •action-reaction*, the numerous
internal or otherwise non-responsive influences, pressures
and constraints which havs affsctod the formulation of
defence policy and the various competitive processes through
which strategic doctrines and weapons programmes have been
developed, clearly establishes that any analysis sf the post¬
war arms competition which describes the contest as a two-
party •racs1 powsred by *actisn-reaetien*, grossly over¬
simplifies the nature ef strategic competition.
Tho Soviet Union and the United States were indeed
placed in a broadly responsive relationship by an initial
adversary perception following tho Socond World War, a
perception which eventually prompted each country te maintain
high levels of military power primarily, although net
exclusively, intended to resist attack: from the ether.
With the advance of modern weapons technology, policies
designed merely t© provide for resistance against attack
evolved inte mere sophisticated strategies of 'nuclear
deterrence*. This gradual evolution took place first in
the United States te be followed by a similar dsvslspment in
the Soviet Unien. The original Soviet American adversary
perception and the * time-lag' separating the emergence ef
deterrence in the two countries, may well have built reaction
into tho foundations of the Seviet-Americar. strategic
relationship. Since the time of these fundamental
developments, a number of specific strategic initiatives
undertaken by each side have, in fact, stimulated reactions
from the ether. Today, •action-reaction* continues to
provide the military-political backdrop against which policy
ie made. However, with that much conceded to the role of
•action-reaction*, no mere can bo granted.
For more than thirty years tho original Soviet and
American adversary or •throat* perceptions, re-confirmed by
the political and military events of the Cold War, have boon
filtered through a complex membrane of domestic or non-
responsive influences, ultimately producing strategic
doctrines and force structures of a strongly natiensl
character. Geography has set the strategic scene differently
for each competitor. History has establishsd deeply ingrained
military traditions. Domestic political circumstances and
the personal ambitions, Judgements and fortunes of individual
political leaders have advanced the development of some policies
and programmes and retarded or terminated tho progress ef ethers.
Economic policy has nourished these doctrines and deployments
compatible with its objectives and constrained these which
violated its principles er exceeded its means. Technology has
encouraged or compelled various changes in force structure and
strategy| and industrial lobbies, armed services and government
bureaucracies hare each exerted influences which betrayed
only a vague awareness of the actions of an external
competitor*
The effectiveness ef the "action-reaction' process has
been further decreased by several factors which have clouded
each competitor's insight into the actions of the other,
making any sensitively precise performance of 'action-reaction*
difficult or impossible to execute* These obscuring factors
have included differing grades or qualities of strategic
doctrine (declaratory and operational) which have complicated
efforts to determine the nature of a competitor's strategic
intentions and objectives* The influence of each contestant's
strategic doctrine upon its own actions has also seriously
de-sensitised the 'action-reaction' process, producing policies
and deployments unrelated to those of the adversary* Sharp
disparities in the 'language of the competitive process* havo
also hindered the aecurate perception ef a competitor's actions
and the very considerable margin of uncertainty en each side
as to the future intentions and capabilities ef the ether, has
sften ensured the failure ef even the most conscientious
attempts at faithful reaction*
The assumption of basically responsive postures by both
the United States and the Soviet Union seen after the Second
World War and a number of instances of direct action and
reaction since that time, have led to the characterisation ef
the Seviet-American strategic relationship as an 'arms raco'
fuelled by the 'action-reaction' process. While the postwar
arms competition can be termed a 'race' in the broadest sense,
the overall development of each contestant*s strategic doctrine
and the overwhelming number of each cosepetiter's individual
policy decisions have not flowed directly from the actions of
the other. They have, in fact, emerged from the interplay
ef a wide range ef Influences and pressures of which reaction
to external stimuli was only ono.
The great complexity of strategic competition clearly
demands a more pertinent metaphor than that ef a simple two-
party 'arms race *. The development of the Soviet-American
strategic relationship might better be described as the product
of a highly complex 'chemical process* which had as its catalyst
the early postwar perception of each competitor as an adversary
by the other. Since the late 1940s, this catalyst of
competition has Initiated the development of strategic
doctrines and force structures in two very dissimilar domestic
environments, yielding two distinctly different strategic
compounds, or policy precipates, which have consistently
retained their respective elements and properties while
continuing some degree of interaction.
PART I




The Early Post-¥»ar Period in The United States
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Early Post-War Strategic Doctrine
In 1793 George Washington issued a warning to the American
people saying:
There is a rank due to the United States among
nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely
lost by the reputation of weakness - if we
desire to avoid insult we must be ready to repel
it; if we desire to secure peace it must be
known that we are at all times ready for war. (1)
Despite Washington's warning, American history provides little
evidence of popular support for remaining 'at all times ready for
war' or for any strategy designed to provide security and political
(2)
influence through the permanent maintenance of large armed forces.
Following a well established tradition, US armed forces were permitted
to deteriorate dramatically after the close of the Second World War.
Defence planning in the immediate post-war period remained centred
around a mobilisation strategy chiefly concerned with the effective
wartime exploitation of the nation's military and economic assets
and the maintenance of high civilian morale. The Unite- States was
still said to enjoy important advantages in its command oi a vast
industrial mobilisation base and a large pool of reserve manpower
which was to be supplied by a proposed programme for Universal
(3)
military Training.
(1) C. Joseph 3ernarao and Eugene H. Bacon, American military
Policy. Harrisburg Penn. : Military Science Publishing
Co., 1955, p.440.
(2) The traditional American difficulty in associating military
power ana political objectives is touched upon in Gordon B.
Turner, 'Classic and modern Strategic Concepts* in Gordon B.
Turner and Richard D. Challener, eds., Rational Security in
the Nuclear Age. Kew York: F.A. Praeger, I960; and John
Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II.
Kew York: F.A. Pra ger, 1965.
(3) Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence. Kew York: Columbia
University Press, 1961, p.47. Also on Universal Military 'Training,
see John ?». Swomley, Jn., The Military Establishment.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. " ~~
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The Mobilisation Concept
Army officers in particular often represented traditional
strategic views in the early post-war years. The Army recognised the
need for little more than a higher order of preparedness. Its
strategic model essentially amounted to a replay of the World War 11
mobilisation with some improvements.^^ General Eisenhower
described preparedness ass
A state of organised readiness to meet external
aggression by a timely mobilisation of public
opinion, trained men, proved weapons and
essential industries together with the unmatched
spiritual sources of America .... (5)
In 1948.the Army Chief of Staff spoke of war as requiring
*a mobilisation' of all the country's resources 'industrial,
agricultural and financial'.The continuing influence of the
mobilisation concept in American strategic thought took effect
immediately after the Second World War in a programme of rapid
(7)
demobilisation planned before the defeat of the Axis. As only
war was thought to warrant the support of large armies, the eventual
( 0)
achievement of peace required their dissolution. One month after
the war, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee estimated that 'a year
or more would be required to reconstitute our military posture at a
(9)
fraction of its recent power'.
(4) Huntington, op. cit.. p.45.
(5) ibid.
(6) Ibid., p.46.
(7) I.E. Bottome in The Balance of Terror. Boston: Beacon fress,
1971, pp.1-6, argues a somewhat 'revisionist' view that the
significance of the demobilisation has been exaggerated, as the
United States rapidly developed as a major atomic power,
posing a serious threat to the USSR.
(8) Huntington, op. cit.. p.35*
(9) Ibid.. p.36.
BO.
The strategic views oi the United States Congiess closely
resembled those of many military men in their still traditional
quality. Many Congressmen shared the opinion of representative
Albert Engel of the House Sub-Committee on War Department
Appropriations, whose primary concern was the reduction of defence
spending, rather than any co:tly departure from the mobilisation
concept. In the event of an emergency, Lr. Dngel explained/
'... Congress will be in session in ample time to make provision
e , <10)therefore'.
Early Attitude to Atomic Weapons
With the dramatic reduction in American force levels, a
gradually expanding US arsenal of atomic weapons constituted the
only major post-war addition to the nation's military strength.
However, the attitu e of many in the armed services to the new weapons
initially bore no mark of great enthusiasm or interest. Atomic
power was certainly not regarded as the basis for transforming modern
strategic thought. Indeed, many commanders retained greater confidence
in the value of proven weapons than in the latest technological
(11)innovations. The atomic bomb was not recommended by its lengthy
(12)
and expensive production process v 'or the allegedly short
supply of uranium, the meagre stock of operational atomic weapons
available -to*" the armed forces and the still significant problem of
delivering the bombs to target. Tor all of these reasons durin& the
(10) Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defence and Congress.
1945-1963. Ohio State Press, 1966, pp.83-64.
(11) Urs Schwarz, American Strategy; A Hew Perspective.
Garden City; New York: Doubleday, 1966.
(12) fcichael Howard, ed., The Theory and Practice of War.
London: Cassell ac Co., 1965. p.201.
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very early post-war period atomic weapons were regarded as little
more than a much improved explosive to be set within the traditional
(13)
form of American strategy.
'Containment'
Foreign Policy v Defence rolicy
In contrast to the largely unchanging nature of American military
strategy in the first few years after the war, the nation's foreign
policy rapidly adjusted to the steady deterioration in east-west
relations which was to give birth "to the 'Cold War'.^^ Y.ashington's
political response to the end of Allied unity came in an effort to
restrict the limits of Soviet power through a foreign policy of
(13)
♦Containment'. While containment marked an American reaction
to the new international environment, any effective effort to resist
a Soviet military move against the west, or to constrain Soviet actions
generally, required substantial military backing of a kind which clearly
was not being provided. The US foreign and defence policies stood in
sharp conflict, with the latter remaining fixed in a traditional form,
incapable of supporting the country's international objectives. If
containment, and later 'deterrence', were to prove viable, both Pentagon
and State Department planning would have to be brought into closer
alignment.
(13) Howard, op, cit.. p.280.
(14) Works on the Cold War conflict which be&an with US and Soviet
perception of each other as adversaries, include D.F. Flemming,
The Cold War and its Origins. Hew York: Doubleday, 1961;
Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima to Potsdam. Hew
York: Vintage Press, 1965; Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of The
Cold War. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1966;
Louis B. Halle, The Cold War as History. Hew York: harper
and Row, 1967; Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The onset
of the Cold war. 1945-1950. Hew York: V< .Yi. Horton, 1970;
P.M. mith, discusses the US Army-Air Force identification of the
USSR as an adversary in 1945 in The Air Force Plans for Peace.
1943-1945. Baltimore, 1970; Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic,
trans, by Frank Jellinek. London: Vteidenfeld and Hicolson, 1973.
(15) Huntington, op. cit.. p.15.
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Groping Towards 'Deterrence'
Brodle and Wolfers Reject the mobilisation Concept
With the tremendous increase in the complexity of weapons
technology and the opening of the Cold War, the development of US
strategy came under growing influence from the scientific and
academic communities. Although the official military strategy
of the day was to retain much of its wartime character for some time,
there were voices of 'modernisation* to be heard among analysts
outside policy-making circles. Bernard Brodie, writing with
Arnold Wolfers in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic lower and World Order
(New York, Harcourt Bruce, 1946), assessed the atomic bomb as a
'quantun jump' in the development of offensive weapons, finally
(17)
establishing the decisiveness of strategic bombing. The
appearance of the atomic bomb persuaded Brodie that the nation's
traditional mobilisation strategy had to be rejected:
The idea which must be driven home above all
else is that a military establishment which
is expected to fight on after the nation has
undergone atomic bomb attack must be prepared
to fight with the men already mobilised and
with the equipment already in the arsenals. (18)
Brodie further argued for the adoption of a strategy of
'atomic deterrence':
(16) H.B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1973, pp.26-27; On the growth of post¬
war national security research, also see Edward L. Katzenbach,
'Ideas: A New ^Defence Industry', The Reporter, karch 2, 1961,
pp.17-21; Bernard Brodie, 'The Scientific Strategists' in
Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and
National Policy-Making. New York: Columbia University Press,
1964, pp.240-256; Gene M. Lyons and Louis korton, Schools
for Strategy. New York: F.A. Praeger, 1965; Bruce L.R. Smith,
The Rand Corporation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1966; Hedley Bull, 'Strategic Studies and its Critics',
World Politics. XX, 4 July 1968.
(17) Moulton, op. cit.. p.27.
(18) Howard, op. cit.. p.159.
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If the atomic bomb can be used without fear
of substantial retaliation in kind, it will
clearly encourage aggression. So much the
more reason, therefore, to take all possible,
steps to assure that multilateral possession
of the bomb, should that prove inevitable,
be attended by the arrangements to make as
nearly certain as possible that the aggressor
who uses the bomb will have it used against him ...
... thus, the first and most vital steps in any
American programme for the age of atomic bombs
is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves
in case of attack the possibility of retaliation
in kind. The writer in making that statement
is not for the moment concerned about who will
win the next war in which atomic bombs are used.
Thus far the chief purpose of our military
establishment has been to win wars. Prom now
on its chief purpose must be to avert them.
Itucan have almost no other useful purpose. (19)
Arnold Wolfers wrote of a kind of 'mutual deterrence' as the
future basis of the Soviet-American strategic relationship; *lt
would not be surprising ... if a high degree of Soviet-American
"Equality of deterring power" would prove the best guarantee of peace
and tend more than anything else to approximate the views and
interests of the two countries'
Writing in 1953, Wolfers also discussed the adoption of a policy
of deterrence based upon 'counterforce' targeting, a policy in which
the United States would announce its intention to attack only
military targets in the event of war, provided that US cities were
(19) Howard, op. cit.. p.160.
(20) Moulton, op. cit.. p.27; The author notes that
occasionally in the text which follows the term
•deterrence' is used anachronistically. This is
done for the purpose of clarity or convenience and
in the knowledge that the concept was not fully





Further evidence of the emergence of the deterrence concept
outside policy-making circles resulted from an Air Force request
to the Rand Corporation in May of 1951 for a study on the selection
of US strategic air bases overseas. The conclusions of a team
of Rand analysts under Albert ttohletetter, appeared in Rand
(22)
Report R-266. Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases.
R-266. in its rejection ox an Air Force plan for the transfer
of bomber aircraft from peacetime bases in the United States to the
major combat theatre either just before or after the outbreak of war,
expressed a far more realistic view of the nature of modern strategic
warfare than that which underlay the original Air Force plan.
(21) Koulton, op. cit.. pp.27-28; In addition to discussion
of the deterrence idea in the United States, the concept
was also under examination in Britain during the late
1940s, where it was eventually accepted as national policy
before the United States moved to a deterrent posture.
(Howard, op. cit.. pp.l60-l6l). Writing in 1948,
Christopher Norborg in Operation Moscow.(London: natimer
House, 1948, pp.197-237), rejected the mobilisation concept
and called for the adoption of what was, in effect, a policy
of 'deterrence' through atomic * forces-in-being'. Also on
the deterrence theme, the former Chief of the British Defence
Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, wrote in 1953:
'The aim of western policy is not primarily to be ready to
win a war with the world in ruins - though we must be as
ready as possible to do this if it is forced upon us by
accident or miscalculation. It is the prevention of war.
The bomber holds out to us the greatest, perhaps the only
hope of that. It is the greatest deterrent'. (Howard,
pp.160-161). Also on deterrence in Britain, see Margaret
Gowing, 2 vols., Independence and Deterrence. London:
Macmillan, 1974.
(22) See A.J. Wohlstetter, F.S Hoffman and H.S. Rowen, Selection
and Use of Strategic Air Bases. Santa monica: Rand Corporation,
R-266, April 1954. A.L. Wohlstetter, 'Analysis and Design of
Conflict Systems', in E.S. Quade, ed., Analysis for Military
Decisions. Chicago: Rand Mchally, 1964; and by the same author
'Strategy and the Natural Scientists' in Gilpin and wright, op.cit.
E.S. Quade, 'The Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases: A
Case History' in Quade, op. cit.: Smith, op. cit.. pp.195-240.
Further, R-266 offered the first penetrating analysis of the concept
of 'first-strike* and 'second-strike* capabilities in a time when the
first-strike/second-strike distinction was little understood.
It gave the first serious consideration to the vulnerability of US
strategic forces when confronted by substantial Soviet air-nuclear
(23)
strength in the latter half of the 1950s. As such, the Rand
study significantly revised the Air Force understanding of deterrence,
arguing that the validity of the concept would shortly rest upon
deterring a strike against the US deterrent force itself through the
deployment of a second-strike capability. Wohlstetter clearly
made the point that deterrence would be seriously compromised by the
command of anything less than a secure deterrent force, able to
survive an atomic first-strike and proceed to the delivery of a
/ p i \
devastating response. '
Air-Nuclear Power i Air Force Views
In addition to the work of private individuals and research
groups, there was also support from within the armed services -
particularly within the United States Air Force (USAFj - for
modifications in strategic doctrine and planning. Air Force
officers, for example, often spoke of the now central ana decisive
role of air-atomic forces. While bold claims on behalf of strategic
air power were by no means unique in the early post-war years, the
marriage of strategic aircraft with atomic bombs significantly increased
the persuasiveness of those arguing for the decisiveness of UoAF's
(23) Smith, op. cit.. pp.231-232; Quade , 'Selection and Use of
Strategic Air Bases', op. cit.. pp.62-63.
(24) Smith, op. cit.. pp.232-234.
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strategic mission.v ' Writing in 1948, General George C. Kenny,
Commander of the Strategia Air Force and General Carl L. Spaatz,
wartime Chief of America's Strategic Air Force in Europe and the
Facific, discounted the possibility of effective western resistance
to a Soviet ground attack on Europe unless the major strategic role
was assigned to air-nuclear forces. The critical element in any
American response to a Russian invasion of Europe was to be atomic
assaults against the industrial cities of the USSR, carried out by
long-range bombers operating from bases in Europe. The United
States would not repeat the experience of the last war by dispatching
large armies to the Continent charged with plowly driving the enemy
(26}
back beyond his own frontiers.
(25) The opini ns of Generals Kenny and Spaatz expressed
below formed part of an intensive post-war debate over
the effectiveness of strategic bombing which included
the 3-36 controversy. Works dealing with the strategic
bombing issue include, US Strategic 3omblnr., Survey.
European War. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, Reports No.1-207, 1945; US Strategic Bombing.
Facific "War. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, Reports No.1-107, 1946; Fred C. Ikle, The Social
Impact of Bomb Destruction. Norman, Okla.: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1958; Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the
Kissile Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1959; Eugene L. Emme, ed., The Impact of Air
Power. Princeton, N.J.: Van Rostrand, 1959;
Lt. Gen. James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age.
London: Hutchinson, 1959; Sir Charles Webster and
Koble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against
Germany. 1939-1945. London: H.M. Stationery Office,
4 vols., 1961; George H. Quester, Deterrence Before
Hiroshima. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.
(26) For the views of Generals Kenny and Spaatz, see
P.ii.S. Blackett, Studies of War. Edinburgh and
London: Oliver and Boyd, 1962, pp.11-14.
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As well as emphasising the critical role of atomic power in
general, Air Force spokesmen also argued for the support of large
air-atomic-forces permanently in being. In testifying before the
Congress in 1946, General Spaatz advised:
The first requirement of the peacetime Air
Force is a combat force-in-being; ready for
immediate employment; thoroughly trained;
well equipped; wisely disposed on strategic
bases, and capable of rapid concentration. (27)
Government Studies
While Air Force officers were expressing views which did not
entirely conform to established strategic precedent in the United
States, far more radical statements were issuing from the Department
of -State. In June of 1948, the State Department produced a study
paper which described the functions of the nation's armed forces
•as a deterrent1, an 'encouragement to nations endeavouring to resist
Soviet political aggression', and also to 'wage war successfully in
( PP ^
case war should ctevelop'. If the armed forces were to serve
these ends, American strategic planners would have to recognise
that a policy 'based on the maintenance of a permanent state of
adequate military preparations is better than an effort pointed
(29)
towards a given peak of danger'. In place of the traditional
American view that armies were to be mobilised to win wars whenever
they might occur and then allowed to dissolve after victory, the
State Department study group was arguing for their permanent maintenance
as an influence on the policy of other states or, in other words, for
the adoption of a 'deterrence' strategy.
(27) Kolodziej, op. cit.. pp.83-84.
(28) Huntington, op. cit.. p.40.
(29) Ibid.
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On January 10, 1950, President Truman ordered both the State
and Defence Departments to conduct a general re-examination of US
foreign and defence policies.The document which resulted,
labelled NSC-68 recommended 'an immediate large-scale buila-up
in our military and general strength and that of our allies with
the intention of righting the power-balance and in the hope that
through means other than all-out war, we could induce a change in the
(31)
nature of the Soviet system'.w ' In brief, the review called lor
an increase in America's limited and total war capabilities lor
'deterrent' purposes.
Evidence of Change in US Defence Policy:
The Emergence of 'Deterrence'
Growing Air-Atomic Element in US Strategy
Despite the arguments for change, American defence policy in the
early post-war period retained much of its traditional character.
However, there was evidence of important modifications unuerway,
including the rapidly expanding role of air-atomic forces in American
strategy. This expansion was encouraged by the desire for a military
counter-weight to the large Soviet presence in Europe where it was
felt that a clear display of western power was required to present
a Soviet attack. As it was thought impossible to compete with the
USSR in conventional strength, the only option available to the USA
was reliance upon its still unbroken atomic monopoly. In fact* the
United States was very probably unable to launch a major atomic
assault in the very first years after the war, lacking both an adequate
(30) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.48-49; Also see 'NSC-68: Prologue
to Rearmament' in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Hammond and Glenn
H• Snyder, Strategy. Politics and Defence budgets. Hew York:
Columbia University Press, 1962.
(31) Huntington, op. cit.. p.51.
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arsenal of bombs and bombers. However, as demobilisation had stripped
the country of nearly every other form of strategic power in any
substantial quantity, the atomic bomb was virtually all that remained
to field against an enemy.
Evidence of the growing commitment to air-atomic power appeared
in the Congressional attitude toward defence expenditure. While
Congressional commitment to restraint in defence spending caused the
Army and Navy to suffer budgetary reduction^ administration requests
for air power appropriations were approved and sometimes even
(32)
increased. ' By the late 1940s, the legislators were convinced
that the old wartime coalition had finally ended. They also
believed that the most effective and economical strategic response
to the collapse of Allied unity rested with atomic bombs loaded
(33)
aboard Air Force bombers, targeted on the Soviet Union.
The Development of SAC Begins
In October of 1948 General Curtis E. Le Kay assumed direction
of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a force created two years
earlier but never properly trained or equipped. General Le .ay
spent eight years equipping SAC with the latest bomber aircraft,
expanding its complex of bases and training its personnel to the
highest performance standards. Le May's achievement with SAC was
significant as another stage in the development of a growing air-
atomic emphasis in US strategy during the late 1940s; but more
important, the development of the Strategic Air Command in the early
1950s as a massively powerful elite force dedicated to permanent and
(32) Robert £. Osgood, Limited War. Chicago: University




instant combat readiness was a major move in the direction of a
policy of nuclear •deterrence' through forces-in -being. As such,
SAC represented both an operational military and conceptual
(34)
advance in US defence policy.
However, by May of 1952 the US Air Force was already concerned
about the vulnerability of SAC bases to Soviet air attack, and
requested that the Hand Corporation undertake a vulnerability
(35)
study. Rand's alarming conclusions, as expressed in K-266^
played a significant part in modifying USAF policy. After an
examination of R-266 the Air Force abandoned its plan for basing
US strike forces abroad in favour of the deployment of SAC within
the United States, with only the explacement of staging facilities
(36)
abroad. In accepting many of the Rand proposals, the Air Force
demonstrated its concern for the vulnerability of SAC in the second
half of the 1950s and its recognition of the first strike/second strike
distinction, as well as its growing commitment to nuclear deterrence,
founded upon a secure deterrent force.
(34) Huntington, op. clt.. pp.308-312.
(35) Smith, op. cit.. p.209; Smith notes (fn.29, p.232), that
•a study of the vulnerability of SAC bases in England done
in 1950 by Hugh J. Miser of the Air Force's Operations
Analysis Office, and a twelve-volume WSEG (Weapons Systems
Evaluation Group) study dealing with SAC's capabilities,
done in 1950, reportedly touched obliquely on problems of
securing the strategic deterrent force'. Smith also notes
David H. Bebeau, Hugh J. Miser, Dale E. Oyster, The Estimated
Effect of a Soviet Atomic Attack on the US in 1952 and 1954.
US Air Force Operations Analysis Office, Special Report Ho.4,
October 18, 1950, as among those early studies which considered
the vulnerability problem, 'out did not call for a deterrent
capable of delivering an unacceptably damaging blow, after the
launch of the enemy's atomic first-strike.




The debate in 1949 between the US Ravy and Air Force over the
wisdom of constructing a new aircraft carrier, as opposed to the
3-36 bomber, broadened into a controversy encompassing the nation's
overall strategy and further illustrated the shift to air-atomic
(37)
weapons in American defence policy. Perhaps of greater interest
today than the argument over bombers versus aircraft carriers, is the
fact that the successful outcome of the dispute for the Air Force
further documented the rise of atomic weaponry in US strategic
doctrine from merely a new explosive to the key element in the
national strategy. However, the B-36 controversy is also noteworthy
as one of the final occasions on which a major strategic issue was
examined in entirely 'non-deterrence' terms. The officers
embattled over the B-36 were debating the surest and shortest road
to victory in any future struggle with the USSR, not the most
( 38)
persuasive of 'deterrent' postures.
Atomic Emphasis Continues despite the
End of US Atomic Monopoly
In September of 1949 the USSR exploded its first atomic device,
three years before American experts had thought it possible. This
was an accomplishment which might have significantly reformed US
strategy, as it suddenly upset the basis of a policy founded upon
America's unique atomic capability. Before the Soviet atomic
(37) Kolodziej, op. cit.. pp.108-111; Osgood, op. cit., p.153.
(38) Huntington, op, cit.. pp.299-300; On the B-36 issue,
also see Investigation of the 3-36 Bomber Programme.
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, US House
of Representatives, 81st Cong., 1st Session, on H. Res. 234,
August-October, 1949.
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explosion it was arguable that the United States could rely on its
unique technological advantage in a struggle with the major land
power. However, with the Soviet development of an atomic
capability, any American use of atomic weapons would expose the
United States to a similar attack. Further, any American threat to
resort to atomic weapons promised to become increasingly incredible
as the USSR's arsenal of bombs expanded and its delivery systems
improved.
Despite the Soviet test, no urgent reshaping of American strategy
was undertaken. Indeed, rather than inspire a shift in strategic
planning, the alarming news from the Soviet Union only seems to have
intensified the US commitment to air-atomic forces. There was no
apparent realisation that the spread of the new technology had
seriously damaged the basis of the American position. The Soviet
achievement seemed only to fire an effort to develop bigger and better
bombs, in support of the newly established atomic bias in American
(39)
strategic doctrine. ' The military's 'just another bomb' attitude
in the immediate post-war period was gradually being replaced by
the widespread belief that an air-nuclear attack would likely prove
decisive in a future war.^°^
(39) Osgood, op. cit.. pp.157-158.
(40) Concentrating on nuclear weapons and strategic aviation,
the Truman Administration presided over a corresponding
decline in the nation's non-nuclear strength until tne
outbreak of the Korean V.ar- as conventional forces were
made to suffer from a programme of economy in defence
spending. (Osgood, op. cit.. pp.154-156).
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The Hydrogen Bomb
The debate in 1949 over the hydrogen bomb ('H-Bomb') and the
final decision approving its development, provide a further
indication of the increasing American emphasis on the new weapons
technology, as well as evidence of an emerging nuclear 'deterrence*
concept. There was little American interest in developing a thermo¬
nuclear weapon until the USSR's first atomic test raised the question
(41)
of finding a strategic counter-measure to ensure western security.
The possibility of a crash programme to develop a thermonuclear bomb as
an appropriate 'response* opened a spirited controversy over the
H-bomb in particular, American strategy generally, and the danger of
(42)
an arms race between the USSR and the United States.
After considerable deliberation and debate involving several
government agencies and departments, as well as a number of university
academics, on January 31, 1950 President Truman approved 'H-bomb
development'. On karch 10, he further ordered the construetion of
(43)
production facilities for the new bombs.
The controversy over thermonuclear weapons marks a highly
significant stage in the American development of a strategy of
nuclear deterrence. The debate was distinctive in that the scientists,
politicians and generals ranged on both sides of the question were not
arguing over how best to win a future war. Indeed, it was widely
held by both opponents and supporters of the hydrogen weapon that it
would be of little operational military value. Unlike the B-36
(41) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.300, 304.
(42) Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Kuclear Weapon
Policy. Princeton, fl.J.s Princeton University Press,
1962, pp.73-97.
(43) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.304, 306.
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quarrel of the same period, the dispute over the 'H-bomb' concerned
a weapon which all agreed could never be used without disastrous
consequences. However, the fact of its 'uselessness' was the
strongest, if not the only, recommendation for the new bomb in the
minds of its advocates. The hydrogen bomb was a weapon intended to
♦deter' rather than to defeat the Soviet Union and the President's
decision in its favour recorded a major move in the emergence of the
( 44)
nuclear deterrence concept in the United States.
The Commitment to Europe
While American 'deterrence' was primarily to be implemented in
nuclear terms, the early post-war years also recorded a largely
conventional military expression of the concept which represented an
important change in US defence policy. For generations the United
States had rejected any suggestions of indefinitely maintaining large
armed forces for any purpose other than the defeat of an enemy.
However, as one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), America agreed to the maintenance of substantial
conventional, as well as atomic forces, in Britain and on the European
continent. This unprecedented commitment demonstrated a considerable
advance in the American understanding of the relationship between
peacetime military strength or 'forces-in-being' and the nation's
international political objectives. American forces were not
dispatched to Europe to resist a Soviet invasion already in progress
or even in response to the danger of an imminent conflict. Although
(44) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.298-300, 305-306; also on the
Hydrogen bomb, see Warner Schilling, 'The H-Bomb Decision',
Political Science Quarterly. LleXVI, No.2, ^arch 1961;
Norman Moss, It en Who Play God. Middlesex: Penguin, 1970.
they were obviously intended to defend Europe if the need arose, a
major rationale for the troop commitment was the 'deterrence' of a
(45)
Soviet conventional assault on the NATO countries.
The Truman Administration Attempts to Implement
'Deterrence' s 1950-1952
Korean Rearmament
The simple existence of the deterrence concept within the ranks
of the nation's military and civilian leadership was not enough to
achieve a genuine deterrence posture. Deterrence required the
additional backing of a substantial increase in American force levels.
In President Truman's final years the administration attempted, with
some success, to achieve the heightened force levels which deterrence
demanded, but which would likely have been entirely unobtainable
had not the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided the means
of winning Congressional approval of higher defence spending.
However, the Korean episode also demonstrated that the American puolic
and the United States Congress were not yet convinced of the need for
any expansion of military strength outside the Korean context, let
alone the wisdom of adopting a broadly based deterrence strategy.
(45) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.312-326.
(46) Works on the Korean War include, 'Atomic Weapons and the
Korean War', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. VI, July
1950; J.D. Hittle, 'Korea - Back to the Facts of Life',
US Naval Institute Proceedings. LXXVI, December 1950,
pp.1289-1297; R.D. Poats, Decision in Korea. Lew York:
McBride Co., 1954; A.l. George, 'American Policy-Making
and The North Korean Aggression', 'World Politics. VII,
January 1955, pp.209-232; Harry S. Truman, Memoires,
Vol.11, Years of Trial and hope. Garden City, N.Y.:
Boubleday, 1956; Peter Oglobin, The Korean War.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Centre for International Studies,
American Project C/58-19, Working Paper III, 1958;
H.A. De V/eerd, The Korean War: Political Limitations. Santa
r/ionica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, P-2059, August 5» I960;
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War. New York: Pocket Books,
Inc., 1964.
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Differing Motivations for Rearmament
Although the war inspired widespread recognition of the need for
rearmament, the nation's leaders differed as to the ultimate
-•
- • •>
objectives of the policy. A number of factors argued for rearmament
in the minds of most observers. There was the obvious need to
conduct the Korean Vkar. The war was the prime, if not the exclusive,
/ i a \
motivation for the Congress and the American people. The
rearmament programme was also seen by some senior commanders as the
route to an improved mobilisation base.^°^ However, many in the
executive branch looked upon the Korean rearmament as an opportunity
to acquire sufficient forces permanently in being to 'deter' the USSR
from initiating a general war, or, failing in its deterrence objective,
to prepare the United States to successfully wage such a conflict.
Air-Nuclear Forces
It was, therefore, within the context of the Asian war that the
administration was able to acquire the funds for the expansion of US
air-nuclear power, as well as its ground strength in nurope. This
was to be done in the light of NSC-68's warning that 1994 would be a
year of particular danger, although the Korean War was expected to be
lctig over by that date.^^ In 1991 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
proposed the enlargement of the Air lorce from the ninety-five wing
total planned for 1992 to 143 wings by the middle of 1994, a proposal
which the administration accepted, attached to its own target date of
July 1999 This period also recorded General Curtis Le may's




continuing development of SAC. By the end of the Truman presidency
he had achieved considerable success in transforming what had been
an inadequate force for either nuclear wax'fare or deterrence into
a large, well-equipped and highly trained permanently combat-ready
nuclear strike force, of no use in Korea, but suitaole for both full-
scale strategic nuclear conflict or the implementation of a policy of
nuclear deterrence.
Conventional Forces
While US defence planners would later return to NSC-681s
identification of 1954 as the year in which the danger of an east-
west conflict would be greatest, in the autumn of 1950 the Joint
Chiefs of Staff pronounced July of 1952 to be the peak risk period,
requiring an Army of eighteen divisions and twelve regimental combat
teams, 1,161 naval craft, two-and-a-third Marine divisions, ninety-
(51)
five Air Force wings and a total armed force of 3,600,000 men.
By 1952, the Army in fact stood at twenty divisions and eighteen
regimental combat teams; the Navy at 1,300 ships and Marines at
three divisions and three air wings; and the Air Force at ninety-
(52)
five air wings, for a manpower total of 3,636,000. In support
of its commitment to European defence from 1949-1951, the United
States pressed for the inclusion of German troops into the structure
of western defence, these troops to join the four US divisions sent
to Europe in 1949. The Americans also established the Seventh Army
in Germany and placed Dwight Eisenhower in command of SHAPE (Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). Further, in 1952 the Lisbon
(51) Huntington, op, cit.. p.60.
(52) Ibid., pp.60-61.
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Conference of the NATO powers set a ninety division NATO force level
to be met by the end of the year. The Korean rearmament programme
thus also confirmed the maintenance of a powerful NATO based
European defence effort as a major objective of American policy,
inspired by the desire to deter or resist a Korean-type conflict
(53)
launched by the USSR on the European Continent.
Rearmament Ends with Korea
Whatever the motives of rearmament's promoters, the growing
distaste for and eventual end of the war which had initiated rear¬
mament eventually slowed its pace. As international tensions were
seen to decline and the nation's defence needs consequently diminish,
force level target dates such as the Air Force goal of 143 wings
were pushed back, weapons production declined and four billion three
hundred million dollars were trimmed from the administration's
(54)
defence budget proposals for fiscal 1953. Nevertheless, while
the programme to provide America with a broadly based military
establishment was largely ended by the Korean armistice, the painful
experience of American reverses on the ground against the Communist
forces clearly illustrated to many the need for a conventional build¬
up and supported those advocating substantial ground strength
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. However, the Korean rearmament
programme was most significant as an attempt by the Truman Adminis-
tration to arm the United States not only in preparation for future
conflicts but also in support of a strategy of deterrence, an effort
which although cut short by the Congress, was not without success.
(53) Huntington, op. cit.. p.62.
(54) Ibid., p.63.
The Role of 'Action-Reaction' Process in the
Development of US Strategic Doctrine i 1945-1952
The development of American strategic thought in the 1945-1952
period does not confirm the example of Soviet actions as the guiding
principle of American strategic planners. Although the simple
existence of the USSR as a powerful adversary, as well as a number of
individual Soviet actions, very significantly Effected the broad
shape of US strategy, its general character and specific features
were, in fact, the product of a generous and disparate mix of
external and internal influences.
Containment
While many of the significant changes in policy during the Truman
years were in fact of mixed origins, the major foreign policy
development of the period - the adoption of containment - represented
a clear reaction to Soviet political and military actions or, at least,
a response to the American interpretation of Russian actions. The
rapid post-war decline in Soviet-American relations generally, Soviet
policy in eastern Europe in particular, the maintenance of large
Soviet conventional forces after the war, the activities of
Communists in Greece and Turkey, all contributed to the American
perception of the USSR as a dangerous and aggressive adversary. The
identification of the Soviet Union as a 'threat* logically led to a
foreign policy designed to limit the extent of the adversary's
power and influence.
The ivofcllisation Tradition and its Critics
Despite the early political assessment oi the USSR as an
adversary, the nation's strategic doctrine failed to 'react' to the
beginning of the 'Cold V.ar' with the alacrity of its foreign policy.
America's native mobilisation tradition continued to influence
strategy, persuading many observers that the support of anything more
then an improved version of pre-war policy w s unnecessary ana
impracticable. Such strategic 'conservatism', setting American
foreign and defence policies at odds, drew criticism which was in
part a response to those Soviet actions which had inspired a foreign
policy of Containment. The perception of the USSR as an aggressive
force, with large armies permanently on station in Durope, prompted
a call for greater American military resources with which to resist
or contain Soviet pressure. However, much of the early criticism
of the mobilisation concept and demands for the maintenance of
powerful forces-in-being or for a strategy of deterrence were not a
direct response to Soviet actions or deployments, as the USSR was
still badly affected by the struggle with Germany and was thought to
be several years from its first atomic explosion. Rather than a
direct reaction to the Soviet Union, the criticism of mobilisation
was largely based upon the strategic or operational implications of
the new American weapons technology for any future conflict after the
inevitable end of the US atomic monopoly. The United States must be
prepared for victory at the very outset of war or risk disaster.
US Air Force criticism of established strategy was also likely
influenced by its World War 11 commitment to strategic bombing and
its individual service interest in further increasing the
significance of air power in American strategy.
Government Study Papers
The two major government study papers produced during the
Truman period can be considered as broadly responsive to the USSR,
in that each was framed with the Soviet Union clearly in mind as a
serious and growing threat. The 1948 State Department effort
called for a major reformation of US defence policy in response to
the political and military challenge posed by the Soviet Union.
Similarly, the later NSC-68 study was generally motivated by the
worsening in east-west relations and specifically by the unexpected
Soviet atomic test in 1949.
However, while the origins and conclusions of these studies were
rooted in the affects of Russian power and potential on the viability
of American strategy, many of their recommendations were not based
upon existing Soviet capabilities. The 1948 paper was written
during the American atomic monopoly and even KSC-68 was produced long
before the Soviet Union was to command a major atomic force. Rather
than representing direct responses to prior Soviet stimuli, their
assessments were, in part, based upon American estimates of future
Soviet capabilities.
The Role of Atomic Weapons in US Strategy : 1945-1949
The growing American reliance on atomic weapons in the late 1940s
was a part of the military effort intended to contain the USSR; but
the increasing stress on atomic power as a major expression of
Containment cannot be regarded as a direct reaction to Soviet actions.
It was certainly not the only conceivable or inevitable 'response'
which the United States might have chosen in a period when the Soviet
Union was without an atomic capability of its own*. The gradual move
in the direction of the new weapons was instead the result of
dorrestic American influence. These domestic factors incluuea the
very early and extensive post-war demobilisation programme, under¬
taken as a result of internal political and economic pressures and
encouraged by US military traditions, which left the American
leadership with very inadequate conventional strength and no
effective means of overcoming the political and economic objections
which would have greeted any effort to restore the nation's armed
forces. The great dearth of conventional strength and the unwillingness
to increase general purpose force levels, therefore, suggested atomic
weapons as the only available source of military power, a source
which was further recommended by its exclusive possession in American
hands. With only the United States in command of the atomic bomb,
it was possible to rely on little more than its simple existence in
the US arsenal - almost regardless of the numbers of weapons actually
produced - to impress the Soviet Union with America's strength.
As such, atomic weapons provided a relatively economical alternative
to the large conventional forces which were unobtainable. iinally,
the atomic emphasis was encouraged by arguments from the US Air force
convinced of the decisiveness of strategic bombing and assured of a
major, if not dominant, role in any air-nuclear strategy.
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Intensification of Air-Atomic Emphasis
in US Strategy : 1949-1952
The increased significance attached to atomic-nuclear weapons
in US strategy following the end of America's atomic monopoly was
a clear reaction to the first Soviet atomic test in 1949. however,
once again the move to an even heavier reliance on the new weapons
technology was not an inevitable, directly reflexive, or emulative
response. Had the United States chosen to counteract directly a
Soviet development which, taken together with Russia's large
conventional forces, threatened to compromise America's atomic
strategy, it might have 'responded' with increased conventional
strength. Instead, for political, economic and technological
reasons, similar to those which originally prompted reliance on
atomic weapons, the United States chose to stress air-nuclear power
as its major response to the USSR's newly demonstrated atomic
capability.
The 'H-Bomb'
A very significant feature of the US reaction to the unexpected
Soviet atomic test and a major event in the generally expanding role
of the new weapons technology in US strategy, was the American
decision to develop an 'H-bomb'. However, while the decision to
produce the new weapon was intended as a reaction to the emergence of
the USSR as an atomic power, once again the character of the American
reaction wras in no sense fated by Soviet actions. The 'H-bomb'
decision, as well as the increasing role of fission and fusion
weapons in US strategy, was largely an independent American judgement
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prompted by the nation's budgetary objectives, domestic, political
circumstances and technological resources.
Air Force Basing and R-266
The original Air Force plan for basing its strategic aircraft
overseas was responsive to Soviet actions in so far as overseas
basing was regarded as a necessary reaction to the 'threat* of a
Soviet ground assault on western Europe. Nevertheless, the
specific judgement that bombers represented the most suitable
instruments for the expression of that 'reaction* was determined by
the same array of domestic political and economic factors which were
rapidly shifting US strategy as a whole towards an air-nuclear
emphasis. Certainly the transfer of aircraft to Europe was not the
only conceivable response to a Soviet 'threat* which was to remain
largely conventional for some time to come. The request to the Rand
Corporation for a study of base selection was a feature of the nuclear
response to the USSR's conventional capabilities in Europe. The
concern over the vulnerability of US bombers to air attack and the
request to Rand for an examination of the problem were also reactions
to the USSR - in this instance reactions to the prospective develop¬
ment of the USSR as a major air-nuclear power. The Rand study
itself (R-266). was framed within the context of Soviet developments
and potential. Its suggested reform in basing policy and
modifications of the deterrence concept were argued largely in terms
of the need to adjust American policy to Soviet capabilities.
However, the Rand conclusions on vulnerability and its policy
recommendations were largely based upon the Corporation's own
estimate of the future development in Soviet air-nuclear strength and
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not upon an existing Soviet capability. Further, other factors
including the question of costs, were also involved in shaping
Rand's proposals. Similarly the apparent Air Force acceptance of
many of R-266' s suggestions was inspired by the growing Soviet 'threat'.
Premier Kalenkov's announcement of an 'H-bomb' test was one specific
Soviet action which encouraged the adoption of the basing study's
views. Here, too, however the Air Force 'reactions' were
supported by projections of future Soviet capabilities. Further,
the Air Force approval of R-266 was also influenced by the cost
factor. The construction of staging installations abroad was
thought to be far more economical than the original plan for
(55)
overseas deployment.
The Commitment to Europe
While ouch of American policy affecting nuclear forces cannot
be charged to prior Soviet actions, the American decision to assign
US forces to Europe permanently marked a clearly direct and
emulative western response to the Soviet Union's substantial general
purpose forces in Europe, attempting to match Soviet deployments
with western forces of the same kind. However, the subsequent
failure of Alliance members - including the United States - to meet
its early troop level pledges to NATO, reveals the less than sharply
sensitive or faithfully emulative nature of even this uncommonly
direct response to Soviet actions and the powerful influence of
domestic economics.
(55) Smith, op. cit.. p.234.
The Korean Experience
The Korean War also prompted at least one specific, if limited,
conventional reaction within the United States government. Korea
confirmed the administration's belief that larger US general
purpose forces were necessary if the United States was either to deter
or resist conventional advances against America's allies in Asia,
or more importantly, in Europe as well. However, despite the
administration's interest in a greater non-nuclear capability, the
eventual withdrawal of public and Congressional support from rear¬
mament revealed that most Americans were not yet ready to 'react' to
the possibility of future conventional attacks by supporting an
expansion of US conventional forces. The 1950s were instead to
record a decided preference for economy in defence spending through
nuclear deployments.
The Role of Action-Reaction in the Emergence
of Deterrence ; 1945-1952
Among the most significant developments in US strategic thought
in the 1945-1952 period was the move from America's long-established
commitment to mobilisation, first in favour of a concept of 'forces-
in-being' and eventually in the direction of deterrence. These
profound changes or 'break-points' in the history of US strategic
doctrine were, in broadly conceptual terms, reactions to the USSR.
Forces-in-being was prompted by the existence of the Soviet Union as
a powerful adversary whose vast resources, large conventional armies
and foreign policy interests, demanded the permanent maintenance of
powerful American forces. Until the time of the USSR's first atomic
test, it was thought possible for the United States to rely on its
technological monopoly to provide for western security.
However, with the loss of America's unique technological advantage
and the prospect of Soviet development as a major atomic power, the
United States was strongly impelled by the nature of atomic warfare,
eventually to establish some kind of 'deterrence' as its first priority.
In short, the gradual almost inevitable emergence of deterrence which
began in the United States during these years was induced by the
critical need to influence or 'deter' a powerful opponent in
possession of a kind, and in time, a quantity of destructive power
which was to make the prospect of even a successful American war
effort against the Soviet Union extremely unattractive. Beyond the
original emergence of the deterrence concept, its subsequent
development was also influenced by the Soviet Union, This was
clearly the case over the issue of SAC basing in which projections
of Soviet air power raised the issue of first and second strike
capabilities, as well as the problem of providing a secure
deterrent force.
However, before assigning full responsibility to the USSR for the
emergence of deterrence in a direct and immediate relationship of
Soviet-American stimulus and response, it must first be noted that the
new weapons technology itself, with the capacity for accomplishing
obliterating destruction in a matter of hours^ would likely have
given birth to deterrence as a concept, if not as an operational
policy, even without the Soviet Union's atomic test in 1949,
Indeed, the earliest calls for deterrence in the United States,
predated the first Soviet atomic test by at least three years.
Second, while the Soviet Union played a great part in accelerating
the acceptance of deterrence, the growing support for the concept
in Washington was, in large part, based upon American projections
of future Soviet developments rather than representing a 'reaction'
to existing capabilities. The Soviet Union was not to command
a major nuclear strike force capable of reaching North America
for several years after the end of the Truman period in which the
American deterrence concept first emerged and in which SAC began
to attend to the question of its own vulnerability,
Finally, although the USSR must be fundamentally credited
with inspiring the move to deterrence in the United States as
a strategic concept, the character or quality of American
deterrence was largely shaped by domestic economic and political
factors which prevented the deployment of powerful conventional
armies and, therefore, determined that the new concept would be
expressed by the United States almost entirely as a strategy
nuclear deterrence, rather than as a more broadly based
interpretation of the principle.
Chapter 2
The Stalinist 'Freeze* on Strategic Doctrine
Stalinist military Science
Soviet military science in Stalin's post-war years was
presented as largely the personal achievement of Stalin and
often labelled as 'Stalinist military Science'.It was
said to be an original and unique thesis: Marxist, Stalinist,
scientific and consequently the guarantor of inevitable
victory, as was brilliantly demonstrated in the 'Great
Patriotic War' 1941-1945# In fact, however, Stalin's great
'innovation' was rooted in the early doctrinal controversies
of the oviet Republic, as were the issues argued in the
re-examination of doctrine after his death. The assertions
of the unique and superior character of Stalinist Military
Science were reminiscent of demands for and assertions of a
uniquely Communist or 'proletarian' military doctrine in the
1920s, a doctrine also lauded for its superiority. War
Commissar L.D. Trotsky's denunciation of such claims as the
idealisation of weakness and his insistence that the realities
(1) Soviet strategic terminology generally defines
military doctrine as the official policy of the
state on military matters in general: military art
is the accepted body of thinking and planning for
waging war ir. accordance with military doctrine:
military science represents the sum of military
thinking on alternative theories and contingency
plans for waging war; See Slovar osnovnykh voennykh
terminov. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965, 'Biblioteka
Ofitsera': 'Voennaya doktrina', p.41, 'Strategiya',
p.220, 'Voennoe iskusstvo', p.44, for official Soviet
definitions.
of warfare applied to communists and capitalists alike, were
views again advanced in the 1950s. Similarly, Trotsky's
rejection of doctrinal rigidity and the very idea of
discovering any timeless strategic truths, as well as his
preference for realism and flexibility, were also to have a
post-war rehearing. Further, the early dispute over the
value of the Soviet Civil War as a model for the doctrine of
the 1920s and later was, in a sense, repeated when the reat
Patriotic War was reconsiaered as a guide to contemporary
doctrine. Finally, the doctrinal debate of the 1920s
illustrated what was to be the continuing domestic political
significance of military doctrine. Just as the opponents
of Trotsky's views employed the dispute as part of an assault
on his personal political position, Stalin secured the
inviolability of 'Stalinist ilitary Science' in support of
(2)his personal political interests.
Signs of 'Stalinist military Science' in the exclusive
sense had already emerged as early as 1942. Its alleged
superiority over any 'imperialist• attempt at scientific
military thought was said to rest upon its ideological
foundation. As a consequence of the insight provided by
v /
arxist methods of analysis, Stalinist military Science was
(2) On the military debate of the 1920s, see John
Ericksor, The Soviet high Command. London:
Uacraillan, 1962, pp.39, 5C-51, 82, 127-129,
134-136.
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not - as in the west - a mere collection of subjective
opinions on narrow operational points. It was instead a
genuinely scientific discipline, offering the student a
thoroughly reasoned, objective and fully comprehensive
examination of warfare as a broad social phenomenon.
Moreover, it afforded socialist peoples a unique and
penetrating understanding of the economic and moral
(3)
character of all capitalist states.
By comparison, the western version of •military science' -
blind to Marxist perceptions - was incapable of producing a
military science worthy of the name. The imperialist powers
were left with only a highly subjective •military art', unaware
of the fundamental nature of warfare as a complex socio¬
economic phenomenon. Such a trivial conception revealed only
a narrow and highly specialised understanding. In short,
western strategy was often reduced to little more than a
tournament of generals, a competition of military tradesmen
(4)
and their over-valued tools.
The Soviet victory over Germany in the Second World War
was offered as conclusive proof of the superiority of Soviet,
(3) Dr. Kenneth Whiting, •Post-War Strategy' in Asher
Lee, ed., The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. new
York: F.A. Praeger, 1959, pp.89-90.
(4) Ibid., pp.89-90.
or more specifically, Stalinist military Science. The
Great Patriotic War experience was to be closely studied as
' 5)
the model for all future conflicts.v Stalin prescribed
that the whole preparation of the army' and 'the further
development of Soviet Military Science* in the future 'must
be conducted on the basis of a skilful mastery of the
experience of the recent war*.^^
(5) R.L. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War. London:
George Unwin, 1954, pp.5B-59.
(6) R.L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Luclear Age.
London: Atlantic Books, 1958» P*62; On the study
of the Great Patriotic War, see Sbornik materialov
po istorii Sovetskogo voennogo iskusstua v Velikoi
Otkchstvennoi voine 1941-1945 gg.. Vypusk H. (ed.
Lt. Gen. V. Vorob'ev): Frunze Military Academy
Moscow, Voenizdat, 1956, 510 pp. (Copy available:
Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh).
A valuable compilation of wartime and immediate
post-war studies of Soviet operational performance.
(This volume carries a Soviet security classification);
Also see Lt. Gen. P.A. Zhilin, (ed.), Ccherki
Sovetskoi voennoi istoriografil. Loscow, voenizdat,
1974, chp.7, On investigation of Soviet combat
experience during the Great Patriotic War,
pp.224-234 (for wartime and post-war military
analysis, up to 1953/54: remainder of chapter
runs to the early 1970s).
The Soviet war effort against Nazi Germany was also
offered as a glorious testimonial to the genius of Stalin
himself. Stalin was not only the architect of the recent
victory, but was increasingly described as the nation's
(7)
supreme military strategist. As the father of 'Stalinist
ilitary Science', ostensibly developed during the Civil Y.ar
and certainly in the Great Fatriotic War, Stalin appeared to
displace or at least overshadow all other strategic thinkers.
The 'Stalinisation' of military science ijvolved reducing the
significance of all non-Russian influences on the development
of the nation'^ strategic thought. The reputation of General
. .1. Kutuzov was raised to new heights, overtaking that of
General Barclay de Tolly whose family was of foreign origin
and whom Frederich Engels had labelled the superior commander
in the war a ainst IJapoleon. By implication the demotion of
de Tolly masked an adverse reflection on the strategic thought
(8)
of Engels. In an article published in Bol'shevik in
1947, Stalin also attacked the long established position of
(9)Clausewitz in Soviet military writing. Although many
commentators including Marx, Engels and Lenin had repeatedly
(7) Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, op.cit.. pp.184-192.
(8) Ibid.. pp.50-51.
(9) 'Comrade Stalin's Answer to a Letter from
Comrade Razin', Bol'shevik. No.3, 1947.
praised Clausewitz, Stalin announced that Clausewitz 'has
hecome obsolete as a military authority' and that 'it is
ridiculous to take lessons from Clausewitz now'.^*"^ As
with Engels and General de Tolly, the post-war revision of
Clausewitz marked an implied criticism of the strategic
judgement of Lenin. Stalin's 1947 article also included a
far more explicit statement of Lenin's limitations in military
affairs. Stalin explained:
Lenin did not consider himself an expert
on military affairs. He did not consider
himself an expert on military affairs not
only in the past, before the October
Revolution down to the end of the Civil
War. In the Civil War Lenin obliged us,
then still young comrades of the Central
Committee, 'to study military affairs
precisely'. As for himself, he frankly
told us that it was already too late for
him to study military affairs. (11)
Major General Isayev concurred with the view that Lenin
(10) Garthoff, How Russia hakes War, op. cit.. pp.55-56.
(11) Ibid.. p.28; Also on the Stalinisation of military
doctrine, see John Erickson, 'Lenin as Civil War
~Leader* in Leonard Shapiro and Peter Reddaway, (eds.)
Lenin the ; an, the Theorist, the Leader. London:
Pall Kali Press, 1969.
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(12)
had never claimed military expertise and had advised
his younger colleagues to study military problems. Isayev
further asserted*
This task fell chiefly and mainly on Lenin's
closest and principal associate, Joseph
Vissarionovich Stalin .... Comrade Stalin
not only thoroughly mastered military science,
but in the very fires of the Civil War
worked out and brilliantly applied the
principles of his military science and
strategical art, a science of an entirely
new type. (13)
In short, in the wake of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin
was firmly established as the world's foremost strategic
thinker and the creator of a major and original advance in
military science which had displaced all earlier analyses.
An important product of Stalin's examination oi military
affairs was the identification of five principles of warfare.
These principles, or 'permanently operation factors', were*^^
1. The stability of the home front;
2. The morale of the Army;
3. The quantity and quality of divisions;
4. The armament of the Army; and
5. The organising ability of the command personnel.
(12) This view has recently been reversed in Soviet writing:
Lenin is now credited with commanding expertise and, in
a sense, 'Stalinist Military Science* has been heavily
•Leninised' - both positions being serious distortions.
See, for example, V.I. Lenin : Sovetskie vooruzhennye
sily. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969* (2nd Edn.) passim.
(13) Garthoff, How flussia fcakes War, op. cit.. p.29.
(14) Ibid., p.34
The 'permanently operating factors' were said to be among
the fundamental principles underlying Soviet strategy,
determining the outcome of any war which imperialism might
(15)
choose to launch. The validity of these factors had
been indisputably demonstrated in the Great Patriotic War,
but it is worth noting that in their ordering they represented
a catalogue of Soviet vulnerability. Surprise attack was
considered only transitory or secondary and could not, of
itself, defeat an enemy. Surprise was quite mistakenly
accorded considerable importance by imperialist commanders;
but, as the USSR had shown in defeating the German invasion
of 1941, it could not decide the outcome of a major conflict.
Although surprise was recognised as significant in tactical
operational and even strategic terms when exercised in
accordance with the permanently operating lactors,^^^ the
(15) Malcolm Mackintosh, Jug, ercaut. London:
Seeker and Warburg, 1967, p.277.
(16) Garthoff, How Russia flakes War, op, cit..
pp.272-275. For an important commentary,
see Col. I, Mafyganov, Peredovoi Kharaktev
Sovetskoi voennoi nauki. Moscow: Voenizdat,
1953, passim.
success of the powerful Soviet counter-offensive against the
German Army allegedly established the ultimate futility of
(17)
any strategy of surprise. In addition to surprise,
Stalin also judged as of only transitory significance such
factors as superior mobilisation speed, experience in warfare,
the transformation of the national economy to war production
(IB)
in peacetime, and climatic and topographical conditions.
(17) Garthofl, Soviet Strategy in the Huclear Age,
op. cit.. pp.04-87; Michael Garder, A History
of the Soviet Army. London: Pall Mall Press,
1966, p.134.
(18) Malcolm Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet
Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press,
1962, p.91.
Combined Arms
Yet another strength of Soviet military science was its
recognition of the 'combined-arms principle', the awareness
that: *..« success in war is not achieved by the one-sided
development of one or the other weapon, but by the perfection
(19)
of all arms and their skilful co-ordination'. Victory
would be achieved through the effective and complementary
performance of all the armed services or 'types oi troops*
•v.- .-»• - . *. •
and weapons systems.
No single service would be considered the warwinning
instrument in and or itself.
In accordance with the combined arms principle, the
Russians firmly condemned the single weapon fallacy or the
view that any single combat force held the key to victory.
Soviet military writing strongly attacked at least three
western examples of the single weapon fallacy: the over-
estimation of strategic air power; the much exaggerated
significance attached to atomic weapons; and western over-
confidence in the mobility and surprise efiect oi tank
formations.
(19) Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy Towards International
Control of Atomic Energy. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre
Dame Press, 1961, p.12.
(20) Ibid.: Garthoff, How Russia Makes V<ar. on. cit..
pp. 177-179. " ~ ~ ~
(21) Ibid., pp.173-177.
Writing in 1949 on the place of aviation in imperialist
doctrine, Marshal of Aviation Konstar;tin Vershinin argued:
The rivival of Douhet's venturous ideas by
Anglo-American warlords, mirrors their
aspirations of conquest, not having reliable
reserves or manpower at their disposal and
searching for obedient cannon fodder in the
Marshalised countries, the warmongers boom
and exaggerate the role of the Air Force
out of all proportion. (22)
In 1950, Colonel-General (later Marshal of Aviation)
S. Rudenko discounted the 'pseudo-scientific theory that a
war can be won by air bombing alone'. This theory, he explained,
(23)
had 'proved itself worthless* in the Great Patriotic War.
The growing American commitment to the atomic bomb was
also regarded as another example of the 'single weapon*
fallacy, the western search for a technical short-cut to
victory. Writing of atomic weapons in 1946, Stalin said:
I do not believe the atomic bomb to be as
serious a force as certain politicians are
inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs are
intended to intimidate the weak nerved,
but they cannot decide the outcome of a
war since atomic weapons are by no means
sufficient for this purpose. (24)
(22) Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, op. clt.. p.l75»
(23) Ibid., p.349; This has been confirmed in an important
recent Soviet study - see Col. I.V. Timokhovich,
Operativnoe iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Vellkoi
Otechestvennoi voine. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976,
esp. Ch.I and Ch.VI.
(24) Mackintosh, Juggernaut, op. cit.. p.278.
Western theories on mobility and surprise of tank
formations developed by Major-General J.S.C. Fuller,
B.H. Liddell-Hart and Colonel General Heinz Guderian, were
also denounced. In 1949, Major-General Isayev said, of
western tank strategy:
The last word in these modish capitalist
theories was the German fascist offensive
strategy and tactics of invasion armies,
which sought to decide the issue of war
by the operation of tank 'wedges', under¬
estimating the value of other forms and means
of warfare, and under-estimating also the
the role of strategic reserves in modern
warfare. As we know, all these one¬
sided theories and vagaries of military
thought resulted for the capitalist states
only in bitter disillusionment and great
catastrophies. (25)
(25) Garthoff, How Russia Hakes V.ar. op. cit.. p.175.
The 'Freeze1
As the only strategic doctrine which provided both a
genuinely scientific insight into warfare and a guarantee of
victory, 'Stalinist Military Science' was much more than
officially admired or recommended. From 1947 until the
Premier's death in 1953, it stood as the only permissible
expression of strategic thought. The virtual ban on any
reconsideration of declaratory doctrine, in effect, 'froze'
the nation's strategy in itE Vsorld War II mould, despite
dramatic developments in post-war weapons technology, as
well as highly significant changes in the post-war strategic
environment.
(26) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Kuclear Age.
op. cit.. pp.62-63; Also see J.M. Mackintosh,
'The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine
since 1918' in Michael Howard, ed., The Theory
and Practice of War. London? Cassell, 1965,
pp.262-263; Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Army
and the Communist Party: Institutions in
Conflict. Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation,
R-446-PR, August 1966, pp.189-191; Katthew P.
Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II.
Myths, Memories and Realities. Hew York:
P.A. Praeger, 1963, Chapters 1-4, pp.3-102, on
historical issues and the wartime record, the
post-war official line, the military and the
interpretation of the war and professional
historians and the war.
The Role of the Ground Forces
Although Soviet doctrine adhered to the combined arms
principle it, nevertheless, stressed the role of ground forces.
The decisive strategic mission wae to be performed by a massive
mobile and co-ordinated advance by infantry, artillery and
(27)
tactical airpower. Among the ground Army components the
infantry was described as the key element and artillery as 'the
main striking force' of the Army, acting in support of infantry
and armoured operations.Armoured forces were divided into
'tank divisions' and 'mechanised divisions'. The former were to
storm through the enemy's heavy defence while the latter were to
(29)
exploit the breakthrough achieved by tanks in pursuing the enemy. •"
Official or declaratory strategic doctrine explained that
the next great war would begin with a heavy air-atomic attack
which would only accomplish a temporary paralysis of the
victim's economy.(30) After the first great fusillade, the
(27) It must be emphasised that there are immense
difficulties in the way of compiling an accurate
account of developments in the Ground Forces after
1946: even official sources dispose of sparse
information. See Garthoff, How Russia Makes ftar.
# p. 174 .
(28) Ibid., pp.299-307.
(29) Ibid., pp.308-315.
(30) Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors.
New York: G.P. Putnam, Sons, 1950, pp.203-204.
conflict would settle into a lengthy war of attrition
dominate^ by ground forces. In the third and decisive phase,
a 'strategic counter-offensive' would be launched, emphasising
mobility and fire power in achieving the 'total annihilation
(31)
of the exhausted and defeated army'. ' This final phase
would end with what was described as 'operational pursuit
on a strategic scale' executed largely by jet aircraft and
(32)
self-propelled rocket artillery.
(31) Zacharias, op. cit.. pp.203-204
(32) Ibid., pp.204-205.
Naval Doctrine
During much of the pre-war period Soviet naval
strategists divided into so-called 'old* and 'young* schools
of thought. The old school represented an offensive ♦command
of the seas* doctrine, relying upon heavy surface ships in an
(33)
effort to control the seaward approaches to the Soviet Union.
In contrast, the young school regarded large surface ships as
both burdensomely expensive ana critically vulnerable to
submarines. Rather than spend lavishly on an imitation of
western surface fleets, the young school favoured a largely
defensive strategy based upon submarines, MTBs, high speed
(34)
destroyers and naval aviation. After a lengthy period of
young school dominance, Stalin began to move declaratory
doctrine in the old school direction in the 1930s, calling
for a large ocean-going fleet. In 1938 the Soviet President
M.I. Kalinin declared that; 'The strongest socialist country
must eclipse the strongest capitalist country - hence the Soviet
(35)
Navy must overshadow the British Royal Navy*. After
(33) R.V. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy. Annapolis Md.:
U.S. Naval Institute, 1968, pp.9-18.
(34) Ibid.. pp.19-27; Also on the *old school* - 'young
school' controversy, see Donald C. V.att, *Stalin* s
First Bid for Sea Power, 1933-1941', United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.90, No.6, June 1964,
pp.88-96.
(35) Ibid.. p.95; Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, op. cit..
pp.174, 362, 365.
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the Great Patriotic War in which the Navy played an
uninspiring part, official doctrine again reflected Stalin's
preference for large surface fleets. The Soviet Navy was at
least eventually to become a major ocean-going force, and, as such,
not only provide for the defence of the USSH, but also support
socialist revolution around the globe.
However, while calling for greatly expanded naval
capabilities, declaratory doctrine also continued to describe
(37)
the Navy as serving in support of ground Army operations.
Stalin characterised the Navy as 'the true helpers of The Bed
Army*, while Hear Admiral V. Belli wrote that: 'War on the
sea has historically never been an independent phenomenon,
( 38)
but always a part of a war as a whole'. In its subordinate
and defensive capacity, the Navy's major responsibility was not
command of the seas, but, in the words of Admiral Isakov,
'to protect the strategic flanks of the Bed Army extending to
the coasts, against enemy landing parties and naval operations,
and to direct its own blows against the enemy's flanks and
(36) Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet
Sea Power. New York: Macmillan, 1974, pp.470-471.
(37) Ibid.
(3P) See Admiral Belli in Vopros.y Strategii .... op. cit..
pp.725-736 for essay on the naval mission and naval
tasks: also Garthoff, How Russia ftak.es War, op. cit..
p.362.
(39)
rear. However, despite the apparently inferior doctrinal
status of the Navy, the post-war Stalin period also recorded
favourable analysis of the performance of navies in World
War II - particularly that of the Soviet Navy - as well as
assertions of an independent Soviet naval mission in a future
conflict, a mission performed thousands of miles from Soviet
territory in apparent contradiction of the view that the navy's
exclusive responsibility was the close support of Army
operations.
(39) Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, op. cit.. p.365.
(40) Mitchell, op. cit.. pp.469-471. There clearly were
expressions of naval support for the deployment of
a large 'balanced' ocean-going fleet which would be
entrusted with important strategic responsibilities,
much as described in 'old school' thinking before the
war. An aspect of the post-war naval desire for
powerful surface forces was reflected in the evidence -
much of it retrospective - of support for the
construction of aircraft carriers. In 1946 Admiral
V.A. Alafuzov wrote: 'The conditions of modern war
at sea demand the mandatory participation in the combat
operations of navies of powerful carrier forces, using
them for striking devastating blows against naval forces
of the enemy as well as for the contest with his
aviation. Both at sea and near one's bases these taske
can only be carried out by carrier aviation'; Herrick,
op. cit.. p.58; Also on the carrier issue, see Edward L.
Barber, 'Soviet Naval Aviation', United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, vol.187, No.l, January I960,
p.52; T.G. -artin, 'A Soviet Carrier on the Horizon',
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.96,
No.12, December 1970, pp.47-51; T.W. Wolfe, Soviet
Power and Europe. 1945-1970. Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Press, 197C, pp.46-47.
127.
Role of Air Power
During the Second World War air power played, at most,
a secondary part in both Soviet doctrine and combat experience.
Alter the German surrender, the Air Force was directed to the
history of the Great Patriotic War as the guide to the proper
form of air doctrine. Stalinist doctrixie continued to cast
air power in a supplementary, although not unimportant, role
(41)
in support of the ground forces. In 1943, Colonel-General
V. Sudets wrote:
... the training of air force units is
planned so that they can, first of all,
provide direct assistance to the ground
forces in all types of operations.
The development of all branches of the
Soviet air force is carried out in
accordance v/ith this fundamental
principle. (42)
Tactical aircraft, comprising most of the Soviet Union's
stock of combat aircraft, were charged with the Air Force's
major mission - assisting the rapid advance of the ground army,
while elite air defence forces defended the Soviet Union itself.(43)
Strategic aviation was also to strike deeply into enemy territory;
but the western stress on the critical sigxxificance of long-range
air strikes against the enemy's urban-industrial power base was
(44)
firmly rejected. Writing in 1949 in ^ilitar.y Thought
(41) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op* cit., p.170.
(42) Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, op. cit.. p.325; See
Timokhovich, op. cit.
(43) Garthoff, How Russia Makes War, op. cit.. pp.356-358.
(44) Ibid., pp.343-350.
(Voennaya tnysl) Colonel General (Aviation) Nikitin advised:
Soviet military science holds alien any
form of the one-sided theory widely
prevalent in the capitalist countries which
considers aviation as the most important
factor of contemporary war, capable practically
independently of deciding the contemporary war.
Our military science recognises that victory
in modern war is achieved by the combined
efforts of all forms and arms of the armed
forces, that no one arm can replace another,
and that each of them must participate on the
basis of able employment of all their character¬
istics and combat capabilities.
On the basis of this deeply scientific
principle, Soviet military science considers
the outcome of war under contemporary conditions
is decided on the field of battle by means of
the annihilation of the armed forces of the enemy
and that one of the most important tasks of
aviation is active assistance to the ground and
naval forces in all forms of their combat activity.
This definition of the fundamental mission of
aviation is not contradicted by the need to employ
part of its forces to strike the deep rear of the
enemy, on his military-industrial targets, but
our military science does not consider such
blows as an end in themselves, but only a
helpful means of creating favourable conditions
for the success of the combat operations of the
ground and naval forces. The structure of our
military air forces is established on the basis
of the scientific definition of the role and
significance of aviation in contemporary war. (45)
In short, the role of the Air Force within the context of
(45) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit..
pp.173-174.
the combined arms principle, was to be significant but only
supplementary. Further, this supplementary function was to
be largely performed on the basis of the World War II strategic
pattern, Stalinist air doctrine, like the body of Stalinist
military thought as a whole, assumed a rigid form in the post¬
war years, largely forbidding any readjustment to developments
in modern weapons technology and continuing to enforce the
model of the Great Patriotic War.^^ Nevertheless, the
writings of several Soviet commanders in the post-war Stalin
period, assessing the performance of strategic aviation during
the Great Patriotic War and considering its future role in the
light of modern technological developments, suggested that
long-range air power had achieved a greater significance than
it had ever before enjoyed within the still Army-dominated
(47)
combined-arms concept.
(46) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op, cit.«
pp.170-176; See Timokhovich, op. cit.. ch.4, pp.241-
260.
(47) For an official Soviet scenario for a Soviet-American war,
see H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union. New
Yorks F.A. Praeger, 1962, p.174.
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Stalinist military Policy
The Role of the Ground forces
In addition to declaratory strategic doctrine, the
Stalinist conception of modern warfare was also reflected in
operational doctrine or military policy. In harmony with the
declaratory doctrine which cast the ground forces in the central
strategic role, after World War II a demobilisation was carried
out which reduced the size of the Army while improving its
capabilities.Demobilisation brought a decline in manpower
levels, although the precise scope of that decline has been
(49)
disputed. Arms production was also cut and defence spending
reduced.However, the demobilisation was not a savage
(48) Once again the great difficulty in examining the
development of the Ground Forces after 1946 must
be noted. See discussion on force structures and
doctrine in a major essay by Major-General M.
Cherednichenko, 'Razvitie teorii Strategicheskoi
nastupatel'noi operatsii v 1945-1953 gg*, Voenno-
istoricheskii Zhurnal. 1976, No.8, pp.38-45; Also
see Col. Louis 3. Fly, The Red Army Today. liarrisburg,
Penn.j The Military Services Publishing Co., 1953.
(49) On demobilisation, see V.N. Donchenko, 'Demobilizatsiya
Sovetskoi Armii i veshenie problemy Kaarov v pervye
poslevoennye gody*, Istoriya SSR. 1973, No.3, pp.96-
102 (see Tables). No other western source has figures
of such validity.
(50) On arms production cuts, see macintosh, op. cit.. p.271;
On defence spending see Abram Bergson, 'Russian Defence
Spending', Foreign Affairs. vol.26. No.2, January 1948,
pp.373-376.
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assault on armed forces strength of the American type. In
the Army's case, there was a selective reduction as part of a
reorganisation programme lasting several years and conforming
to Stalin's personal faith in the importance of large numbers of
troops and weapons, his desire for increased divisional fire
(51)
power and mobility, as well as the concept of defence in depth.
The Army reorganisation brought important changes in the
administration of the armed forces generally and the Army in
particular, as well as changes in force structure and improvements
(52)
in equipment and weaponry. The reorganised ground forces
were deployed across the whole of the Soviet Union but were
concentrated along its western approaches. The generally extended
deployment revealed Stalin's commitment to a policy of active
perimeter defence designed primarily to protect the huge Soviet
continental land mass, a continental defensive emphasis which
was also reflected in the character and deployment of the other
(53)
armed services.
The dominant position of the Army in both Stalinist
declaratory and operational planning was in part, the result
(51) See under Ground Forces in 50 let vooruzhennykh sil
SSSR. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968, ch.ll, pp.506-511.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Union and Arms Control.
Baltimores Johns Hopkins Press, 1570, p.25.
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of professional military judgement and experience as well
as geopolitical factors. However, the heavy stress on ground
forces was also the product of the USSR's limited strategic
alternatives. The Soviet Union, confronted by an adversary
of enormous industrial strength, armed with an alarming new
weapon and, as the Soviet naval command emphasised (and still
does), representing a major maritime coalition, was unable to
deploy any strategic counterweight against the USA other than
a large ground army appearing to threaten the invasion of
western Europe (a 'hostage Europe' strategy) in response to
(54)
an American atomic attack.
(54) Mackintosh, op. cit.. pp.270-271; Wolfe, op. cit..
pp.32-35; Marshal D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign
Policy Re-appraised. Cambridge Mass.t Harvard
University Press, 1963; William Shelton, Soviet
Space Exploration. New York: Washington Square
Press, 1966, pp.37-38, quotes the Director of the
Nuclear Energy Centre at Novosibirsk, Dr. Gersh
Budscer, as saying of early post-war Soviet policyj
•We didn't have the A-bomb than and were afraid of
you. We have had a long history of people coming
to get us and we were nervous about your big bomb.
So we put a lot of troops on the new European
border. It was a show of bodies and force, but
it covered up for us. We bluffed it'.
133.
Role of Naval Power
The primary role of the Soviet Navy in this period, with
most of its manpower assigned to coastal defence and land-
based fortifications, was clearly the protection of the ground
Army's seaward flank.v55) Despite Stalin's 'Old School'
preference and pronouncements, and a vigorous programme of
naval construction, the USSR was unable to deploy an ocean¬
going Navy or to develop a new operational doctrine dealing with
the command of such a force either before or after ¥«orld V«ar 11.^^
(55) Hanson W. Baldwin, 'The Soviet Navy', Foreign Affairs.
vol.33, No.4, July 1955, p.601.
(56) See Boevoi put' Sovetskogo voennomorsKogo flota.
Moscows Voenizdat, 1974 (3rd Edn.), Ch.XII.
See also Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov,
fcorskaya moshch' gosudavatva. Moscow: Voenizdat,
1976, Ch.III for post-war developments. See also
Morskoi Sbornik. On the strength of Stalin's Navy
and the intensive surface and subsurface construction
programme, see Robert F. Kerner, 'Russian Naval Aims',
Foreign Afiairs. vol.24, No.2, January 1946, pp.290-
299; Frank Uhlig, Jnr., 'The Threat of the Soviet
Navy*, Foreign Affairs, vol.30, No.3, April 1952,
pp.444-454; Rudolf Lusar, "The Red Fleet is being
Built Up', United States Naval Institute Proceedings.
vol.80, No.l, January 1954, pp.57-66; Barker, op. cit..
pp.51-59; David Woodward, The Russians at Sea.
London: William Kimber, 1965; Michael MccGwire,
'Soviet Naval Capabilities and Intentions' in
The Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East: her
Capabilities and Intentions. London: RUSI, 1970;
and by the same author, 'Soviet Naval Procurement',
Ibid.; On the post-war acquisition of Axis ships,
see Lt. i.V. Tuleja, USNR, 'The historic Fattern of
Russian Naval Policy', United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, vol.77. No.9, September 1951, pp.959-967,
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Regardless of the support which may have genuinely existed
for a large surface fleet and the old school quality of
declaratory doctrine, the policy actually im; lensented
apparently included a blend of 'young school1 doctrinal
elements, with the 'fortress fleet' and 'fleet-in-being'
strategies. The 'fortress fleet' concept involved a fixed
passive defence intended to resist an amphibious invasion
with coastal artillery, anti-aircraft installations, naval
infantry, short-based aviation and coastal patrol craft.
•Fleet-in-being' referred to a more free ranging force
operating almost independently of coastal support installations,
a force largely to be composed of a destroyer leader and
cruisers under construction. These ships were initially to
protect Soviet coastal areas but were eventually to implement
(57)
an 'old school' strategy. Until such time as the Davy
shifted to an ocean-going posture, its main task was largely
coastal defence. In so far as any more ambitious 'command
(57) Herrick, op. cit.. pp.60-61j Richard A. Ehafter,
'A Sew Red Kaval Doctrine in the Making?', United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.78, So.10,
October, 1952, pp.1091-1090, discusses the
•fortress fleet' - 'fleet-in-being' concepts,
quoting Captain Alfred T. Mahan to the effect
that they represent: 'the antipod.es of each
other. They represent naval or military thought
polarised ...'•
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of the seas* or ocean-going objectives concerned the Russians,
it wac only to establish control of the seaward approaches ,to
the USSR. Ihirther, this mission was not to be accomplished
by warships alone, but was also to be greatly assisted by
/ CQ\
land-based air power and other on-shore elements.
However, in addition to coastal defence, the heavy post-war
investment in submarine construction reflected the assignment
of a new operational role to the Soviet Kavy, namely the
interdiction of western sea communications across the Atlantic.
The wartime force of some 220 submarines was improved and
expanded, providing the Russians with more than 300
(59}
submarines by 1953 to carry out this important new mission. '
(58) Baldwin, op. cit.. pp.601-602.
(59) Wolfe, op. clt.. pp.45-46; Also on submarine
strength, see T.V. Tuleja, op. cit.; F. Uhlig, Jr.,
op. cit.
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Role of Air tower
Like the Soviet Navy, the major strate0ic role of the
Air Force was to assist ground Army operations, largely
performing tactical missions in support of the Army's rapid
thrust into Europe. The post-war demobilisation reduced
aircraft production from 40,000 to 10,000 a year; but combat
strength remained largely unchanged and the Air Force retained
its status as second in size only to that of the United States.
Lore than 75^ of its combat aircraft were stationed in the western
regions of the USSR and central Europe.^1) Much of the total
force was assigned to close support operations for the ground
forces, eliminating enemy bases beyond the Army's grasp, conducting
reconnaissance and tactical interdiction. As well as tactical
support of the ground Army's offensive, the Air Force was also to
perform a vital and newly intensified air defence mission. The
air defence forces (EVO) underwent extensive improvement after
the war, with the rapid development of several new varieties
(60) Marshal of Aviation S.A. Krasovskii, (ed.), Aviatsiya
i kosmonavtika SSR. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968, Ch.V
for post-war developments. For a journalistic and
highly melodramatic survey see Robert Jackson,
The Red Falcons. London: Clifton Brodie, 1970,
p.164.
(61) Ibid.
of interception aircraft, the deployment of anti-aircralt
artillery and an attempt to construct the most effective visual
(62)
and radar warning system possible. Nevertheless, despite
a concentration on defensive capabilities, the air defence
system in this period remained inadequate. Aircraft were
not yet available in the required numbers or quality.
Further, in the absence of sufficient ground control inter¬
ceptor facilities, a shortage of all-weather aircraft, bad
(62) The highly successful post-war R&D programme
designed to develop interceptor aircraft -
greatly assisted by German and British technology -
produced several new aircraft types, including the
twin turbo-jet kiG-9. (Willian Green, 'The Develop¬
ment of Jet Fighters and Fighter 3ombers*, in Asher
Lee, ed., Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p.135). the
Yak-15. the first Soviet jet fighter, the succeeding
Yak-17. (Jackson, op. cit.. pp.162-163); The LA-15
anc* ¥ak-23. lightweight fighters, (Green, op. cit..
pp.137-138) and the I.liG-15. which was to supersede
^A-15 and Yak-23 (Ibid.. p. 130). Beginning from
a position of maBked inferiority at the end of
World War II, by the early 1950s, the fighter
development programme had raised the quality of
Soviet fighter technology to a level of equality
with that of the west (Asher Lee, 'Strategic Air
Defence', in Asher Lee, ed., op. cit.. p.120).
The inventory of Soviet tactical aircraft also
included the piston-engined IU-2 bomber, followed by
the twin-jet IL-28 (Asher Lee, The Soviet Air Force.
London: Duckworth, 1961, pp.167-168).
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weather training and an effective national radar warning
network, the Soviet Air Force was to remain capable of only
good visibility operations in the early 1950s.
Strategic aviation throughout Stalin's post-war leader¬
ship retained the distinctly subordinate position in Soviet
doctrine and policy which it had held during the war.
However, there were public expressions of support for an
improvement in its status. There was also a vigorous
effort to develop a long-range bomber, improve navigation,
flying and bombing skills, construct air bases and simulate
attacks on U.S. cities.
(63) Wolfe, op. cit.. pp.47-49.
(64) For example, departing somewhat from orthodox
strategic air doctrine in 1946, Major General of
Aviation Tartarchenko wrote: 'It would appear
that contemporary air forces are capable of
deciding not only tactical but also operational
and strategic tasks which no arm other than
aviation can fulfil ... in future engagements
the place of application of the main force will
be not so much the front as the rear of the enemy*.
(R.L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Kuclear Age.
op. clt.. p,17l); also in the support for
revision in strategic air doctrine, see Asher Lee,
The Soviet Air Force, op, cit.. pp.196-197; On the
effort to develop a strategic bomber, see below
pp. 151-/51.
(65) J.R. Shepley and C. Blair, Jn., The Hydrogen Bomb.
New York; David McKay, 1954, p.199.
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In 1953 the US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Nathan
Twining astimated that the Soviet Union commanded about 1,000
(66)
obsolescent TU-4 non-jet medium range bombers.v ' However,
with its 350 mile per hour speed and 4,000 mile range, the
TU-4 would have been unable to elude American jet interceptors
/ cn \
or to hit US cities and return to base. The Russians
(68}
were also still without an air refuelling capability. In
short, the programme of strategic aviation R &. D while
significant, did not signal any revision in strategic air
doctrine, nor did it succeed in providing an Air Force of
genuinely strategic capabilities until after Stalin's death.
It did succeed in demonstrating to the world that a potent
strategic bomber force was within the USSR's grasp .(*>9)
(66) Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, 'Long-Range
Air Attack' in Asher Lee, ed., Soviet Air and
Rocket Forces, op. cit.. p.108.
(67) Shepley and Blair, op. clt.. p.202.
(68) A.R. Horelick and M. Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet
Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, pp.17-18.
(69) Ibid., p.18. Also on Stalin's Air Force, see Robert
A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power. London:
Faber and Faber, 1962.
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East European Rearmament
While improving the strength of Soviet general purpose
forces, Stalin also pursued a programme of military assistance
to the USSR's European allies from 1949 to 1953. By 1948 the
Soviet Union had concluded bilateral defence treaties with the
countries of eastern Europe. In 1949 these nations began a
process of military improvement and reorganisation on the Soviet
model.The officer corps in each case was relieved of
those men unsuitable for professional or ideological reasons
and re-staffed with more acceptable native personnel or by
(71)
Soviet officers. Further, large quantities of Soviet
equipment in service with Russian troops were delivered to the
various national forces. By the time of Stalin's death, the
USSR's socialist allies in Europe supported about 1,500,000 men
in uniform, organised into some sixty-five to eighty divisions,
less than half of which were Judged to be combat ready in some
(72)
degree. East European air power was also attended to, with
the primary emphasis on the construction of airfields available
to the USSR's own aircraft, as well as the emplacement of an air
defence warning system. It was not until after the Korean ftar
(70) The basic reference in this context is Zarozhdenie
narodnykh armii stranuchastnits Vakshavskogo
Dogovora 1941-1949 gg. koscow; Mauka, 1975. passim.
See also Wolfe, op. cit.. p.42.
(71) The basic study on non-Soviet officer corps is still Ithiel
de Sola Pool, Satellite Generals. A study of kilitary
Elites in the Soviet Sphere, Hoover Institute Stucd.es, 1955,
passim; See also under national entries (eg. Hungary).
(72) Wolfe, op, cit.. p.43.
that a major effort began to improve east European air forces
(73)
and to integrate their strength with that of the Soviet Union.
While the Russians did not manage to accomplish entirely
the revival of eastern European armed forces or their full
integration into a broad structure of Soviet bloc defences
before Stalin's death, they did establish a large supplementary
force, impressive at least in quantitative terms and
significant as the basis for future co-operation and
(74)
standardisation of all socialist forces in Europe.
(73) Wolfe, op, cit.. p.43.
(74) Ibid.. p.44} For a general study of east European
rearmament, see (collective authorship) Zarozhdenie
narodnykh armii stran-uohastnits Varshavskogo
Dogovora 1941-1949 gg. Moscow: Eauka, 1975. For
a case study of the rearmament of Czech forces in
particular see K. Eejedly, 'X nekterym otazkam
budovani Cs lidove armady v duchu sovetske vedy v
letech 1948-1950', Historle a vo.ienstvi. Eo.4,
1963, pp.545-576.
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Weapons Research and Development
The principles of declaratory doctrine and the provisions
of operational strategy do not account for the whole of Soviet
etrate/ric development at this time. There is also the key
question of military research and development and the problem
of the relationship between advanced military technology - or
an advancing technology - and the ossification of 'doctrine*.
This problem is of particular interest in those areas of
intensive R and D activity which appear to conflict with
declaratory doctrine in its emphasis on conventional European
ground war and the World Sar II strategic model.
Atomic Weapons
Soviet atomic research began as early as the 1920s, with
many of its earliest researchers - euch as Peter Kapitse and
(75)
V.I. Vernadsky - returning to Russia after study in the west,
Vernadsky r turned from the Curie P.adium Institute in Paris to
found the USSR's State Radium Institute in 1922.In 1930
A.P. Ioffe conducted atomic research in the Physical-Technical
Institute in Leningrad, as programmes also proceeded in Moscow
(77)and Kharkov. Seven years later, Soviet scientists produced




Europe's first cyclotron. In 1940, a Sepcial Committee on
/ "70)
the Uranium Problem was established. Atomic research
before the war was not only remarkable for its scientific quality
but also for the open and unclassified atmosphere in which it
(79)
progressed, suffering very little, if any, political interference.
In 1941, the R&D effort was, of course, badly crippled by the
German invasion. Hevertheless, despite the difficult circumstances
it was during the war that the Soviet Union was first committed to
an atomic weapons programme. The precise date of the commitment
is not clear.Soviet physicist, Igor N. Golovin, set the
date at 1942, with an acceleration ordered after the first American
(81)
bomb test on July 16, 1945. Igor ¥. Kurchatov reported that
(82)
Soviet Physicists were developing atomic weapons during the war.
Speaking of the American atomic capability in Movember of 1945,
Foreign Minister kolotov advised: '... it is not possible at the
present time for a technical secret of any great size to remain
the exclusive possession of some one country or some narrow
(S3)
arch of countries'.
(78) Whiting, op. cit.. p.92
(79) Kilmarx, op. cit.. p.218
(80) It should be noted that biographical studies of Academician
Kurchatov place the origins of the Soviet military-nuclear
programme in the period 1942-1943: See P.T. Astashenkov,
Akademik I.V. Kurchatov. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971, pp.190-204.
(81) Wolfe, op. cit.. fn.7, pp.35-36.
(82) Whiting, op. cit.. p.93.
(83) Nogee, op. cit.. p.15.
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He pledged that: 'We shall make up properly for all lost time
and shall see to it that our country shall flourish. We shall
(64)
have atomic energy and many other things too'. ' Stalin is
said to have ordered an accelerated campaign for atomic weapons
/ QC\
development a few days after the American attack on Hiroshima.
In any case, the Russians were certainly engaged in serious
atomic weapons research by 1945.
In a February 1946 speech, as if hinting at the USSR's
new weapons research effort, Stalin subtly promised to end the
US atomic monopoly. The premier said:
special attention will be devoted
to ... the widespread construction of all
manner of scientific research institutions
that can give science the opportunity to
develop its potentialities. I have no
doubt that, if we give out scientists proper
assistance, they will be able, in the near
future, not only to overtake, but to surpass
the achievements of science beyond the
boundaries of our country. (86)
In September of 1947, G.M. Malenkov advised that:
*!« have set ourselves the task not only of catching up with
the scientific achievements abroad, but of surpassing them'.
Colonel G.A. Tokaev, a member of a special 1947 commission on
aviation and rocket plane research, quotes the commission's
president, Colonel-General Serov, as saying: 'Don't worry.
There can hardly be another war before 1950 or 1951, and by
(84) Kogee, op. cit.. p.15.
(85) Ian Grey, The First Fifty Years. New York:
Coward-AcCann, 1967, pp.412-413.
(86) Shulman, op. cit.. p.24.
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that time we shall have ato-rlc bombs - and better ones -
than the Americans*..'ilovan Djilas recalled Stalin
as having said of the atonic bomb in January of 1948s
•That is a powerful thing, powerful*. Djilas remembers,
'His expression was full of admiration, so that one was given
to understand that he would not rest until he, too, had the
"powerful thing"
With the firm support of the leadership, the Russians
themselves claim that their first graphite reactor, constructed
under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov, went into operation in
December of 1946, a development estimated by Arnold Kramish as
having occurred in the autumn of 1947.With a reactor in
service, one of the greatest problems had been solved.^0)
Robert Kilmarx explains that:
After 1947 the programme moved into high
gear as uranium ore extraction was
increased} reactor development for the
production of plutonium was accelerated*
uranium isotope separation by the
gassebus diffusion method was initiated
and a larger accelerator construction
programme was developed. Significant
increases were alr>o made in research
facilities (particularly under the
Academy of Science) and in nuclear weapons
testing and production. (91)
(87) Col. G.A. Xokaev, Stalin eans war. London:
Weidenfeld and Ficolson, 1951, p. 123.
(88) Shulman, op. clt.. p.21.
(89) Viiolfe, op. clt.. fn.7, pp.35-36.
(90) Whiting, op. cit.. p.93.
(91) Kilmarx, op. cit.. p.226.
The efforts of Soviet scientists were rewarded in 1949
when the Russians surprised the world with their first atomic
explosion. Frogress continued in the early 1950s,
bringing the detonation of the USSR's first air-dropped
hvdrogen bomb in 1953. some time before the date predicted by
American experts and before the United States had itself
exploded an air-dropped weapon. With the end of 1953, the
Russians had seven nuclear explosions to their credit and
seven more by October of 1954. Overall, between 1949 and
(92) The USSR in the late 1940s commanded sufficient
scientific knowledge and resources to develop atomic
weapons without foreign assistance. However, the
Russians could not call upon the magnitude of
economic and industrial strength to support an
intensive research programme of the American type.
To speed the development process, they therefore,
supplemented their scientific inquiries with a
considerable intelligence effort. (Lansing Lamont,
Day of Trinity. New York: Atheneum, 1965, p.282).
A Canadian Royal Commission in 1946 uncovered a
widespread Russian intelligence campaign in North
America which, after 1945» had emphasised the
collection of atomic secrets. (J.N. Westwood,
Russia 1917-1964. Harper and Row, 1966, p.144).
While the Soviet Union would have produced atomic
bombs without any such espionage programme, it has
been estimated that the information gathered abroad
reduced the time needed to detonate the first weapon
by as much as three years. (Lamont, op. eit.. p.282).
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(93)
1959 fifty to sixty nuclear devices and weapons were tested.*'
From the quantity of resources, committed, and the pace
of the research effort undertaken, it is clear that, despite
the tone of the declaratory position on the new weapons
technology, Stalin strongly supported an intensive programme
of atomic weapons development.
(93) Kilmarx, op. cit.. p.258.
Missiles and Missile Research
In addition to the rapid development of atomic weapons,
there was also an intensive effort in Stalin's later years
to produce military rocket and long-range missile delivery
systems. With a long standing interest in massed artillery,
the Russians have been concerned with the military applications
of rocketry for many years. They developed a group of
scientists familiar with the field before the Second Tvorld
War, operating a military rocket research programme in the
1930s.While nearly all available resources had to be
devoted to resisting the German attack, before the end of the
Great Patriotic War the Soviet government resumed rocket
(95)
research. During the war the Russians introduced the
Stalin Orpan. a launcher with sixteen to sixty Katyushka
rockets, each with a three to six mile range. 1943
a rocket-propelled penetration bomb was available for launch
(97)
from Stormovik fighters. Speaking of far more advanced
weapons, Stalin reportedly spoke to a meeting of the Polit-
bureau and the Council of Ministers in 1947, askings
(94) Andrew S. Haley, Rocketry and Space Exploration.
Princeton: Van Kostrand, 1958, p.94.
(95) Shulman, op. cit.. pp.24-25.
(9b) Haley, op. cit.. p.94.
(97) Haley, Ibid.. p.94.
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Oo you realise the tremendous strategic
Importance of machines of this sort?
They could he an effective straight-
jacket for that noisy shopkeeper Harry
Truman. fte must go ahead with it,
comrades. The problem of the creation
of transatlantic rockets is of extreme
Importance to us. (98)
Reflecting the importance of long-range rockets, an
intensive effort was made to benefit from German experience in
the field, first as a further development of artillery, but
(99)
later as a vital part of strategic warfare. After the war,
the Russians attempted to reconstruct German rocket production
facilities, rebuilding the rocket research centre at Peenemuende.
as well as other miseile and aircraft engine installations.^*0^
Technical 'talent scouts' searched Germany for scientists,
attempting to convince those in the western occupation zones to
enlist in the service of Soviet research.
In October of 1946 all available scientists in the Soviet
zone were transported to the USSR.^*U*^ Dr. G.A. Tokaty,
chief Soviet rocket scientist in occupied Germany, recalls
(98) Dr. G.A. Tokaty, 'Soviet Rocket Technology' in
E.M. Emme, ed.. The History of Rocket Technology.
Detroit: %ayne State University Press, 1964,
pp.280-281.
(99)Kilmarx, op, cit.. p.223.
£lOO)Asher Lee and R.E. Stockwell, 'Soviet issiles' in
Asher Lee, ed., The Soviet Rocket and feissile Forces.
op. oit.. pp.148-149. " — —
(101)Ibid.
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Stalin*s great displeasure at being unable to acquire any of
the leading V-2 or other rocket engineers and administrators,
nor a complete German rocket factory organisation. Instead,
the Russians were able only to piece together ruined German
research facilities, shipping laboratories and workshops to
the USSH.^102^
Dr. Walter Dornburgher, commanding general at ieenemunde
explained that at the end of the war the United States and the
Soviet Union were approximately equal in the quality of their
rocket technology but, thereafter, their respective programmes
evolved differently. Dornburgher described American research
as employing the advances of German knowledge in a broad pattern
of long term weapons development, whereas the Russians operated
under a 'do it as soon as possible' approach.
After Germany's defeat, top priority was assigned to
rocket research behind a wall of heavy security.Between
the years 1947-1953 missiles were not publicly discussed,
despite the intensive work underway on their development.
Post-war research, while fairly comprehensive, early stressed
ballistic missiles. ^ Within that field work on surface-to-
(102) Tokaty, 'Soviet Rocket Technology' in Emme, op. cit.. p.279*
(103) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit.. p.153*
(104) Haley, op. cit.. p.123.
(105) Gartboff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit.. p.225.
(106) Ibid.. p.232.
surface ballistic missiles was considered the project of
over-riding importance, the first priority being the
acquisition of a few V-2(A-4) weapons as the basis for the
later development of long range missiles.Work also
proceeded on increasing the range, payload and reliability of
the V-2 type with the aim of rapidly beginning the production
of missiles of medium and intercontinental range.Further,
an ICBM project may have begun as early as 1948.^°^
Certainly the Russians were very far from satisfied with
the capabilities of the V-2. In the autumn of 1946, Air
Force Marshal Zhigarev saidj
We must admit that our V-2 type rockets
do not satisfy our long term needs, they
were good to frighten England, but should
there he an American-Soviet war, they
would be uselessj what we really need are
long range, reliable rockets capable of
hitting target areas on the American
continent. This is an aim that should
dominate the mind and efforts of your
(Dr. G.A. Tokaty's) rocket group. (110)
(107) Kilmarx, op. clt.. p.233.
(108) Ibid., pp.233-234.
(109) Ibid., p.234.
(110) Tokaty, 'Soviet Rocket Technology' in
Emme, op. cit.. p.280.
On March 14, 1947, G.KI. Malenkov reportedly told a
Kremlin meeting of aircraft and rocket designers:
No comrades; 1 am not happy with our
V-2s; we cannot rely on such a primitive
weapon; besides, should there be another
war, it would be a war, not against Poland;
our strategic needs are predetermined by
the fact that our potential enemy is to
be found thousands of miles away. (Ill)
According to Dr. Tokaty, with German help, V-2
production was fully restored during 1945-46.^^"^ The levels
of V-2 output at Peenemunde in 1944 were equalled by the Russians
between 1946 and 1947. By the period 1949-1990, Tokaty claims
levels far exceeding Peenemunde's performance in both quantity
and quality.fly 1949, he asserts that the achievement of
full serial production of a large single stage rocket, a much
improved V-2 described as the 'Pobeda' or T-l type, with a
maximum range of some 500 miles. ^
(111) Tokaty's 'Soviet Rocket Technology' in
Erame, op. cit.. p.220.
(112) Ibid., p.279.
(113) Ibid.. p.280; The first test of a ballistic missile,
labelled the R-l is reported to have taken place
in October 1947, with an improved version, the
R-2. tested in 1950, P.E. Efimov (Col.Gen.), ed.,
Boevoi Soyuz Bratskikh Armii. Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1974, p.212.
(114) Tokaty, 'Soviet Rocket Technology' in
Emme, op. cit.. pp.279-280.
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The years 1951 and 1952 brought further reports of an
improved V-2 produced in large numbers.(11^) Par from
satisfied with the T-l1 s inadequate range, a programme for its
immediate improvement was begun. Experiments on a winged
version increased the range to 990 miles, but, as this too
was far short of the mark, work began on a weapon of more
advanced design, the T-2. first test-fired in the late 1940s.
A two-stage rocket, it had a range estimated at from 1,200 to
1,500 miles. In any case, it looked to be a genuine inter¬
mediate range ballistic missile.
Several test-firings of an IRBM type were conducted in
1954 and 1955, likely including the last T-2 tests.
While T-2 marked a quite respectable achievement, it was
also unsatisfactory for use against North American targets.
Nevertheless, it provided the basis for a missile of the
highly desirable intercontinental range, the three-stage T-3.
on which work may have begun as early as 1948.





Ab well as the T-3. the Russians were also attempting
to perfect a boost-glide rocket powered vehicle. This
weapon, theoretically, could have served as a high-altitude
bomber. 3ased upon the German 'Saenger concept', it was
designed to reach an altitude of 162 milee and, by skipping
along the layers of the atmosphere near the Karth'e surface,
fly up to 10,000 miles without landing or refuelling in flight.^^)
In addition to ground launched weapons, research was also
conducted into the possibility of launching missiles from
submarines. It has been reported that in 1945 the judgement
was made that the submarine offered the most suitable launcher
for the delivery of the USSR's future atomic weapons on Korth
American targets. The warhead was allegedly to be delivered
by a torpedo detonating a shallow waterburst.However,
regardless of the accuracy of these reports, the Soviet
occupation of Germany offered the Russians an alternative
submarine launching system - a 100ft. German submersible
launching platform or canister, designed to fire a V-2 rocket
from a gyro-stabilised platform. Under the German plan, three
such 500-ton canisters were to be towed by a single submarine.^121^
(119) Kilmarx, op. clt.. p.234.
(120) MccGwire, op. cit.. p.84.
(121) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit.. p.151.
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The Russians also acquired German plans for an improved
version of this early submarine missile system, tentatively
labelled the y-3.*122^ In the Soviet adaptation of the V-3
system, the Z-claas submarine was chosen as the launch vehicle.
In 1947-1948, it was reportedly decided to develop a nuclear
submarine, with diesel Z-clags remainixjg the interim launcher
for a missile with a 350n.m. range - the Z V-class SSB. In
1949-1950, the decision was made to install three Z V-class SSBs
on board each Z-clase submarine. The first test-firing took
place in 1955.(123)
The vigorous effort to develop long-range missiles,
which could only be of great significance in the US-Soviet
strategic relationship, when joined with atomic warheads
accounts for another instance of apparent conflict between
a doctrinal orthodoxy stressing European ground war and
conventional weapons and the post-war programme of military
R k e.(^4)
(122) Albert Parry, Russia's Rockets and Missiles.
London« Pacmillan, i960, p.153.
(123) T'ccGwire, op. cit.. p.84.
(124) Also on Soviet rocket and missile development, see
Col. G.A. Tokaev (Tokaty), Stalin Deans ¥»ar.
London: Weldenfeld and Kicolson, 1951; Soviet
Space Programmes: Organisation. Plans. Goals and
International Implications. U.S. Government
Printing Office: Staff Report prepared for the use
of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session. Pay 31, 1962j
Michael Stoiko, Soviet Rocketry: The First Decade of
Achievement. Sewton Abbot; David and Charles, 1970.
Strategic Aviation
In addition to atomic and missile research, the efiort
to develop a strategic bomber marked a third major research
progracjne which could be regarded as conflicting in some
degree with a declaratory doctrine which strongly emphasised
conventional ground war in the European theatre. During World
War II the American B-25 twin-engine bomber served as the
Soviet strategic aircraft. In April of 1944, Stalin
requested 500 US four-engine Liberators and 3-17s. While
this request was never granted, the Russians did acquire the
B-17 and 3-27 in 1943 and 1944. however, as these aircraft
were unable to reach North American targets they were not
placed in production. In 1944 a suitable model for
strategic bomber production finally came into Russian hands
when four 3-29A aircraft crash-landed in Siberia.The
senior Soviet air force official, Marshal Konstantin Vershinin
(127)
ordered that a Soviet prototype of these aircraft be produced. '
(125) Kilmarx, op. cit.. p.209. It should be noted that
there is no complete history of the Soviet Air Force.
An unpublished work by Alexander Boyd, history of
Soviet Air Power, is to be published by macdonalds at
the end of 1976.
(126) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit..
p.177; On the B-29 crash and its consequences, also
see 'The Billion Dollar Bomber*, parts 1 and 2,
Air Enthusiast, vol.1, Eos. 2 and 3, July and August, 1971.
(127) Shepley and Blair, op. cit.. p.198.
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In only one year A.N. Tupolev turned out a modified B-29.
labelled the TU-4. and drew the blueprints for its mass
production.By 1948, it was in mass production and the
(129)
first deliveries were made to long-range aviation.
Although TU-4 production represented a remarkable achievement,
the TU-4 was only a medium-range bomber, with a maximum radius
of action of less than 1,500 miles.
By the time of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, the
USSR was still without a long-range bomber capable of striking
US targets. The Soviet Air Force retained its
(132)
continental or European orientation.* ' It was unable to
endanger the United States itself and posed only a secondary
(133)
threat to Europe with ageing propeller driven bombers.
The inability to develop a heavy jet bomber by 1950, or soon
thereafter, stemmed primarily from the difficulty of producing
(128) Shepley and Blair, op. cit.. p.198.
(129) Kilmarx, op. cit.. p.230.
(130) Philip Joubert, 'Long-Range Air Attack', in Asher
Lee, ed., Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p.107.
(131)Ibid.
(132) Wolfe, op, cit.. pp.40-42.
(133) Joubert, Ibid., p.108.
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a jet engine of sufficient power.
After the Korean ¥,ar a number of improvements were,
nevertheless, achieved in long-range aviation which was now
made to more closely resemble America's Strategic Air Command.
Navigation and bombing skills were improved; ever longer
cross-country and over-water flights were made; large formation
flights were practised; in-flight refuelling was studied;
bombing attacks on US cities were simulated; air bases were
built and, by 1955, 700 TU-4s were in service.^^5) Further,
the propulsion problem was greatly eased by the development
of a co-axial jet engine design with over 10,000 lbs. of static
thrust. In 1954 engines capable of 15,000 lbs. of thrust -
as powerful as any in the world - were being built.
In the same year, the Russians succeeded in producing the Badger
a twin-turbojet medium bomber and two heavy intercontinental
bombers, the four-turbojet Bison and the multi-turbojet Bear.
The USSR was also developing a fleet of in-flight refuelling
aircraft, adding new long-range airfields and improving aircraft
, V-
(137)
dispersal in the Arctic region. '
(134) Joubert, op. cit.« p.108.
(135) Shepley and Blair, op. cit.. p.199.
(136) Joubert, op. cit.. p.lo8.
(137) Ibid., p.109.
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The Badger was a turbojet design with a 1,500 mile
radius of action and a maximum speed of 600 to 625 miles
per hour. The Bear had four jet turboprop power units, with
a 12,000 lb. shaft horee power in each engine, a radius of
action of over 4,000 miles, a maximum bomb load of ten tonB
* - «■»
and a top speed of 500 m.p.h. The Bear was the first Russian
»:< mtmmmrnmmrn 1M,/
bomber with North American range and aerial refuelling capability.
It was in service at the beginning of 1954, but its turboprop
engines were unable to reach supersonic or high subsonic
M 1Q\
speeds. The four turbojet Bison was the fastest of the
long-range jet bombers and was to roll off the production line
(139)
at the rate of fiteeen to twenty per month from 1955 onward.
■ -we
The apparent urgency of the post-war R&D programme of
bomber development which was to provide the USSR with an air¬
borne intercontinental strike capability after Stalin's death
marked a third major research undertaking which was not entirely
compatible with a declaratory doctrine which described the
bombing of an enemy's urban-industrial areas as, at most, a
secondary and indecisive mission.
(138) Joubert, op, cit.. p.110.
(139) Ibid.
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Role of Action-Reaction in the Development
of Stalinist Strategic Doctrine
Evidence of Reaction
The post-war future of the Soviet Union's wartime strategic
doctrine was assured by its adoption as Stalin's personal
strategic creed. By 1947 the doctrine and experience of the
war were established as timeless and unquestionable strategic
truth. In such circumstances, the USSR was poorly placed for
sensitive reaction to American actions. However, despite the
rigidity of Stalinist strategic doctrine and its calcifying
influence on operational planning, there is evidence of some
degree of Soviet responsiveness to American actions and devel¬
opments.
Adversary Perception
The sheer proportions of American power and potential,
«** -
as well as the course of US foreign policy after the war, all
but ensured an early and fundamental political 'reaction' in the
Soviet identification of the United States as a major adversary
whose opposing interests and formidable capabilities demanded
the maintenance of substantial Soviet military forces. The
United States emerged from the Second V.orld War with tremendous
economic power. In addition to industrial strength, she
commanded a large ocean-going navy, a force of relatively long-
range aircraft and an entirely new weapons technology of
unparalled destructiveness. America also clearly demonstrated
her opposition to the spread of Soviet influence by the adoption
of a foreign policy of Containment. This policy was implemented
in Europe by economic and military aid to anti-Communist
elements in Greece and Turkey and the gathering of much of
western Europe into an anti-Soviet alliance in 1949. These
developments, added to the USSR's ideological perspective,
were more than adequate to cast the United States in the role
of a dangerous adversary.
(140) Isaac Deutscher in Stalin. London: Oxford
University Press, 1967, pp.983-585, argues that
the American atomic monopoly and the Truman
doctrine of economic aid to the anti-Communist
cause generated the post-war Soviet build-up
in conventional forces which, in turn,




" The 'Hostage Europe* Strategy
Evidence of Soviet 'reaction' to the United States in
this period also appeared in the so-called 'hostage Europe'
strategy. During the late 1940s the Russians were faced by
a rival whose atomic capability they would be unable to equal
for several years. The military-political threat implicit
in this alarming American advantage probably prompted a desire
for some variety of Soviet countermensure, both to provide for
the physical security of the USSR as well as to ensure against
any US attempt to exploit its unique strategic capability in
political terms. The establishment of large Soviet general
purpose forces on the frontiers of western Europe cannot be
explained as solely a response to the atomic bomb. Nevertheless,
the apparent holding of Europe 'hostage' was likely encouraged
by the American atomic monopoly and represented an attempt to
'react' to the American 'threat* as effectively as possible in
difficult circumstances. uch as the Americans were driven to
'react' to the USSR with atomic weapons by an unwillingness,
or a practical political inability, to respond in any other
fashion, the Russians were compelled by their economic and
technological limitations to 'react' to the USA by deploying
a conventional military counter-weight in Europe. In other
words, while the perception of the United States as an adversary
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inspired a Soviet strategic response, the nature of that
response was very significantly determined by the internal
economic and technological constraints placed upon Soviet
policy. Added to the influence of domestic constraints, the
ground Army 'reaction1 was encouraged by Russian military
tradition and experience, as well as positively demanded by
the principles of Stalinist strategic orthodoxy.
Strategic Air Power
Although there was no major reform of strategic air
doctrine in Stalin's time, there was evidence of some public
support for its revision, accompanied by a major investment in
the development of long-range aircraft. The apparently
intensified interest in strategic aviation likely represented
a reaction to the superiority of western aviation after the
war. The physical evidence of the Allied bombing of Germany
observed by Stalin on the occasion of the Potsdam Conference,
reportedly prompted an acceleration in the development of Soviet
strategic air power, a project which came before the Politbureau
in 1948.^^"^ Yet another external encouragement for the
improvement of strategic aviation was the technological treasure
(141) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age,
op. cit.. p.178.
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which fell into Russian hands during the occupation of Germany.
The Soviet occupation zone included about 80^ of enemy air¬
craft production facilities. However, while a heightened
interest in long-range aviation and the programme of bomber
development were likely stimulated from abroad, the still
largely unchanged nature of air doctrine demonstrated the
limited effect of external stimuli on Stalinist air doctrine. ^^3)
4
(142) Group-Captain E.M. Clause, 'Soviet Concepts of
Air Power', in The Soviet Union in Europe and
the Hear East: Her Capabilities and Intentions.
'i I p.61.
(143) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit.,
pp.170-176.
Air Defence
While the declaratory Soviet position on strategic
aviation did not undergo any radical revision during Stalin's
post-war years, military policy affecting the nation's Air
Defence Forces (FVQ) was substantially altered. Air defence
had not been regarded as a high priority strategic mission
either before or during the Great Patriotic War.^"^^ However,
after the war a vigorous attempt was made to increase the
nation's air defence capability. This re-assessment of air
defence marked a clear Soviet reaction to an adversary with
extensive experience in strategic bombing, superior bomber
technology and a rapidly growinc commitment to long-ran&e
aviation. Specifically, the Soviet reaction involved an
intensive development of jet aircraft suitable for defensive
operations, a programme cf fighter pilot training, the expansion
of air base and ground support facilities and an effort to
establish an early warning radar system.gaCh of these
actions can be reasonably regarded as a response to western
air power.
(144) For a basic historical outline, see Voiska protivovozdushnoi
oborony strany. Ist.ocherk, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968,
Pt.III, Ch.l and Ch.2, p.337 ff.
(145) Kilmarx, op, cit.. p.228.
166.
Declaratory Kaval Doctrine
Similarly, the clear support for the construction of an
ocean-going navy during the Stalin period was very likely
encouraged by the example of large western navies and as
such, also qualifies as a kind of Soviet reaction to external
stimuli. The desire for a shift in naval doctrine and
deployments received far more high level backing than the
occasional suggestion of increased emphasis on strategic
bombing. Stalin personally expressed his own desire for a
•big navy' posture on a number of occasions. However, the
simple recitation of 'old school' doctrine did not produce an
effective 'response' to western naval superiority in
operational terms, as neither the doctrine nof the quantity
of surface ships required by the 'old school' philosophy
were produced.^^6)
A far more direct and effective reaction took place
with regard to Soviet subsurface forces. After the Second
World War, the Russians were confronted by large Anglo-
American surface fleets. Further, the post-war western
(146) 3ee below pp. 175-17fc.
alliance arrangements between Europe and North America
relied significantly upon American seaborne supply and
reinforcement of Europe. The Soviet policy on submarine
construction, providing for a substantial increase in
submarine strength, was a response to the new post-war
naval environment, arming the USSR with an expanded
submarine force in order to assault enemy surface fleets
and to sever the American-European sealink.
Military Research and Development
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While the attempt to develop atomic weapons in the USSR
began before the first US test, the acceleration of atomic
research after the war represented a reaction to the much more
advanced American capability. From the available evidence it
would appear that Stalin regarded a permanent American atomic
monopoly as intolerable. He, therefore, ordered that a Soviet
weapon be developed as soon as possible, marking a direct
emulative reaction to the United States. Similarly, the post¬
war effort to produce strategic bomber aircraft was also spurred
by the example of western capabilities. However, in each case -
atomic weapons and long-range aircraft - after the technology
had been developed it was placed within a Soviet doctrinal
context. In other words, sven after acquiring both boobs
and bombers, the Russians did not adopt the air-atomic emphasis
looming ever larger in American strategic thought. Technology
may have been emulated but doctrine was not.
Unlike tha programmes of atomic and aircraft research, the
intensive and highly significant effort to develop a Soviet
missile capability can only be considered as a response to
American actions in the broadest terms. It can be regarded as
responsive only in so far as it was prodded by a desire to acquire
an intercontinental strategic reach, drawing Korth America within
the range of Russia strike forces. However, the history of
Soviet missile R&D reveals its essentially domestic origins.
(147) See pp. IVJ'155^ 171-180.
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Evidence of Domestic Influences on Doctrine
While there were specific instances of Soviet reaction
to and occasionally emulation of American actions -
particularly in technological terms - the sources of Soviet
strategic doctrine and policy in this period were over¬
whelmingly domestic or internal, as Stalinist strategic
doctrine displayed a rigidly unchanging and unresponsive
quality.
The Doctrinal 'Freeze'
Stalinist strategic doctrine as a whole clearly displayed
a stiffly unresponsive character. More than seemingly
unmoved by American actions, it appeared overtly hostile to
any reforming influence, whether foreign or domestic. Despite
dramatic technological developments in the United States and
significant changes in the Soviet strategic environment,
'Stalinist Military Science' was established - in its wartime
form - as the supreme accomplishment in military thought,
superseding all other analyses. American doctrine was sharply
dismissed as trivial and unscientific. All earlier commentators
on strategy - including Lenin - were discounted and Stalin
proclaimed the exclusive strategic authority and his military
science the ultimate unchallengeable conception.
This intensely rigid and introspective declaratory view
was in part the result of the needs of domestic and foreign
propaganda, a desire to assure the Soviet prople and the world
at large that the USSR's technological inadequacies would have
no significant effect on the outcome of another conflict.
It may also have been supported by the same conservatism which
initially prevented American planners from re-drawing US
strategy immediately after the war. However, beyond the needs
of propaganda and the effect of any professional military
conservatism, the virtual 'freeze* on doctrine in general,
the continued primacy of 'the permanently operating factors'
in particular, and the relegation of such factors as surprise
attack to a secondary status, were decisively determined by
the views and objectives of Stalin himself. The hardening
of doctrine in its World War II form was largely the result
<■*>-* •**
of Stalin's personal strategic oonvictions, as well as the
aim of maintaining his position as the definitive strategic
thinker and the architect of victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Sensitive and direct doctrinal response to American actions or
the implications of modern weapons technology would have
endangered the Premier's Olympian place in Soviet history and
strategic thought and compromised his authority in contemporary
affairs. Each of these entirely domestic, indeed personal,
political factors proved far more influential in forming Soviet
doctrine than the actions of the United States.
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Assessment of Atomic Weapons
The secondary role assigned to the atomic bomb in both
declaratory and operational doctrine during these years provides
further evidence of Stalinist strategic insensitivity to US
actions. The development of atomic weapons in the USSR was
greatly accelerated by American actions and the official
denigration of their significance was to a degree inspired by
the need to put the best public face on the Soviet Union's
technological shortcomings. However, the persistent
subordination of the new technology to eBtablishftfsys terns -
even after the end of the American atomic monopoly - and the
failure to train the armed forces in the conduct of an atomic
war was internally motivated. Firstly, the entire weight of
Soviet tradition and experiences, backed by the example of the
recent world war, did not favourably dispose the Russians to
a radically new air-atomic strategy. Like many of their
American counterparts, Russian commanders continued to prefer
battle-tested systems and proven strategic concepts. This
preference was no doubt effectively supported within the
policy-making machinery by a large and politically influential
ground army which would have had little to gain by mimicking
the American assessment of long-range aviation and atomic
weapons. The much inferior status of these weapons was also
ensured by Stalin's personal desire to preserve wartime
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strategic doctrine inviolate. Beyond the political motivations
for maintaining the doctrinal status quo, the Premier's
unadmiring view of the atomic bomb was also due to his
apparent failure to fully understand the profound effect which
technology was to have on the nature of modern warfare.
As a consequence, while strongly supporting every effort to
end the American atomic monopoly and acquire the latest variety
of 'improved explosive', Stalin did not recognise any need to
modify Soviet doctrine.The new and better bomb was
simply to increase the effectiveness of the Great Patriotic
War strategy.
(148) Kenneth R. Whiting in 'The Past and Present of
Soviet Military Doctrine', Air University
Quarterly Review, vol.XI, No.l, Spring 1959,
pp«38-6o.,questions the degree to which
Stalinist doctrine was actually 'backward and
obtuse', suggesting that it was adequate to
Soviet interests and capabilities at the time.
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Role of the Ground Army
As well as failing to imitate the growing air-atomic
emphasis in US strategy, the Russians also maintained a view
of ground armies which diverged dramatically from American
policy. In accord with American tradition, the United States
rapidly dismembered its conventional forces after the war.
In sharp contrast, Stalin presided over a programme of Army
reorganisation and modernisation, providing the USSR with a
large and generally improved standing army.
Although any drastic demobilisation of the American
kind would have been incompatible with the responsive 'hostage
Europe' policy, the distinctly 'un-American' stress on
conventional armies in Soviet doctrine was largely the product
of domestic factors. Russia's military tradition, historical
experience and geo-political position would have all but
compelled any post-war government to retain the powerful
ground armies which had been maintained long before the
United States emerged as a world power. High conventional
force levels were essential to resist local attacks, as well
as to ensure the 'progressive' political development of central
Europe. The dominant strategic role of the army was also
sustained by its position as the major and most influential
military institution within the USSR, fully able to resist
any encroachment upon its status from the other armed services
Finally, the army's paramount place was decisively
supported by Stalin's personal interest in the preservation
of a doctrinal orthodoxy which had long upheld the primacy
of the ground forces within Russian and Soviet strategic
doctrine. In short, 'hostage Europe' aside, any emulation
of American ground force policy was firmly ruled out by the
historical and geo-political facts of Soviet life, as well
as the overwhelming weight of institutional and even
personal political interest.
Naval Policy
After many years of marked Inferiority to the great
naval powers of the west, declaratory Soviet naval doctrine
did, in fact, betray some evidence of responsiveness to
western, if not particularly American, capabilities. Any
assessment of the 'big navy1 element in declaratory doctrine
as a direct reaction to a specifically American challenge
is complicated by Stalin's expre sion of an 'old school'
preference in naval planning long before the United States
developed as the major 'threat' to Soviet security. As
early as the 1930s, Stalin sought increased naval strength
in an effort to achieve something nearer equality with the
west at sea. More importantly, claims of responsiveness in
Stalinist naval doctrine are not entirely confirmed by the
record of naval planning and deployments during the late
1940s and early 1950s. In contrast with the public support
for a large ocean-going surface fleet of the American or
British type, no such force wle deployed, nor was an operational
ocean-going strategy developed. Instead, the Soviet Navy,
while substantially strengthened after the war, largely retained
its secondary strategic status and coastal defence role. Its
major new responsibility was an interdiction role to be performed
by submarines. The failure to make good in operational terms on
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the ambitious 'old school' surface doctrine was the consequence
of several domestic constraints on policy. Firstly, Russian
historical experience, the geographical position of the USSR
and possibly the weight of Army opinion and influence, all
worked to maintain a Navy of less than 'blue water' capabilities,
as well as a naval strategic role which declaratory doctrine
continued to describe as indecisive, despite several 'old
school' public pronouncements. Secondly, a Navy of the
formidable proportions which Stalin desired would have added
a heavy burden to the strained resources of post-war Russia.
Ravaged by years of fierce fighting, the development of a
large 'balanced' fleet at least had to be postponed. In the
interim, a more economical and traditional alternative was
accepted in the maintenance of the Navy's role as a largely
defensive force of only secondary strategic significance.
The most direct and effective Soviet naval reaction to
western policy under this interim strategy was expressed in
the much expanded submarine force designed to breech seaborne
trans-Atlantic links between the United States and Europe.
Role of Air Power
To the extent that the discussion of long-range air power
in the Soviet Union revealed an Increased interest in strategic
bombing after the war - an interest reflected in the vigorous
effort to produce a long-range bomber - the Soviet Union might
be said to have reacted to the example of western capabilities.
However, any such 'reaction' proved to be very limited in its
effect, as Soviet air doctrine remained largely unchanged in
both declaratory and operational tens throughout the post-war
Stalin period. Efforts were made to reorganise and improve
Soviet, capabilities in the air; but the Russians did not choose
to react to their great air-atomic adversary by imitating US air
doctrine. Instead, aviation - strategic, tactical and
defensive - was confined to the important but secondary strategic
mission of supporting ground operations and providing for the
defence of Soviet air space. Elevating air power beyond this
secondary status would have defied Soviet military tradition
generally and the vital strategic model of the Great Patriotic
War in particular. Air officers would also have had to
succeed in accomplishing the very formidable task of
superseding Army influence within policy-making circles, a
totally unobtainable objective in view of Stalin's unbending
enforcement of World War II strategy as a timeless conception#
Finally, any revolution in operational air strategy
was opposed - even if it had been thought desirable - by
the economic and technological constraints on Soviet policy
which significantly influenced the extent of any increase
in Air Force strength.
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Rocket and Isslle Development
Finally, the early Soviet commitment to rocketry was
clearly not a direct emulative reaction to the United States,
Indeed, the military interest in rockets long preceded the
emergence of the USA as a major factor in Soviet defence
planning. Rocket scientists trained before the war were able
to make highly profitable use of captured German research
facilities and personnel. They rapidly proceeded to develop
a missile capability superior to that of the USA at a time
when the Americans were fixed to strategic aircraft as their
long-range delivery system. Rather than a direct reaction to
the United States, the emphasis on missiles represented a
decision to pursue an independent technological initiative and
advantage, a Soviet solution to the problem of developing an
(149)
intercontinental strike capability. As well as the
objective strategic arguments urging the deployment of a
(149) Martin Caidin in Overture to Space, Hew York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 19^3, pp.53-54, explains
that the Idea that the Russians in the late
1940s chose to build ICBMs rather than strategic
bombers because they lacked aircraft and airfields
is untrue. He recalls that in the early post¬
war period, the decision was made to develop both
long-range missiles and strategic bombers,
although the seven to ten year 'lead time* for
the bombers prevented the aircraft R 4c B
programme from bearing fruit until the mid-
1950s.
missile force the vigorous R&D effort in this field was
also advanced by the support of the Soviet Army, the armed
service which was to have charge of the nation1s long-range
missile strength until the establishment of the independent
missile service under Khrushchev. Any interpretation of the
missile programme as directly responsive to the United
States is further qualified by the Soviet concentration
during and for several years after the Stalin period - on
the deployment of Intermediate and Kedium Range Ballistic
Missiles (I/MRBJ), rather than ICBJ/s, an emphasis in part
reflecting the still potent influence of Russia's traditional
concern with the European theatre.
The Stalinist 'Freeze1:
Operational and Doctrinal Consequences
It was to remain the Stalinist expectation that the
course of a future war would parallel that of the Great
Patriotic War, a massive and prolonged struggle, centring on
the European continent in which the superior ground strength
of the USSR would eventually wear the enemy and his technology
into exhaustion. Stalin*s highly unresponsive refusal to
accept any reform or reconsideration of post-v.ar strategic
doctrine, even after the USSR had developed atomic weapons
and expanded considerable resources on missile and bomber
research, firmly fixed Soviet doctrine in its Yiorld Y.'ar II
mould•
This 'freeze* on strategic .thought was to have both
operational military and doctrinal consequences. First, in
an operational sense, the absolute and unquestionable
assurance that 'Stalinist Military Science* would inevitably
guarantee victory for the Soviet Union in any future war may
have instilled an unwarranted sense of complacency or over-
confidence, which while always undesirable, was particularly so
when the US-Soviet power balance dramatically favoured America.^^0)
(150) H.S. Dinerstein, *The Revolution in Soviet Strategic
Thinking* in Phillip E. Mosely, ed., The Soviet Union
1922-1962. New York: Praeger, 1963, p.362.
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Second, the •permanently operating factors', as a
fundamental feature of 'Stalinist Military Science* provided
guidelines far too general and truistic to be of any practical
value in actually formulating an operationally useful or
effective strategy. Despite the ritual fanfare which these
five allegedly decisive factors were constantly accorded, they
amounted to little more than an extravagantly overblown strategic
, (151)
commonplace.
Further, the affect in operational terms of a sterile
official doctrine was made even more damaging by its resolute
»» - - Be
enforcement as the sum total of strategic truth. In such
circumstances the foviet armed forces were prevented from
grappling with many of the strategic realities of the post¬
war world. More specifically, the 'freeze' on doctrine
certainly prevented the armed forces from attaining as high a
degree of preparedness for atomic warfare than might otherwise
have been achieved by the early 1950s. Although dramatic
progress was made in weapons development, at the time of
Stalin's death the armed services were trained to wage only
conventional war. The first series of articles on nuclear
weapons for the instruction of military officers did not
(151) Dinerstein, 'The Revolution in Soviet Strategic
Thinking', Op, cit.. p.362.
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appear until 1954.It was not until that date that
serious studies are known to have been made on troop training,
for nuclear »ar. In short, while Stalin approved the rapid
production of atomic hardware, as well as long-range delivery
systems, he firmly refused to permit an unfettered analysis
of their strategic significance. Soviet forces were
consequently supplied with the latest weapons the nation's
technology could provide, but forbidden to study their most
effective operational use.
As well as limiting the operational capabilities or
combat-readiness of the Soviet armed forces, the 'freeze' on
doctrine obviously also retarded the development of strategic
doctrine itself. As a result of Stalin's unwillingness to
accept certain of the implications of modern weaponry and the
strict enforcement of his strategic views, the conventional
European theatre orientation of Soviet doctrine was not only
maintained throughout the Stalin period, but survived into
the Khrushchev era, when the concentration on European ground
warfare might well have been rapidly replaced by a iocus on
the major air-atomic adversary at intercontinental range.
(152) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in tht: Nuclear Age.
op. cit., p.64.
(153) Wolfe, op. cit.. p.35.
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Perhaps more importantly, as the United States was
moving to an air-nuclear strategy and the concept of nuclear
deterrence was making its first appearance in America,. Stalin's
unyielding grip on the lessons of the Great Patriotic War made
even the examination of the deterrence concept impossible until
after his death. The ban on the expression of any new
strategic ideas until at least 1953 opened a doctrinal 'lag'
or 'gap' between the United States and the Soviet Union over
the concept of nuclear deterrence. With or without Stalin,
the strategic perspective of the Soviet Union would have
inevitably differed from that of the United States. The
realities of geo-politics1 and the experience of Russiaiand
Soviet history alone strongly argued for a concentration on the
European theatre and the crltioal mission of ground armies.
However, the imposition of Stalinist orthodoxy introduced or
perhaps increased an underlying strategic asymmetry between
the post-war doctrines of the USSR and the United States,
establishing a fundamentally asymeieixteill relationship which,




(154) Roman Kolkowicz in *Strategic Parity and Beyond*,
World Politics. April 1971, pp.429-451, argues thatj
•Soviet strategic doctrine and capabilities would
appear to have lagged behind those of the United States
by about five years'.(p.439) Also on the 'lag* issue,
see, by the same author, Soviet Strategy in the nuclear
Era, I.D.A. R-789, September 1970; R.L. Garthoff, in
•Soviet Attitudes Toward Modern Air Power*, Military
Affairs,vol."XIX, No. 2, Summer 1955, pp.76-80; appears
to lend some support to the 'lag' concept, at least
as it concerns air power. in 1955 Garthoff argued that
the then Soviet view of the role of air power closely
resembled that/Q$"ie United °tates ten years earlier.
He contended that the Russians had in the first ten
years after World War II elevated strategic air power
from a •sideshow1 to a 'main show1, while the United
States in the same period had come close to establishing
air power as the central feature of US defence policy,
(p.80) Colin S. Gray in 'Predicting Arms Race
Behaviour*, Futures, Gciober 1974, pp.380-385
appears to' regard the suggestion of a 'lag* as a
product of the misconception of the 1960s that US
strategic doctrine represented the only reasonable
viewpoint. The fact that Russian doctrine differed
from that of the United States, was taken as proof
of the 'lagging* or 'backward* nature of Soviet
strategy.(p.385) Other works touching on the
educational issue include Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's
Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy,
hew York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, p.160; Johan Jorgen
Hoist and ^'illiam Schneider, eds., Why A3?.? Policy
Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy. New
York: Pergamon Press, 1969, pp.168-169; Edward
Klein and Robert Kittell, *3hh! Let's Tell the
Russians', Newsweek. May 5, 1969, p.47; Federation
of American Scientists, Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Military R and D of the Federation of
American Scientists, Is there an R and D -5SE?
May 6, 1971.
While Stalinist doctrine failed to produce any concept
of nuclear deterrence, the assignment of large Soviet
conventional forces to Europe and the rearmament of
indigenous east European armed forces were in part motivateu
by a strategy intended to 'deter' an American nuclear attack
by threatening the United States with the occupation of
western Europe. In other words, the 'hostage Europe'
strategy can be regarded as an application of the deterrence
principle and further, as an application of the principle in
response to a specific US action - the development of an
American atomic capability.






The 'New Look' in US Defence Policy
187.
Re-examination of Defence Policy
Truman Policy Under Attack
The 1952 presidential election followed several years of the
danger, frustration and expense of Containment. The Republican
attack on the Truman Administration's foreign and defence policies
emphassised two major themes. First, it stressed the need for a
more dynamic or offensive American posture, not merely containing but
positively shrinking the power and proportions of the Communist world.
The second and perhaps somewhat incompatible theme was the necessity
for reducing both the cost and the risk of America's international
commitments, providing for the nation's economic as well as its
military security. In short, the Republican Party under Dwight
Eisenhower offered the very attractive, if rather improbable, prospect
of greater security at a lower political and economic price.
In the period from the 1952 election to the public axn»oun*ement
of the 'New Look' defence policy in January 1954, a number of study
papers and discussions marked the gradual formulation of the new
Eisenhower policy. The President-elect set the central problem of
his administration before a gathering of advisers just after the
election. Mr. Eisenhower discussed the need to solve '"the great
equation" of maintaining indefinitely a strong military force without
(2)
bankrupting the country in the process*. In 1954 the hew Look
(3)
was presented as a solution to 'the great equation'. '
(1) Robert E. Osgood, Limited War. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957, p.241.
(2) Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defence and Congress, 1945-1963.
Ohio State University Press, 1966, p.181.
(3) On the development of the New Look policy, see Samuel P.
Huntington, The Common Defence. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1961, pp.73-75; Kolodziej, op. cit..
pp.183-189.
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The New Look Unveiled
The 'Long-Haul* Approach
On January 7, 1954 Dwight Eisenhower gave the first presidential
expression of the New Look in American defence policy.The
President described the policy as resting upon a 'long-haul* approach
Hntr
to defence planning. In place of costly 'year of crisis' programmes,
the United States would indefinitely maintain a high plateau of
(5)
preparedness.
Increased Flexibility with Reduced Spending
Two of the most valuable benefits accruing from the 'long-haul'
approach were said to be increased flexibility and reduced defence
costs. The greater flexibility or 'selectivity' of the new strategy
was to allow the United States to resist Soviet aggression on 'our'
terms by 'means of our choosing*, as Secretary of State, John foster
Dulles put it.^^ *A potential aggressor must know', insisted the
Secretary, 'that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that
(7)suit him'. On the same theme, Admiral Arthur ft. Radford explained:
'We are serving notice on the other side that if they hit us at one
place, we might hit back at them somewhere else and not necessarily
/ Q \
with atomic weapons. This gives us the initiative*.
A more flexible strategy would permit the west to adopt the
posture best suited to each developing situation. American strategy
(4) New York Times. January 8 1954, p.l. New iork Times
noted below as NYT.
(5) NYT, January 24, 1956, p.11.
(6) NYT. January, 13, 1954, p.l.
(7) NYT, January 13, 1954, p.l.
(8) NYT, March 17, 1954, p.6.
1 AO
Dulles said:
Dust have the mobility and flexibility to bring
collective power to bear against an enemy on a
selective or massive basis as conditions may
require. For this purpose, the arsenal must
include a whole range of air, sea and land power
based on both conventional and atomic weapons.
These new weapons can be used not only for
strategic purposes, but for tactical purposes. (9)
As well as flexibility, Sew Look planning would also reduce the
accelerating cost of American defence by offering a variety rather than
a •multiplication of military means', permitting America * to get and
share more security at less cost* in Secretary Dulles* words
Indeed, the desire to restrain the increasing defence burden, defeating
the Soviet Union in its alleged attempt to precipitate an American
economic collapse, was one of the moat important inspirations for the
entire New Look.^"*"^ Hanson Baldwin of the Hew fork Times
described the economic motive behind the Kew Look as meaning
*... we have slightly increased our calculated military risk in
(12)
order to decrease our calculated economic risk*.
Significance of modern weapons Technology
In addition to budgetary savings as a consequence of more thoughtful
long-range planning, economies were also to result from the recognition
and thorough exploitation of what the President described as *the new
(13)
relationship between men and materials* in modern warfare. The
Kew Look was based upon the premise that a revolution had taken place
in weapons technology, transforming the nature of warfare, substituting
to a significant degree air-nuclear power for large and costly ground
(9) KYT, March 20, 1954, p.l.
(10) KYT, January 13, 1954, p.l.
(11) KYT, January 24, 1954, Lection IV, p.3.
(12) RYT, February 24, 1954, p.13.
(13) KYT, January 8, 1954, p.l.
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armies. Discussing nuclear weapons in his January 1954 State of
the Union Address, President Eisenhower explained that America and
her allies would not shrink from their use against an aggressor,
(14)
'... if they are needed to preserve our freedom*. A few days
later, the Secretary of State declared a fundamental principle of the
New Look, explaining that henceforth America would confront any enemy
with *a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places
of our own choosing', the strategy which was to be labelled
(15)
•massive retaliation*. Mr. Dulles also announced that the
United States would achieve improved security at a saving to the
taxpayer 'by placing more reliance on community deterrent power and
less dependence on local defensive power'.(^) jn Secretary
pledged that New Look policy did not mean that the United States would
(17)
'turn every local war into a general war'. Instead, he described
the New Look's chief motivation as the desire to assure the Russians:
•if they attack the United States or our vital interests, we will hit
(18)
then with everything we have'. '
(14) NYT. January 8, 1954, p.l.
(3.5) NYT, January 13, 1954, p.l.
(16) Ibid.
(17) NYT. March 20, 1954, p.l. Colin S. Gray argues that
Secretary Dulles always thought of US nuclear retaliation
as 'selective'. Gray quotes Dulles as describing the
American position as 'essentially a policy of deterring
war by a capacity for selective retaliation'} Colin S.
Gray, 'The Racing "Syndrome" and the Strategic Balance',
a paper prepared for The International Seminar on
•The Future Role of Soviet Military Power with the East-
West Political Context', Stiftung Fur Wissenschaft und
Politik. Eggenberg, West Germany, May 1-2, 1975, p.3.
(18) NYT, March 20, 1954, p.l.
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Massive Retaliation and 'Balanced Forces*
Supporting Mr. Dulles on the massive retaliation issue, the
President asserted that rapid and devastating retaliation against
attack was America's surest defence. The value of surprise attack
had increased with the power of modern weaponry. The most
dependable deterrent against nuclear surprise was now the aggressor's
(19)
awareness that it would bring instant retaliation. The
President contended that any expression of concern over a possible
•imbalance' in American defence policy as a result of its nuclear
emphasis did not represent a professional military view.
Mr. Eisenhower said that for the professional the 'balanced forces'
concept did not require slicing the defence budget into three equal
parts, with one third going to each of the major armed services.
Balance was properly defined in terms of the strategic circumstances
existing at any given time. In an age of air-nuclear power, a
proper balance required an emphasis on strategic nuclear forces.
Declining Role of General Purpose Forces
The stress on the importance of nuclear weapons clearly brought
a decline in the strength and strategic significance of ground armies.
As the major means of delivering the New Look's all important nuclear
(21)
blow, the Air Force was regarded as the most important armed service.
The bombers of the Strategic Air Command were described by Defence
Secretary Wilson as the nation's first line of defence, as well as the
(22)
primary deterrent. General Curtis E. Le May identified 'an attack
(19) NYT, January 14, 1954, p.17.
(2°) Ibid., p.18.
(21) NYT, February 6, 1955, Section IV, p.5.
(22) NYT, April 5, 1955, p.14.
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by a substantial, long-range nuclear air force', as the greatest
danger facing America. He warned:
Such a force can be deterred, or - in the event
of aggression - destroyed only by superior air
power} both medium and long-range, backed by
adequate defensive air power. (23)
While the Air Force was assigned the key role, the US Havy
retained major responsibilities, largely because of its submarine and
anti-submarine units, as well as its carrier-based and nuclear armed
(24)
aircraft. The US Army and marine Corps became the 'low men on
(25)
the totem pole'. The revolution in military technology and the
resultant change in the relationship between men and weapons were
said to have ended the era of large and costly ground armies.
Continuing their full-scale maintenance in the atomic age was
regarded as both economically wasteful and strategically outmoded.
US ground forces in Korea were to be withdrawn as soon as
/ \
possible in accord with the Hew Look commitment to a general
reduction in America's international military obligation, returning
as many troops to the United States as could be removed from their
(27)stations around the world. Under the new defence policy such
conventional forces as remained in active service were to be augmented
(28i
by a strong and highly mobile 'strategic reserve'. In the words
of President Eisenhower's 1954 State of the Union Address:
Our forces must regain mobility of action.
Our strategic reserves must be centrally placed
and readily deployable to meet sudden aggression
against ourselves and our allies. (29)
(23) HYT, December 7, 1955, p.34.
(24) HYT, February 6, 1955, Section IV, p.5.
(25) Ibid.
(26) HYT. January 8, 1954, p.l.
(27) Ibid.: HYT. January 24, 1954, Section IV, p.3.
(28) HYT, January 13, 1954, p.l.
(29) NYT. January 8, 1954, p.l.
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Finally, the New Look also included among its high priorities the
improvement of America's continental air defence through guided
missile development,^0^ the strengthening of interceptor forces and
(31)
the deployment of improved radar warning systems.
First Re-examination of Massive Retaliation :
Limited Nuclear War
While the reliance upon massive retaliation as the centre piece
of American defence policy was publicly adopted in 1954, it was at
least as early as 1955 that this key aspect of the New Look came unaer
a re-examination which was to lead to a so-called 'New New Look' in
(32)
the latter half of the 1950s. The first official reconsideration
of massive retaliation was closely related to the anticipated Soviet
achievement of nuclear parity with the United States. Once freed from
the inhibitions of massive retaliation, it was feared that the Russians
would mount political and military advances supported by their
(33)
superior conventional forces. This concern inspired the
administration to begin a modification of massive retaliation
centering around tactical nuclear weapons and the concept of limited
nuclear war, planning for the use of small battlefield weapons as
well as, or-even instead of, large city-destroying bombs. The
progress of this modification was marked by a National Security
(30) KYT. February 6, 1955, Section IV, p.5.
(31) NYT, January 27, 1955, p.l.
(32) Massive retaliation, 'or the threat of it* is described as 'in
decline almost from its enunciation in 1954', by Thomas C.
Schelling, Arms and Influence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Piess, 1966, p.190. Urs,"Schwarz judges the New Look's
nuclear emphasis as having been 'by 1953 rendered obsolete by
events and by private strategic study' but, nevertheless, assesses
it as 'not altogether ineffective' as a positive influence -
from the American perspective - on the foreign policy actions of
the Soviet Union. Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: A New
perspective. New York: Doubleday, 1966, pp.84-91.
(33) NYT, March 21, 1955, p.l.
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Council instruction to the Defence Department assuming the use of
nuclear weapons in any future war, as well as by NATO's acceptance of
(34)
atomic weapons as the key to European defence. '
In fact, America's interest in tactical nuclear weapons began
long before the outset of any review of massive retaliation;-. In
1951 the United States conducted tactical nuclear weapons tests and was
considering the use of tactical weapons in limited conflicts. By
1957 the decision was made to provide the nation's ground, air and
naval forces with these weapons, in large part as a result of the
western inability or unwillingness to match Soviet conventional
(35)
strength in Europe.
In March of 1955, Secretary Dulles discussed nuclear retaliation
at less than a full-scale level. He spoke of the growing probability
that tactical nuclear weapons would be used against military targets,
sparing the civilian population. With an increasing store 01 tactical
weapons, the Secretary believed -that there would be a corresponding
( 36)
decrease in the likelihood that the large bombs would ever be used. '
President Eisenhower spoke of using atomic weapons with a high degree of
precision. The President explained:
Where these things are used on strictly military
targets and for strictly military purposes, 1
see no reason why they shouldn't be used just
exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else. (37)
(34) NYT, March 17, 1955, p.5.
(35) Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971, pp.25-31.
(36) NYT, March 16, 1955, p.l.
(37) NYT, March 17, 1955, p.l.
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The New Look in Operation
Defence Spending and manpower Levels
Among the proudest achievements of the hew Look in operation was
the firm limitation of military spending, an accomplishment reflected
in the declining manpower strength of the nation's ground armies.
Defence spending in the first of the fully New Look budgets -
?Y 1955 - displayed a genuine concern for reduced military expenditure.
The administration's claim in January of 1955 of having accomplished:
'... the largest single tax reduction in any single year in the
(38)
country's history*, was made possible by cuts in defence costs.
Military spending fell by #8.1 billion from its FY 1955 high of
(39)m. e billion, ; accompanied by a corresponding slump in the size
of the nation's ground forces. The total number of active service¬
men in June 30, 1954 was 3,328,000 as compared with 3*046,700 in
June, 30, 1955.^^ This reduction trimmed the Army from nineteen
to seventeen divisions in FY 1955, a force of 1,407,000 troops cut
to 1,172,000. Similarly, the Marines dropped from 225*000 to
215,000 troops. In addition to ground forces, the Navy went from
741,000 seamen in June of 1954 to 689,000 in June, 1955.^"^
In the preparations for the FY 1956, defence budget, the
administration abandoned the attempt to stabilise military spending
at #34 billion, accepting expenditures of #36.7 billion.^Of
this total figure, the Army was provided with nearly #9 billion
compared with more than #16 billion in FY 1953.^*^ As with
(38) Huntington, op. cit.. p.76.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Kolodiej, op. cit.. p.190.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Huntington, op. cit.. p.93.
(43) Ibid., p.79.
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spending levels, the administration's manpower planning for FY 1956
approximated ground force levels originally intended for the following
fiscal year. The total number of men in uniform in June of 1956 was
(44)
2,815,000, originally the FY 1957 goal. The budgetary and
manpower statistics for FY 1957 continued the New Look trends, with
very little change. Defence Secretary Wilson explained to the
Congress that the administration was proposing nothing 'fundamentally
(45)
different from that outlined ... last year'. Defence expenditure
exceeded #35 billion, with the Air Force receiving the largest share
of the total, approximately #15.7 billion of the administration's
requests. The Army was to operate on #7.8 billion, while the Navy




While a future war under the New Look schema was to b^/^elatively
brief nuclear contest, the Eisenhower Administration did make some
provision against the possibility that a longer struggle involving
substantial numbers of troops might develop, authorising measures
designed to improve the national mobilisation base. Perhaps the most
significant of these, and another hallmark of the New Look in operation,
was the strengthening of manpower reserves. As an improved reserve
system promised substantial forces at a relatively low cost, it was
entirely compatible with New Look doctrine. The increased reserve
(44) Huntington, op, cit.. p.77.
(45) Kolodziej, op. cit.. p.226.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Huntington, op. cit.. p.88.
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emphasis resulted In the growth of the reserves from 578,000 in June
of 1953 to one million men in June of 1957. Spending on the reserves
climbed to #879.8 million in FY 1957, more than double the rate at
the outset of the Eisenhower Administration.
The Nuclear Emphasis
The New Look in operation was also marked by implementation of
the doctrinal concentration on nuclear weapons. It was very early
established, in Eisenhower planning that any war beyond the 'brush
fire' level would certainly be a nuclear conflict. Nuclear weapons
were to be considered 'conventional', available for use whenever the
military situation required. The President explained that the
administration's policy was 'to stress new weapons, to stress the
modern means of delivery of firepower and to minimise, so far as we
could, the use of individuals who could better be employed in
building roads and schools and other things'.(49)
Nuclear power was not to be reserved for the destruction of large
enemy urban-fndustrial centres in a general war. Tactical, weapons
were also to be used in lower level conflicts. In Dulles* words,
nuclear weapons were '... becoming more and more conventional and
replacing what used to be called conventional weapons' By the
end of 1954, the United States had persuaded the NATO alliance to
(51)
accept nuclear weapons as the basis of any feasible European defence,
a defence which the administration believed, at least for a time, could
(48) Huntington, op. cit.. p.81.
(49) NYT, August 2, 1956, p.l.
(50) Huntington, op. cit.. p.80.
(51) Ibid.. pp.80-81.
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be mounted with high precision against exclusively military targets.
Tactical nuclear bombs need not, it was said, bring great destruction
(52)
to civilian population centres.
Strategic Aviation
With significant reductions in the role and actual proportions
of ground armies in New Look policy, and the establishment of nuclear
weapons as the central feature of American strategy, the responsibilities
of strategic aviation were expanded. However, an examination of the
New Look in operation reveals that this increased status was reflected
largely in the relative decline of the other armed services rather than
(53)
in any absolute expansion of long-range airpcwer. The Eisenhower
Administration did not order any rapid increase in strategic air
power of the sort which might have been expected from the tenor of
New Look doctrine. Indeed, President Eisenhower approved a slow
down in the rate of the Truman Administration's plan for Air force
expansion to a total of 143 wings by December of 1935* This
overall goal was reduced to 137 wings, eliminating six wings of
airmen and transport aircraft but retaining the Truman figure of 126
combat wings. Although preserving the 126 wing objective
Eisenhower planners postponed its achievement from the end of 1953
to June of 1957.
(52) However, such confidence in the almost surgical capabilities
of tactical nuclear weapons was not supported by a 1955
Simulation of a nuclear battle with many European parallels -
Exercise Sage Brush. It appeared impossible to conduct any
effectively limited nuclear war. Lassive destruction, likely
escalating to full-scale strategic warfare, seemed probable.
(NYT. December 5, 1955, p.12).




The New Look programme also included as one of its most
prominent declaratory and operational features a substantial
strengthening of America's continental air defence. Continental
air defence was, in President Eisenhower's view, one of the two
fundamental elements of a deterrence policy, the other being
(55)
strategic air power. But unlike the New Look as xt aiiected
long-range aviation - where force levels were maintained at the
standard set by the previous administration - the new policy brought
a very significant increase in the nation's continental air defence
capability, establishing an extensive and integrated air deience
system far superior to anything the United States had ever before
commanded. The much increased air deience effort marked an
important departure for American strategic planning which was not
made to attend to the defence of the continental United States
against direct attack, moderating Air Force emphasis on oixensive
operations.
fissile Development
The New Look in operation was also marked by an intensified
effort to develop a missile capability. After World War II a large
number of German rocket research personnel and quantities of research
equipment were transported to the United States. However, this
imported expertise was not, as in the USSR, fuelled into an intensive
(55) Huntington, op. cit.. p.83.
(56) On the build-up in US air defence, see EYT January 27,
1955, p.l* NYT. February 6, 1959, Section IV, p.5;
Huntington, op. cit.. pp.326-341.
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(57)
programme of missile development. Nevertheless, despite the
relatively low level commitment to missile research, between 1945
and 1953 some 114 missile projects were initiated by the armed services.
During the first half of the 1950s a number of official and
unofficial studies were undertaken which concluded that an acceleration
of the nation's missile programming was essential. In 1954, the
Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or 'Von Neumann Committee'
reported that a workable ICBK could be produced within six to eight
years and urged that its development be established as the 'highest
(59)national priority' in view of the Soviet lead in missile technology.
At the same time a Rand Corporation study, as well as the findings of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, confirmed the Von Neumann
recommendations^*^ which had succeeded in instilling a new sense of
urgency in the US missile programme. Within a week of the completion
of the Von Neumann report the acceleration of the Air Force ICBm
project was ordered and a new managerial organisation for missile
development - another Von Neumann proposal - was speedily established.^1)
By the close of 1955, ICBM research had been greatly envigorated and
re-organised and was firmly en route to the production stage of
development.
(57) In 1947 a Defence Department Study, 'Operational Requirements for
Guided Missiles' identified the development of guided weapons for
the defence of bombers, as well as weapons designed to improve the
capabilities of bomber and fighter aircraft as the top priorities
in missile research. The development of a long-range surface-to-
surface missile was set as a fourth order priority. (Ernest G.
Scbwiebart, A History of the US Air Force Ballistic missiles. New
York: F.A. fraeger, 1965, p.45). As for the scientific community,
both Professor Theodore Von Karmari and Dr. Vannevar Bush argued
that the missile was unlikely to develop as a major weapon without
several years of further research.(Schwiebart, op. cit.. pp.43-44^-6, 57).
(58) Michael H. Armacost. The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The




(61) Schwiebart, op. cit.. pp.75-85.
The Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (I;iBK) programme was
much advanced in January of 1955 when the Technological Capabilities
Panel, under Dr. James R. Killian, issued a report warning that,
without a vigorous missile effort, the USSR would be well placed to
threaten American strategic superiority by the early 1960s. It there¬
fore recommended that, in addition to the more challenging lCBfc
programme, the United States first attempt to meet the Soviet missile
(Co\
'threat* by deploying an IRBM. ' Responding to the Killian study.
President Eisenhower approved the competitive development of an
IRBM by the armed forces, blessing the continued development of the
Air Force Thor and Army Jupiter weapons. A vigorous inter-service
battle for operational control of the IRBM was decided in 1956 when
(63)
the Air Force was awarded both the Thor and Jupiter projects.
Development of a Western Alliance System.
Yn'hile the United States was implementing the hew Look
massive retaliation policy, it was also engaged in the establishment
of a system of anti-Communist alliances, attempting to organise many
of the countries along the borders of the USSR and Communist China
into collective security arrangements. A rearming Aest Germany
was admitted to NATO in 1955. The Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty
Organisation) was signed with American encouragement and the South
(62) Armacost, op. cit.. pp.50-51.
(63) Ibid.. pp.117-120; KYI. November 7, 1956, p.l.
East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATG) was founded.
(64) Bottome, op, cit., pp.31-35. The New Look policy was
subjected to intense criticism from politicians,
academics and military commanders throughout the
Eisenhower Administration. Much of the controversy
related to one fundamental question: What kind of war
should the United States be prepared to fight? Would
another great war be essentially an air-nuclear struggle
in which ground armies would be no more than a secondary
element, or would such a conflict witness an air-nuclear
exchange as the prelude to vital ground army operations?
The debate involved the strategic role of each armed
service, as well as the relative significance of their
various weapon systems. On the Hew Look and the views
otiits critics, see General Matthew Riagway, Soldier.
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956; W.W. Kaufmann,
•The Requirements oi Deterrence', in W,W. Kaufinann, ed.,
Military Policy and Notional Security. Princeton, N.J.;
Princeton University Press, 1956; Henry Kissinger,
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Harper and Brothers,
1957; Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy. Cambridge, „,ass.:
Harvard University Press, 1958; Lt. General James M. Gavin,
War and Peace in the Space Age. London: Hutchison, 1558;
General Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1959; General John B. Medaris,
Countdown for Decision. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,
I960; Glenn H. Snyder, 'The "New Look" of 1953' in V..R.
Schilling, P.Y. Hammond, G.ii. Snyder, Strategy, Politics
and Defence Budgets. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962, pp.383-524; Bottome, op. cit..
For the views of the New Look's critics, also see New
York Times. January 24, 1954, p.25; March 20, 1954, p.6;
March 31, 1954, p.l; April 10, 1954, p.16; July 31, 1954
p.5; January 4, 1955» p.l; April 10, 1955, Section IV,
p.3; July 15, 1955, p.l; July 17, 1955, p.l; January 17,
1956, p.l; May 5, 1956, p.l; May 19, 1956, p.l; may 20,
1956, p.l; May 24, 1956, p.12; June 24, 1956, p.l;
August 3, 1956, p.9; August 5, 1956, p.37; September 1,
1956, p.7.
Role of Action-Reaction in the New Look Period
Evidence of Reaction
He-examination of kassive Retaliation
The New Look clearly cannot be described as the direct or
inevitable consequence of Soviet actions or as an emulation of Russian
policy. The influence of domestic factors on the development of
Eisenhower defence policy outweighed the affect of all others.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence in this period of American
responsiveness to ot consideration of either Soviet actions and
capabilities or American estimates of future Soviet actions and
potential capabilities. Some degree of awareness of or 'responsiveness*
to the USSR appeared in the administration's early concern over the
future efficacy of massive retaliation. It was the administration's
concern over the implications of the projected increase in Soviet
nuclear strength coupled with the Soviet Union's already established
conventional advantage which urged an early reconsideration of the
massive retaliation doctrine.
Improved Air Defences
The importance attached to the defence of North American
airspace during the first half of the 1950s also reflected sensitivity
to Soviet actions. The evidence of Soviet progress in the development
of long-range aircraft and nuclear weapons persuaded the Pentagon to
provide for the possibility of air strikes against America itself.
This the administration did by constructing an extensive and integrated
204
air defence system. However, while the new concern with air defence
was fundamentally stimulated by an undeniable improvement in Soviet
capabilities, it was also fuelled by estimates of operational
Soviet air power (the 'bomber gap') and projections of future
deployments which proved to be markedly inaccurate. ^5)
Acceleration of fissile Research
While a host of domestic factors explain the origins and
developmental course of American missile research, the programme was
in fact significantly accelerated by reports of Soviet missile research
in several official and unofficial studies, including the Von Neumann,
Rand Corporation and Killian reports. The disturbing affect of
these accounts was reinforced by frequent reports of Soviet missile
tests. In part, as a response to this mounting evidence, president
Eisenhower ordered the acceleration of ICBL research in 195b, assigning
the existing Atlas project the highest national R&D priority. He
(661
further authorised work on the Titan ICBai as a backup system. The
President also approved the competitive development of an intermediate
range weapon by the armed services and ordered intensified anti-
ballistic missile research.
(65) On the 'bomber gap', see Bottome, op. cit.. pp.35-38;
Colin S. Gray, describes the 'bomber gap' as resulting from
the faulty western belief 'that there is a single arms race
path that both adversaries must follow - a path dictated by-
technology and by its associated (and presumed to be coramon)
strategic logic'. In other words, because the USA iavoured
the long-range bomber it was assumed that the Russians would
as well, Ignoring the political, technological circumstances and
preferences of the USSR: Colin S. Gray, 'Predicting Arms
Race Behaviour', Future?. October 1974, p.384.
(66) Armacost, op. cit.. p.53.
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Collective Security Systems
In its sponsorship of widespread collective security arrangements
the New Look period recorded a kind of political-military 'reaction1
to the American perception of the USSR (as well as Communist China)
as a menacing adversary. These alliances included a NATO enlarged
by the admission of West Germany - whose rearmament was itself a
•reaction' to Soviet conventional strength in Europe. Each of these
alliances was concluded in an attempt to organise resistance to
Communist pressure on countries located near the borders oi the
Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.
Evidence of Domestic Factors Influencing Eisenhower Policy
The New Look's Nuclear Emphasis
The Eisenhower decision to base American defence policy on the
nation's strategic nuclear capability was certainly not the direct or
inevitable consequence of Soviet actions, but was instead of domestic
origin. Its prime motivation was the sincere conviction that American
security was seriously threatened by the potentially ruinous rate of
federal expenditure, a large proportion of which was assigned to the
Pentagon in general and the support of conventional forces in
particular. If the country was to remain solvent the defence budget
had to be restrained while somehow managing to provide for the nation's
defence. This economic assessment was accompanied by the rapid
development of nuclear weapons - strategic and tactical - as well as
several strategic delivery systems, persuading the administration that
the answer to both physical and fiscal security lay in sophisticated
weapons technology. While most convenient for administratioft purposes,
this judgement was not a facile justification for reducing general
purpose forces. It rested upon the firmly held belief - entirely at
odds with Soviet thinking - that nuclear weapons had revolutionised
warfare, transforming the relationship between manpower and weapons.
The awesome capabilities of the new weapons were thought to have
ended the long reign of ground armies, establishing massive air-nuclear
strikes as the decisive factor in any future war. It was this Judge¬
ment, coupled with the administration's all important economic
objectives which stimulated the New Look's nuclear bias.
Dominant Role of Strategic Aviation
Similarly, the New Look's assignment of the decisive strategic
mission to long-range aviation was neither dictated by the actions of
the Soviet Union nor suggested by the example of Soviet doctrine.
Indeed, the Soviet Long Range Air Force was accorded only a secondary
status among the nation's armed forces and was never deployed at
anything resembling the force levels of the Strategic Air Command.
Further, from the late 1940s onwards, the USSR demonstrated a degree
of interest in an alternative delivery system - the ballistic missile -
which was not to be matched in the United States until the mid-1950s.
The pre-eminence of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), rather
than representing a reaction to the USSR or an emulation of Soviet
doctrine, was the product of the economic and technological motives
which inspired the overall nuclear bias in American policy.
However, while the economic objectives of the Eisenhower Administration
resulted in a position of special favour for air-nuclear forces, the
deep commitment to reduced defence spending extended even to SAC,
which - despite the increased doctrinal role of nuclear weapons and
long-range aircraft - was not increased in strength beyond the level
established by the previous administration.
In addition to the concern with spending and the confidence in
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nuclear power, the concentratior on strategic aviation was also entirely
compatible with established American doctrine and combat experience.
During World War II, the United States had invested heavy responsibility
in strategic bombing, emerging into the post-war period with great
faith in its effectiveness. This faith was further strengthened by-
dramatic improvements in nuclear weapons technology and bomber
performance. Finally, the airpower cause was advanced by the pressure
and incluence of the Air Force itself, as well as its industrial
and political allies.
Missile Research and Development
The major external stimulus to American missile research in the
first half of the 1950s was a steady flow of reports telling of
substantial Soviet progress in the field. However, the American
programme was neither initiated in response to Soviet actions, nor
closely directed by the course of Soviet research, about which
relatively little was known. The development of long-range missiles
in the United States was first urged by technology itself. In the
early 1950s progress in nuclear and missile research convinced many
that the production of IRBMs and ICBMs, armed with nuclear warheads,
was an entirely fea-ible project. The probability that a new and
highly promising strategic capability was obtainable strongly argued
(67)
for its acquisition. ' The missile programme was also spurred by
the adoption of the New Look which fostered a general search for
technological solutions to the nation's defence problems. With the
advancement in warhead and launcher development already achieved, the
production of a nuclear tipped ballistic missile qualified as a highly
(67) Armacost, op. clt.. pp.56-57, 68-69;
Schwiebart, op. cit.. pp.60-64.
(68}
suitable New Look undertaking.
In establishing nuclear weapons as the most important element in
the nation's defence and the largest claimant on its reduced
expenditures, the New Look encouraged each of the three major armed
services to bid for a role in missile warfare as the most dependable
means of acquiring a generous share of Pentagon spending as well as
a 'decisive' strategic mission. As a result, the US Army, Air iorce
and Navy each became spirited and sharply competitive promoters of
their own missile projects.ihe services were also prompted to
press for missile development by a Pentagon policy-making system which
encouraged inter-service competition in weapons development. The
Defence Department, under Charles E. Wilson, was marked by a
diffusion of authority, a tendency to leaWe the hardware decisions
to the military, rather than assert civilian leadership, and the
view that technological options should not be discarded any earlier
than necessary or, in other words, a belief in the wisdom of
duplication in weapons development. The Budget Bureau's practice of
establishing only an overall defence spending limit - leaving the
armed services to determine how best to spend their allotted portions,
also permitted a high degree of competition.
In addition to the impetus to missile development provided by
various civilian and military institutions, a significant measure of
responsibility for the initiation and gradual intensification of the
missile programme must be credited to a number of individuals who
firmly believed in the missile as a delivery system and demonstrated
(68) Armacost, op. cit.. pp.267-270.




a range of technological, political and entrepreneurial talents in
accomplishing the development and deployment of several missile
(71)
types. Trevor Gardiner, the USAF's Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development, was one such individual. Gardiner played
a major part in committing the Air iorce and the US government to
(72)
the development of an ICBM.
Just as the early motivation for missile research at large
stemmed from several sources, the conception of each missile system
and subsequent development and deployment decisions were the result
of a highly complex decision-making process involving a great many
disparate factors. These factors included administration policy
and priorities, Fentagon interests and organisation, the strategic
and tactical doctrine of each armed service, their respective combat
experience, professional skills, technological resources and generally
differing strategic perspective, as well as their narrow, often
conflicting, institutional interests.
Development and deployment decisions were also influenced by
vigorous and widespread political lobbying in which the relative
political influence of each service weighed significantly in the final
(71) Armacost, op. cit.. pp.270-271, 290.
(72) Ibid.. pp.59-60, 273-274. Other examples include Professor
Von Neumann whose committee accomplished a great deal in
promoting the ICBM (Schwiebert, op. cit.. pp.21-22), Air
Force General Bernard Shriever, Commander oi the Western
Division of the Air Research and Development Command
(Armacost, op. cit.. pp.57-58), Admirals Arleigh A. Burke,
William F. Raborn and Hyrnan Rickover, were also very
effective in promoting the suomarine launched missrle and
the nuclear submarine (Ibid.. pp.67-68).
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outcome. The process of lobbying and bargaining involved the
Army, Navy and Air force, as powerful interest groups in inter-
service conflicts and shifting alliances under the nominal but
(73)
often ineffective direction of the civilian leadership.
These services campaigns and promotions frequently involved lobbying
by the armed services within the Department of Defence, the
Executive Branch as a whole, the Congress, the political parties and
the general public. The Services were assisted in their efforts by
their respective advocates and supporters among the country's
universities, private and semi-private research organisations, the
press and the defence industries, who together extended the decision-
(74)
making process on deployments over a wide spectrum of American society.
The defence industries not only helped to stimulate R&D
generally, but also influenced individual development and deployment
decisions. In the years during and after the Second World war, the
United States built a massive aircraft industry based upon government
contracts. The prospect of a shift from bombers to missiles -
a new complex, sophisticated, weapons type which would not likely be
required in large quantities - was not initially greeted with
enthusiasm by government contractors. However, with the eventual
acceptance of the missile age as inevitable, the Air force and the
aviation industry were determined to manage the development and win
operational control of the new weapons, minimising the role of
other service contractors and the Army's in-house missile group.
They therefore mustered the full range of their political and
(73) Armacost, op. cit.. pp.250-251.
(73) Ibid., pp.251-258.
(75)
economic resources behind Air Force missile projects,
contributing to the evolution of a less than fully objective
process of decision-making on weapons development.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
While the prospect of the USSR soon adding great air-nuclear power
to its already established conventional 'superiority', helped to draw
the administration's attention to the limitations of massive retaliation,
the United States clearly did not choose to 'respond' to the growth of
Soviet nuclear strength or to its own projections of the USSn*s future
nuclear deployments, in Soviet terms. Such a decision mifoht have
moved the administration to 'match' Soviet ground forces, a 'reaction'
forbidden by the President's economic principles. Instead, the
administration spoke of the tactical use of nuclear weapons, describing
them as 'conventional', and as such, suitable as a substitute for the
expanded ground armies which would have represented a direct, emulative
•reaction' to the Soviet Union but which would have violated the
administration's self-imposed budgetary strictures.
(75) Armacost, op. cit.. pp.153-155; Assessing the influence of
industry on weapon deployment, General James Gavin wrote:
•Industry can make extravagant claims for their products and
convince Congress of the accuracy of these claims, even though
they are not valid. If a service will go along with industry
it means an increased budget and money to spend, sometimes on
things not directly associated with the industry - supported
product. It is difficult for a service to resist pressures
since by going along they can rationalists their position in terms
of the overall good that can be accomplished with more money.
The amount of money that is spent on nation-wide advertising, by
industry, for hardware that is obsolete, is sizeable, and the pressure
that industry can place through lobbies in terms of employment,
payrolls and effect upon constituents is impressive to Congress.
Finally, when such forces come into play in the committee system
that presently characterises the decision-makin^ process of the
Department of Defence, they can become very harmful. It is at
this stage that they assume the appearance of inter-service
differences although fundamentally, the problem is an industrial
and not a service one. This gets to the heart and soul of a
type of competition that leads to results that are, at times,
alarming'. Gavin, op. cit.. p.243.
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Manpower Reserve System
Yet another feature of New Look policy which reflected the desire
to produce an economical alternative to active ground forces was the
programme for improving military manpower reserves. Opposed by
allegedly superior conventional armies, the administration refused to
'react* in the manner urged by many senior Army commanders. It instead
chose to spare the US Treasury the expense of large active forces by
creating only an expanded pool of reserve manpower. Economy once
again prevailed over the apparent demands of direct action and reaction.
Consistency of Eisenhower Policy
The strong influence of domestic priorities generally and the
critical importance of economics in particular on Eisenhower deience
policy is revealed in the administration's record of consistent
dedication to reduced defence spending, diminished military defence
spending, manpower levels and a heavily nuclear bias in American
strategy. Despite the disturbing Korean War experience, the Communist
victory in Indo-China, the growing air-nuclear capabilities of the U5SA,
alarming assessments of Soviet nuclear potential, reports 01 a 'bomber
gap* and a Soviet lead in missile development, as well as continuing
Soviet conventional superiority, the administration firmly held to its
original economic and strategic convictions throughout President
Eisenhower's tenure. In the face of what might have proven sharply
arousing external stimuli the United States government remained
committed to economy in defence expenditure and firmly convinced of
the adequacy of its nuclear strategy.
Deterrence and the New Look
The New Look did not mark a radical revolution in American
strategic doctrine or operational planning. Nevertheless, the New
Look brought a major advance in the nation's commitment to the concept
of deterrence. The years 1945-1953 traced a gradual expansion in the
role of nuclear weapons in US strategy and the emergence of the
deterrence concept. However, the mobilisation tradition remained
alive in the minds of senior military commanders and in the policy of
the Truman Administration. Beyond arming to deter or to wage a full-
scale nuclear conflict, the United States - at least in theory - was
still preparing to conduct a major ground war with relatively large
active forces supported by an extensive mobilisation system. With
the adoption of the New Look, the Eisenhower Administration discarded
most of the Truman remnants of mobilisation. Although the New Look
established the improvement of manpower reserves as one of its
objectives, this was done in an attempt to avoid the maintenance of
high levels of active manpower and not in an effort to develop a broad
mobilisation base. Largely departing from the mobilisatioxi tradition,
the New Look pLaced heavy emphasis on nuclear forces-in*being generally
and the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence in particular.
While the idea of preparing to wage and win any future war was
certainly not abandoned, by the mid-1950s the first priority of
American policy was to support a strategy of deterrence through the
permanent maintenance of massive nuclear strike forces constantly
prepared to retaliate against any enemy. Conventional forces were,
of course, preserved but reduced in size and strategic signiiicance.
Further, the very meaning of 'conventional' was now taken to include
nuclear weapons of the tactical variety. Tactical nuclear weapons
were to assist in deterring conflicts below the full-scale nuclear
level, as well as to fill the breach left by the diminished numbers
of ground troops in the event of a major 'conventional conflict.
In short, under the New Look, the United States completed the move
to the concept of deterrence through nuclear power.
Little of the credit for this significant development in American
policy can be awarded to the Soviet Union. Although the armed forces
deployed under the New Look were intended primarily to deter, or if
need be, to defeat the USSR, beyond the underlying Soviet presence in
the mind of policy-makers as a formidable adversary, the Soviet Union
exerted little direct influence on the general character or specific
design of Eisenhower strategy. Indeed, had the administration been
prepared to honour fully its obligations under the rules of 'action-
reaction', the United States might have 'reacted' to the allegedly
rapid growth of the USSR as both a major nuclear and conventional
military power by launching a build-up in American general purpose
forces. Instead, it implemented a strategy with a sharply
divergent emphasis.
The New Look's overall nuclear bias and its commi-fement to nuclear
deterrence, rather than representing a direct response to Soviet
actions, was in fact, largely stimulated by the administration's
economic objectives and technological-strategic judgements. The
New Look's nuclear bias was largely motivated by the judgement that
America's overall security could not be assured without balanced budgets
and that balanced budgets could only be achieved b., deploying
'unbalanced' forces in which the burden of American defence would
rest upon nuclear power.
The economic and technological motives which prompted the general
Shift to nuclear weapons in American defence policy were also those
which inspired the adoption of the deterrence concept. Any strategy
preserving the mobilisation tradition was unacceptable to the hew
Look's authors, if only because the expense of maintaining a broadly
based mobilisation system would have seriously violated the
administration's fundamental commitment to cutting defence costs.
Beyond the economic factor, the final move to deterrence was also
strongly recommended by the very capabilities and implications of air-
nuclear technology which had originally suggested deterrence to the
Truman Administration. It was becoming increasingly apparent that
both the level of destruction of which nuclear weapons were capable
and the speed of their delivery had changed the nature of warfare and
significantly affected the role of the armed services. Luring a
period in which nuclear weapons could decisively smash an opponent
within a matter of days the age of lengthy general mobilisations had
clearly passed.
Further, the estimated consequences of a massive nuclear exchange
strongly proposed successful deterrence as the first - although by
no means the exclusive - responsibility of the nation's strategic
forces. In short, without the stimulus of Soviet actions, the nature
of nuclear weapons as revealed to the Americans in the development of
their own strategic systems, powerfully - if not irresistibly - argued
against mobilisation and for deterrence. In any case, deterrence was
clearly not suggested by the example of Soviet strategic doctrine; as
the Soviet Union still engaged in shaking off the rigid doctrinal
orthodoxy of the post-war Stalin period, was only just beginning to
consider ahd debate the deterrence concept.
Chapter 2
The Post-Stalin Debate and
The Emergence of Soviet 'Deterrence*
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The Post-Stalin Debate
The Decline of Stalinist Military Science
Throughout the early post-war years, Soviet stiategic doctrine
was rigidly cast in the mould of 'Stalinist Military Science',
freezing Soviet strategy in its World War II form. While Russian
plans for pouring vast conventional forces into western Lurope in
response to an atomic attack may not have been unrealistic in the
late 1940s, with the expansion of America's air- nuclear power
*»• " ,.■*
Stalinist strategy was becoming damgerously outmoded. The reform
of Soviet doctrine has become an unavoidable and urgenir necessity.
The opportunity for reform appeared in Larch of 1953 with the
death of Stalin. Almost immediately after Stalin's death the armed
services began the lengthy process of 'de-Stalinisation', opening
a debate on the validity of their former leader's strategic thought.
This re-examination was begun by Major General N.A. Talenskii in a
September 1953 article, 'On the Question of the Laws of Military
(2)
Science'. General Talenskii, for the first time in the Soviet
press, expressed the view that the so-called 'permanently operating
factors' were not, in fact, a fundamental anu. universal law of war.
The five factors did not represent absolute truths which coula be
(3)
thoughtlessly applied in every conflict. Talenskii continued
to laud Stalin's five factors as highly significant but presented
his own statement of the basic law of war, describing military
victory as fundamentally the product of 'successive blows accumulating
in force', 'the superiority in the permanent factors', and 'a
(1) H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union. hew York:




comprehensive exploitation of the economic, morale-political and
military potentialities in their unity and interactions*.^^
Talenskii's modification of orthodox Stalinist doctrine also
included the observation that the laws or rules of warfare applied,
equally to both socialist and imperialist forces. In other words,
while western leaders could not draw upon the moral force of their
(5)
peoples,the rules of battle were the same for both sides.
Talenskii also cautioned that the USSR's superior social system
provided no automatic guarantee of victory. In every conflict
the Soviet Union would have to fight with skill and courage in
order to defeat imperialism. Any complacent expectation of
inevitable victory might well bring defeat.
Although challenged within the Soviet armed forces, the strategic
review which General Talenskii began only months after Stalin's death
had changed the doctrinal environment, greatly reducing the
significance of the permanently operating factors. Sy 1955 the
(7)General's originally rather radical views had become respectable.
In that year, General P.A. kotmistrov delivered the first public
revision of the 'permanently operating factors'. While acknowledging
that careful observations of the five principles was necessary for
victory, he denied that they represented the sum total of strategic
wisdom, eliminating the need for any further thought. He joined
Talenskii in warning that Russia could not rely on any automatic
victories, neither could she rest secure in the belief that
(Q )
imperialist commanders did not understand the 'permanent factors'.






By 1955 Stalin's laws had not only lost their position as the
key to all future victories, but the very idea of discovering any
final principles was refuted by the editors of the journal military
Thought. (Voennaia mysl). explaining: it is not yet possible
(9)
to propound any final and definite formulation ol the basic law'.
With the need for public worship of the 'permanent factors' at an
end, the discussion of defence issues could be conducted in an
atmosphere of relative freedom. Writers on strategy could refrain
from including the ritual statements of inevitable Soviet victory,
as well as formal disparagements of western strategic primitivism.^^
They could now belatedly proceed with a much more uninhibited study
of modern warfare and the USSR's defence requirements than Stalin
had been willing to tolerate.
Although the efforts of General Talenskii and others to break
the calcifying grip of the permanent factors on military strategy
met with considerable success, the five factors were not completely
discarded. They were no longer cast as the sacred sum total of
strategic wisdom, but the decisive role of Stalin's principles was,
nevertheless, frequently asserted in the military press during the
first two years after Stalin's death.however, from approx¬
imately 1956-1959 the permanent factors thesis as expressed in its
Stalinist form, largely disappeared, although surviving in essence
through a continued emphasis on the importance of the full range of
political, economic, morale and military factors in the achievement
t. , + (12)oi victory.
(9) Dinerstein, op. clt.. p.61.
(10) Ibid.. p.62.
(11) R.L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of future t*ar. Washington, D.C.
Public Affairs Press, 1959, p.32.
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In short, although the 'permanently operating factors' were
still frequently accorded great public respect, the thaw in Soviet
military doctrine opened a re-examination of military strategy which
by 1955 dislodged the 'permanent factors* from their status as
infallible scripture. At the close of the decade the process of
revision had largely removed the five principles from military
discussion in Stalinist terms; although they continued to influence
the character of Soviet strategic doctrine. Only the paralysing
dogmatism of earlier times had been completely rejected.
The dethronement of the 'permanently operating factors* had a
number of affects on Soviet military thought. Two of the most
significant were the re-assessment of surprise attack in modern
warfare and the reappraisal of air-nuclear power. During the post¬
war Stalin years, surprise attack was usually described as an
important but indecisive influence on the outcome of a future war.
However, the death of the wartime leaafer brought a re-examination
of the contribution of surprise to victory. The post-Stalin review
of surprise seems to have begun in the autumn of 1953 with the
publication in Military Thought of an article by General Talenskii
in which the General explained:
It is well known that the influence of surprise
on the course of military operations can be
significant. But as a result of the correct
actions of a commander, the effect of an enemy
surprise attack can be to a greater or lesser
degree paralysed by a system of measures,
worked out by Soviet military science, in
particular a system of operatioz.al and tactical
security, and by high vigilance and combat
preparedness of the troops, etc. (13)
(13) Garthoff, op. cit.. p.62.
220
Talenskii expected that future wars would be lengthy struggles,
but did not 'exclude the possibility of a decisive defeat in a
limited time of one or another opponent, given the existence of
certain conditions'. While victory is the product of many battles,
the General acknowledged: *... perhaps in certain conditions and
situations it will even be possible to win a strategic operation
(14)
without recourse to consecutive operations'.
In October of 1953, Military Thought followed Talenskii's views
with an argument new "to Soviet military doctrine; Colonel ftenakhov
wrote:
Under current conditions, the danger of surprise
attack by the aggressors has not only not declined,
but on the contrary, has become still more sharp.
What causes this? Above all, the appearance of
new forms of armament of enormous destructive
and devastating action which in the hands of the
aggressors, are a most dangerous means of attack,
capable of bringing innumerable calamities to
peace-loving people. This concerns similarly
the development of aviation and other forms of
military technology and delivery means ...
Surprise of attack, of course, was and remains
a transitory factor not deciding the fate of wars.
However, as is well known from the experience of
the war, surprise can bring great advantage to
the aggressor and enormous loss to the victim of
the attack. It would hence be unforgivable
not to take account of this factor and to under¬
estimate it. (15)
In 1954 the military press generally continued to stress on the
primacy of the permanent factors while, nevertheless, acknowledging
that the course and outcome of a future war could be determined by a
surprise nuclear attack in certain circumstances. Any such apparent
contradiction was resolved to Soviet satisfaction by the contention
that adequate defences would cost the enemy the advantage of
(14) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p.44.
(15) Garthoff, op. cit.. pp.61-62.
(16}
surprise. The gradual process of doctrinal revision had,
by 1954, moderately increased the roles of surprise without
revolutionising the official viewi. on this issue. The 'permanently
operating factors' remained decisive. Although, in the words of
General N. Pukhovskii} with the development of military technology
and the employment of new means of destruction, the surprise element
(17)
acquired even more significance than it had in past wars', surprise
remained a secondary influence.
In 1955, a major advance was made in the doctrinal statu® of
surprise attack beginning with an article in the February 3 issue of
I ilitary Thought entitled, 'On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary
War' by Marshal Rotmistrov. Marshal Rotmistrov wrote:
Surprise attack with the employment of atomic
and hydrogen weapons and other contemporary
weapons now assumes new forms, and is capable
of leading to significantly greater results
than in the past war. One may frankly say
that under the circumstances of the use of
atomic and hydrogen weapons, surprise is one
of the decisive conditions, for achievement of
success not only in battles and operations,
but even in wars as a whole. In certain cases,
surprise attack with the mass use of new weapons
can provoke the quick collapse of a state
whose capability for resistance is low as a
consequence of the basic failure of its social
and economic structure and also for an
unfavourable geographic location, (IB)
kore than simply enlarging t e recognised significance ox
surprise, Rotmistrov also argued that simple retaliation against such
an assault was an inadequate response. A 'pre-emptive' or 'xore-
stalling' strike was required:
(16) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p.183.
(17) Ibid.. p.182.
(18) Garthoff, op. cit.. pp.64-65.
... since too often in past history aggressors
have used, surprise attacks on other states, we
cannot ignore these lessons of history and we
must always be ready for pre-emptive action
against the cunning of aggressors .... The
duty of the Soviet armed forces is to not
permit surprise attack of the enemy on our
country, and in case an attempt is made, not
only to repulse the attack successfully, but
also to deal to the enemy simultaneous blows
or even pre-emptive surprise blows of terrible
crushing power. For this the Soviet army and
navy have everything that is necessary. (19)
While Rotmistrov was arguing for a pre-emptive capability, he
made clear that he was not endorsing preventive war. He cautioned:
•Striving to seize and hold the strategic initiative must not be
understood as intention to start a preventive war against the
/ 2Q \
enemies of the USSR who are preparing to attack us*. u Ho fewer
than forty-eight statements appeared in the Soviet military press
during 1955 which followed Rotmistrcv in reflecting the changing view
(21)
of surprise and pre-emption. however, despite his pioneering
opinions on the surprise-pre-emption issue, Rotmistrov warned against
an over-emphasis on surprise saying: 'Surprise cannot, however,
yield a conclusive result, cannot bring victory in a war with a
(22)
serious and strong enemy'. Surprise was not to be regaraed
as essential for victory. It was only necessafy to take full
(23)
account of its affect on the early stages oi a war.
Intimately linked with the re-assessment oi surprise attack in
Soviet doctrine was the re-evaluation of the significance of nuclear




(23) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p.186.
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weapons. In the post-war Stalin period, atomic weapons were not
thought to have fundamentally altered the nature oi modern warfare.
However, in the early years after Stalin's death, deepening Soviet
insight into the new weapons technology and the growth of American
air-nuclear power compelled a change in the attitude to nuclear
power. Fron>at least 1955, the Soviet Union acknowledged the great
significance of nuclear weapons and set about planning for the
(24)
conduct of a major nuclear war.
The increased respect accorded to surprise attack and nuclear
weapons also resulted in the gradually improved status of air power.
Immediately after the Second World War, the Russians concluded that
strategic bombing had contributed relatively little to the defeat of
Germany, an assessment which seems to have largely persisted until
(25)
the middle of the 1950s. However, in 1954 an indication oi a
shift in attitude towards strategic bombing appeared in articles on
air defence. A Red Star article by Col. G. Fedorov in January of
1954 spoke of 'numerous and destructive bombings by enemy aircraft',
in a future war. In the following year, Fedorov explained that
(26)
bombing had brought '... great difficulties and deprivations'.
A colleague also described the conduct of offensive and defensive
(27)
strategic operations as representing a new military discipline.
In January of 1955 there was evidence of a significant
re-evaluation of strategic aviation. In that year the Air Force
.journal (Vestnik vozdushnopo flota) discussed the tactical use of
nuclear weapons and judged the bomber to be the best available





delivery system. Later in the year, mention was made of the use
of aircraft for relatively long-range atomic strikes. It was not,
however, until 1957 that the major role of air power was clearly
established.
The much improved status of strategic aviation was accompanied
by positive assessments of the capabilities of long and inter¬
mediate range missiles. As early as 1947, btalin decided to develop
an intercontinental strike capability based upon ballistic missiles
as well as aircraft. Developmental work proceeded from the late
1940s into the post-Stalin era with considerable intensity; but
it was not until 1956 that the Soviet press began to publish highly
admiring articles on the topic of ballistic missiles. By 1956
military authors spoke of the balanced development of air-power
(29)
including both manned bombers and missiles.
With the new awareness of surprise attack and air-nuclear power,
there was also a consequent upsurge in the importance attached to
both air defence and civil defence. V/hile air defence hac. been
regarded as a mission of importance in Stalin's time, it was perhaps
not given the weight which the post-Stalin appreciation of nuclear
weapons and surprise attack was eventually to bring. In early 1955,
the press began to discuss the necessity of active air defence in a
period when only a very few aircraft could cause terrible destruction.
Whereas in the past the interception of a large number of enemy
aircraft could be regarded as satisfactory, the new weapons technology
(28) Dinerstein, op. cit.. pp.230-232.
(29) Ibid., p.232.
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demanded the destruction oi all attacking planes.^0)
The grave threat of nuclear attack also inspired a keen
interest in civil defence. In the immediate post-Stalin years,
an important programme was initiated to educate the public on civil
defence in a nuclear war. Millions of pamphlets were printed in the
latter half of the 1950s explaining the affects of nuclear weapons
and recommending measures designed to protect the civilian
population. ^
The Malenkov-Khrushchev Contest
During the years 1953-1955, as the Soviet military was carrying
out a re-examination of strategy, the political leadership was
engaged in a struggle to determine the post-Stalin succession, a
contest which involved a number of differences over the impact oi
nuclear weapons on Soviet security and the USSR's defence requirements.
Assessing the implications of modern weapons technology,
G.M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council cf Ministers, concluded that
the tremendous power of nuclear weapons would make any future war a
(32)
terrible disaster for both socialist and imperialist countries.
The use of military force had become a means to no rational end.
Malenkov spoke of a third world war as '... a new world holocaust,
which, with the present means of warfare, means the destruction of
(33)
world civilisation'. Echoing Malenkov*s views, the government
newspaper Izvestia wrote approvingly of President Eisenhower's
(3C) Dinerstein, op. cit.. pp.233-239.
(3D Ibid., p.243.
(32) A.L. Horelick and M. Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet foreign
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, p.19.
(33) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p.102.
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December 1953 warning that, despite America's nuclear power, a
Soviet-American conflict offered: '... the probability of
civilisation destroyed ... and the condemnation of mankind to
(34)
begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery*.
The Izvestia article 'agreed completely with the appraisal of the
danger contained in present-day atomic weapons which was expressed
by Eisenhower*. ' Alluding to America's new post-war vulnerability,
the article explained:
The post-war development of the technical
facilities of warfare has advanced so far
that now the ocean is no longer a reliable
protection against blows in war. The
contemporary development of aviation, missiles
and the submarine fleet make it possible to deal
crushing blows across a distance of many
thousands of kilometers. Why, there are already
appearing even in the American press sufficient
admissions of the fact that the age of invulner¬
ability of overseas states is a thing of the past. (36)
While an atomic war promised horrific disaster, warfare
took on a suicidal aspect with the development of the
hydrogen bomb by both the USA and the USSR. In Malenkov's view,
this great new weapon assured the obliteration of all combatants.
However, in the Premier's opinion the shattering power of the
H-bomb, although posing the danger of a devastating American assault,
also provided the Soviet Union with a reliable guarantee against an
(37)
American attack. Indeed, the staggering power of nuclear
weapons was thought to have modified the Marxist doctrine on the
inevitability of war between capitalist and communist states.
In 1953 the Soviet writer M. Gus explained:





Experience has shown and proved that we are
in a position to prevent war, and to paralyse
the action of this law (of the inevitability
of war). As one bourgeois radio commentator
expressed it, in previous years people looked
at their calendars anxiously as the pages
came nearer and nearer to August, the classic
month for the beginning of world wars, but in
1953, for the first time, people drew an easy
breath in the certainty that such an obvious
threat of war had significantly reduced this
year, and had considerably receded. (38)
Expressing a similarly confident view on the diminishing
likelihood of war, M.I. Mikoian declared:
The danger of war has receded to a large extent
in connection with the fact that we now have
not only the atomic but also the hydrogen bomb ...
In the course of the last four or five years,
the ruling circles of the USA have declined
negotiations with the Soviet Union, while
trying to convince public opinion that these
negotiations were useless and that it was not
even worthwhile to initiate them. It is quite
instructive therefore, that after the Soviet
Union made the hydrogen bomb, and it is not
yet known whether the United States of America
has such a bomb, the government of the United
States of America proposed to the Soviet Union
the initiation of negotiations on questions of
atomic energy. (39)
In March of 1954, Mikoian apparently joined Malenkov in the
belief that Russia's then current atomic forces provided the USStv
with a 'deterrent' capability.
The power of nuclear weapons was evidently to be relied upon to
convert the imperialists to the ways of peace. iualenkov's apparent
confidence in the then rather meagre Soviet nuclear capability,
probably rested upon a strategic concept later described in the west
(38) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p.67.
(39) Ibid., p.71.
(4°) Ibid*. PP.15, 101.
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as 'minimum deterrence* or the deployment of a small nuclear
(41)
force in an effort to dissuade a potential enemy from attack.
Believing that nuclear weapons had both greatly increased the
destructiveness of war,as well as positively contributing to Soviet
security, ttose of Malenkov's persuasion insisted that it was
'necessary and possible* to adopt a policy of peaceful co-existence.
Nuclear weapons had made war appear unattractive to the imperialists
but the terrible capabilities of the new weapons nevertheless
demanded that the strongest possible guarantees against conflict
be established. Steps had to be taken to end the Cold War. In
the words of the Soviet Premier:
It is not true that mankind faces a choice
between just two possibilities: either a
new world holocaust or the so-called cold war.
The peoples (of the world) are vitally
interested in a firm consolidation of peace.
The Soviet government stands for further
relaxation of international tension, for a
firm and lasting peace and resolutely opposes
the policy of cold war for this policy is a
policy of preparation for a new world holocaust
which, with the present means of warfare, means
the destruction of world civilisation. (43)
In other words, Mlenkov seemed to be implying the possibility
of a new and ideologically rather unorthodox relationship of long-
(44)
term accommodation with the west.
The development of nuclear weapons was also thought to provide
a means of reducing defence expensitures. As only a relatively
small number of bombs could accomplish damage levels which would
previously have required years to achieve, it was possible to assure
(41) Horelick and Rush, op, cit.. p.19.
(42) Ibid., p.26.
(43) Dinerstein, op. cit.. pp.101-102.
(44) Ibid., p.102.
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Soviet security with relatively small strategic forces, freeing
substantial resources for investment in the civilian economy.
The opportunity had finally arrived for substantially improving the
Soviet standard of living through the further development of light
industry.(45) in August of 1953, Malenkov explained that the
period of intense concentration on heavy industry had passed and a
new period had begun.'46) it was now possible to correct what one
economist described as: 'a certain backwardness in the production
(47)
of goods in popular demand ...*.
Underlying much of the defence debate in the post-Stalin
leadership contest was a basic difference over the implications of
nuclear weaponry for Soviet security. While those represented by
•V.alenkov argued that the new technology had improved Soviet security,
reducing the danger of an American attack, those in accord with
Party Chairman U.S. Khrushchev and Defence minister Nicholai Bulganin
took a directly opposing view. Par from being able to rest
securely behind Malenkiv's 'deterrence* concept and minimal nuclear
forces, Khrushchev argued that the Effect of nuclear weapons was,
in fact, ambivalent. Their awesome power could serve to caution
the imperialists against aggression; but that same power might also
tempt the United States to resolve the east-west struggle through a
surprise attack. As a result, in March of 1954, Bulganin departed
from the traditional Stalinist view of surprise as a secondary factor,
warning of the growing danger of a surprise nuclear attack. Unlike
the more optimistic Malenkov assessment, Bulganin felt that the
increasing threat of surprise posed by the hydrogen bomb had




diminished Soviet security.With surprise now more tempting
than ever, nuclear weapons could hardly be said to have reduced the
likelihood of war. The danger of war was also said to remain high
as a result of the unchanging nature of capitalism. Khrushchev
advised:
The Communist Party and the Soviet government
cannot but realise that there are reactionary
forces in capitalist countries which seek to
find a solution to their economic difficulties
and the exacerbated contradictions of the
imperialist camp by the preparation of a new war. (49)
V.M. Molotov observed that it was 'impossible not to take into
account that before everyone's eyes the policy of the preparation
of a new war is being carried out by the reactionary forces
The Khrushchev faction warned that estimates of nuclear damage levels
and a reasonable Soviet attitude could do nothing to eliminate the
aggressive plans of the imperialists, ambitions which were deter¬
mined by the very nature of capitalism and the laws of history.
In support of their ominous views, Khrushchev and his colleagues
pointed to a number of developments abroad. Among the most
disturbing of these was the Dulles doctrine of 'massive retaliation',
a policy which Pravda explained meant:
The United States intended in case of any local
conflict, wherever it happened, to begin military
operations where they pleased and against whom
they pleased, using all kinds of weapons,
including atomic bombs. (91)
Such a policy implied an American intention to exploit local wars
(32)
as a means of triggering more serious conflicts. The then current
Indo-China crisis was regarded apprehensively as an opportunity for
(48) Horelick and Rush, op. cit.. pp.22-24.






the implementation of the highly dangerous Dulles doctrine.
«
In any case, the openly declared American attachment to retaliation
'instantly by means and at places of our own choosing* was not
considered to be the policy of a fully rational state. far from
accepting the reasonable quality of American policy, Khrushchev
(54)
questioned the very sanity of the American Secretary of State.
The more alarmist Khrushchev school also pointed to the beginning of
German rearmament as yet another sign of western disinterest in
peace. This programme was thought to be a step in the west's
preparation for the final clash between the capitalist and Communist
world's which the imperialists would initiate in a last futile
(55)
attempt to resist the laws of history.
In such circumstances, with the United States publicly
committed to relying upon its nuclear forces, the Khrushchev group
found itself unable to place its confidence in any strategy of
'deterrence'. Indeed, the Premier's faith in the adequacy of the
Soviet 'deterrent', as well as his grim expectation of the
consequences of a nuclear war, were condemned as both complacent and
defeatist, lulling the Soviet people into dangerous apathy. The
idea of peace through 'mutual deterrence' was described as a
capitalist slogan designed to afflict the Russians with a false sense
of security. In his prediction of 'the destruction of world
civilisation' as a result of nuclear war, Malenkov had foolishly
dismissed any possibility of the USSh. winning or seemingly even
surviving such a conflict. The Khrushchev group accepted that an




American nuclear attack would bring great destruction to the
Soviet Union; but they disputed the suggestion that a nuclear
exchange would mean complete disaster for both sides. This
argument was a capitalist deception intended to dull Soviet
vigilance, and propagate the notion that resistance to an American
attack was pointless. In response, the Khrushchev faction assured
the Soviet people that a general war threatened the collapse of
(56)
only the capitalist system.
In a time when the inherently aggressive nature of capitalism
was made still more dangerous by the terrible power of modern
technology, and the irrational and unreasonable quality of American
policy, the Soviet Union could not afford the delusion of •mutual
deterrence1 as a guarantee of peace. Sharing the globe with a
powerful aggressive and unpredictable opponent, the USSrt must
recognise that: 'at any moment ... mankind might be faced with the
(57)
accomplished fact of the beginning of a destructive atomic war1. '
In such circumstances, it was hardly sensible to speak of reducing
the nation's defence burden or devoting larger resources to the
civilian sector of the economy. On the contrary, Khrushchev and
his associates argued for a still greater commitment to the armed
forces and heavy industry. Bulganin explained that the USSR had to
increase her military power as the west was not planning for 'mutual
(SB }
deterrence', but for war with the Soviet Union. Bulganin warned
in November of 1954: 'So far no changes have taken place in the
international situation which would give us grounds for reducing our
attention in any degree to the question of strengthening our





defensive capabilities*. Additional strength was required
for defence as well as to strengthen the Soviet position in talks
with the west.^0^ On the light versus heavy industry question,
Pravda explained:
... while carrying out the programse of the
further improvement of all branches oi the
socialist economy and the programme of the
systematic improvement of the material
welfare of the people, the party will push
heavy industry forward above every thing else
and unswervingly, (61)
A Pravda editorial also argued:
•The growth of heavy industry is the basis
for the further development of the whole
economy and the guarantee of the inviolability
of the borders of our motherland (62)
Those advocating a higher investment in light industry were
described as •pseudo-economists* by 1'ravda* s editor, Dimitri
(63)
Shepilov. ' He further argued:
'Stalin showed more than once that in the face
of capitalist encirclement we cannot halt the
tempo of the forward movement of heavy industry
.... To hold it back means to fall back4
and the backward are beaten*. (64)
The leadership contest eventually brought victory to Khrushchev
and his colleagues. During 1954 iiialenkov's public statements
slowly traced a retreat from his earlier views on 'nuclear deterrence'
and Soviet-American relations. The Premier was gradually separated
from his sources of support until he was compelled to resign as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers on i-ebruary 8, 1955






(65) Ibid., pp.73-75; 112-114; 116-117; 128.
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Khrushchev and Bulganin : 1955-1937
V<ith the resignation of Kalenkov, the Khrushchev-Bulganin team
came to power as the opponents of a 'deterrence' emphasis in defence
policy and the prophets of an American nuclear attack. The USSR
was not to risk its survival on the deterrent affect of the country's
still meagre nuclear forces, but was to develop a 'war-winning'
capability. As part of this new strategy and in recognition of the
new importance of surprise attack, the Soviet Union was to develop
the capability to deliver a pre-emptive strike. pre-emption would
limit the USSR's losses and favourably influence the outcome of the
(66 }
war. ' In pursuit of these goals, Khrushchev and Bulganin
presided over an increase in the Soviet Union's military power.
However, the period 1955-1957 was also marked by an apparent reversal
of their earlier attitudes on the likelihood of war.
Almost immediately after the defeat of Malenkov, Khrushchev
and Bulganin shifted their position on the likelihood of war,
/ rrj \
reflecting far less concern over the danger of an American attack. '
Following rapidly on Bulganin's succession as Premier, the new
leadership acted to improve the USSR's foreign relations, moves not
entirely consistent with a highly pessimistic view of the world
situation. In 1955 a settlement was reached with Austria, Soviet
troops were withdrawn from that country and Mr. Khrushchev met with
the American President at the Big Four Summit Conference in Geneva.
Against the background of these positive steps toward accommodation,
(66) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp.24-25.
(67) Ibid.. p.95.
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the official Soviet view of the prospect for peace improved
considerably. Indeed, the change in the Soviet world view and
the degree to which the earlier alarmist position may have been
related to the struggle with Malenkov, was clarified at the Supreme
Soviet session which received Malenkov's resignation. On that
occasion, Molotov told the legislature of the weakness and
constraints afflicting the new Republican leadership in Washington,
adopting a tone markedly difierent from earlier fears of an
(68)
American attack. '
The Party Chief's changing views were reflected in his
modification, of the Marxist principle on the inevitability of war
with imperialism, Khrushchev reminded the Twentieth Party Congress,
in February of 1956, that when the dictum on the inevitability of war
was first issued, imperialism controlled the entire globe.
However, by the mid-1950s, Capitalism had been greatly weakened by-
Socialist victories in the USSR and in many other countries around
the world. These victories and the military power which they
placed in the hands of peace-loving peoples, forced the west to
recognise the impossibility of a successful attack on the USSR.
The continued existence of Capitalism preserved the danger of war
but the reality of Soviet power meant that there was 'no fatal
inevitability of wars'.The nature of the capitalist system
had not changed, requiring the Soviet Union to keep its military
guard as high as possible. However, the danger of nuclear devastation
facing all nations, as well as the strength of the Socialist world




the terrible risks of another great war.^°^ As well as
detecting a reduced danger of an American attack in 1956,
Khrushchev also modified hiB views on the likely consequences of
a nuclear war, seeming to move more closely to iialenkov's dire
warnings. In April of 1958 his estimates of war damage went so
(71)
far as to include the 'annihilation of all life on earth'.
However, in early 1957 Khrushchev again shifted his view on
the probability of war. It was now once again argued that, despite
the great increase in Soviet military power, many American leaders
were determined to discover some means of launching a nuclear war
(72)
without suffering retaliation. In January of 1957, a Chinese-
Soviet declaration included the first charge of America's violent
intentions for two years. It warned: All the peace-loving nations
of the globe should be constantly vigilant and prepared for a
persistent and prolonged struggle with the camp headed by the United
States', in view of the American 'policy of aggression and preparation
(73)for war'. On liarch 18, a Pravda article pointed out that,
while war was no longer inevitable, 'Capitalism has been, remains
and in the future will be, the source of threats of aggression and
(74)war'. Capitalism's obvious decline might well prompt the west
to violent stop-gap measures. During the first half of 1957 the
Party Chairman spoke of the real danger of war resulting from
American miscalculation or accident. Speaking of the threat of
war, Khrushchev told the Mew York Times in Lay of 1957:






In this connection it should be realised that,
given the existence of atomic and hydrogen arms
and given the existence of rocket technology
and inter-continental missiles, it is not to be
excluded that a war can be unleashed as a result
of some kind of fatal error, which will lead to
untold tragedy for the peoples, not only of our
two countries, but for the peoples of the whole
world. (75)
On the question of whether the future would bring war or peace,
Khrushchev explained: 'It is hard, I repeat, to say in which
/ \
direction the scales will tip*.
In a May interview, he denied that nuclear weapons might assure
world peace and also advised:
We do not want to be like the lamb, defenceless
before the wolf. Both the lamb and the wolf
live on the same earth. But by the right of
might, the wolf eats the lamb. We want to have
xangc so that the wolf knows that an attack on
the peace-loving cannot be carried out with
impunity. The wolves may lose their skins and,
perhaps even worse, their heads. (77)
Post-Stalin Strategic Doctrine and Policy
General Purpose forces
Ground Forces
By the middle of the 1950s the Russians continued to describe
the ground forces as: 'The main element of the armed forces
Indeed, the nuclear age was occasionally said to require larger ground
(79)
armies than before, increased in mobility, manoeuvre, fire power
and reconnaissance capability. These requirements were thought to
(80
have increased the importance of both armoured and airborne forces.
(75) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p.84.
(76) Ibid.. p.85.
(77) Ibid., p.87.
(78) R.L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Ruclear Age.




While Khrushchev's policy in the mid-1950s was marked by a
reduction in the overall level of military manpower, these cuts
(81)
did not appear to affect Army strength seriously. As
manpower levels were being reduced the Army was re-organised and
modernised in an effort to improve its fire power and mobility.
The ground forces were extensively motorised, air transport
(82)
expanded and modern weapons delivered to Army units.
The Army was also trained in the conduct of its operations
under atomic attack. Articles on the topic appeared in the
military press. Manuals on atomic warfare were written, atomic
manoeuvres practised and changes in operational procedures and
tactics considered. By 1955 training for atomic warfare had
become a regular feature of Army training and Soviet tactical
atomic weapons had been developed. The atomic nuclear emphasis
(81) Prom 1955 to 1957 the USSR announced the dissolution of
'63 divisions and independent brigades' but did not
identify the number of combat divisions affected. (T.VV.
Y;olfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, pp.164-165). In 1955 and
1956 it was claimed that total armed forces manpower had
been cut by 184,000. Premier Khrushchev was later to
assert that the overall level of armed forces manpower from
1955 to 1958 had been reduced from 5,763,000 to 3,623,000.
(Michael P. Gehlen, The Politics of Co-existence. Bloomington,
Ind,: Indiana University Press, 1967, p.71). While a
reduction in something li.ve 1947 levels was probably achieved,
western sources reported no decline in the number of divisions.
Those cuts which were carried out were reportedly achieved by
converting full strength combat ready divisions to 'cadre
strength'. In other words, officer ana NCO strength was main-
maintained (with the exception of political officers), while
enlisted ranks vere reduced. (Garthoff, Soviet Strategy
in the nuclear Age, op . ci t.. p. 150). The Army retained
twenty-eight divisions in eastern Europe and sixty to seventy
divisions in western Russia. (Wolfe, op. cit., pp.166-167)}
also see L.P. Bloomfield, Y..C. Clemens, Jr., P. Griffiths,
Khrushchev and the Arms Race. Cambridge, Mass.: The kIT
Press, 1966, pp.98-99.
(82) Garthoff, Soviet strategy in the liuclear Ago. op. cit..
pp.161-162; Michel Garder, A History of the Soviet Army.
London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, pp.141, 143; Malcolm
Mackintosh, Juggernaut. London: Seeker and Warburg,
1967, pp.292-293.
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which was permeating the whole of the Soviet armed forces
foretold difficult days for the ground forces. For the moment,
1955 or 1956 appears to have witnessed a re-allocation of defence
expenditures which reduced the portion of the national budget




The supporting missions of tactical aviation in this period
included - as during World Yiar II - the destruction of enemy troops
and equipment engaged in battle, as well as troops and equipment held
in reserve, the interdiction of enemy supply lines, assistance to
ground force offensives and the pursuit of the enemy through bombing
strikes. Finally and perhaps most importantly, tactical
aviation was to establish Soviet air superiority by destroying the
enemy's air forces in the air and on the ground.^*''1 Tactical
aviation continued to comprise the largest proportion of the nation's
bombers and fighters and air transports were assi£ned, as before, to
the support of ground operations. About two-thirds of military
aircraft served in a supporting role and more than half were in the
(86)
charge of Frontal Aviation. The increased status of strategic
aviation and occasionally adverse public judgements on the future of
manned aircraft were not reflected in tactical force levels or the
persistent effort to improve the quality or tactical air power.
(83) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the liuclear Age, op. cit..
pp.156-166; Bloomfield, op. cit.. p.42; Also on the Soviet
Army, see 3.H. Liddell-Hart, ed.. The Soviet Army. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956; Edgar O'Ballance, The Red
Army. London: Faber and Faber, 1964.
(84) Lee, op. cit.. p.160.
(85) Ibid., p.158.
(86) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy and the Huclear Age, op. cit.. p.163.
(87) Ibid.; Lee, op. cit.. p.159.
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The improvement of tactical aviation in this period involved the
(QQ)
introduction of several new types of combat aircraft, ° in
search of greater mobility, Transport Command was also enlarged
with the deployment of greater numbers of both fixed wing
transports and helicopters.
Sea lower
In the early post-Stalin years the Navy argued for the
continuation of Stalin's surface ship construction programme -
suspended soon after the late Premier's death - opposing the view
that nuclear weapons and land-based missiles had dramatically reduced
(90)
the strategic significance of sea power. Despite doubts as to
the future of the Navy, it was officially recognised that 'combat in
(88) The MiG-17 fighter appeared in 1994 as a replacement
for the IiiG-15. In 1994-1955 the Ya.i-25 joined
tactical aviation in squadron service as the standard
night and all-weather fighter. In 1955 the nid-19 -
the first Soviet jet fighter capable of supersonic
speeds in level flight - began to replace the miG-17
in tactical units. 3y 1957-1958 the fciG-19 was
superseded by the more powerful MiG-21. From 1956-
1957 a supersonic advance on the IL-28 bomber, the
11-40 Blowlamp entered service. At about the same
time a bomber ve sion of the Yak-25 became operational
with radar bombing equipment. (William Green, 'The
Development of Jet Fighter and Fighter Bombers', in
Asher Lee, The Bovie t Air and socket forces. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959, pp.140-1455
-6®e* QP« cit.. pp.159} 168-169).
(89) Lee, op, cit.. p.163.
(90) T.W. Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United
States and its Influence on Soviet Naval Developments',
in Michel MccGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments:
Capabilities and Context. Halifax, N.S.; Dalhousie
University, Centre for Foreign tolicy Studies, 1973,
pp.219-220.
241.
naval theatres assumes more significance than in the recent war*
and that nuclear technology •significantly increases the power of
(91)
the Navy and widens the framework of the employment of the Navy'.
Khrushchev's policy in this period acknowledged at least two highly
significant naval missions: the destruction of enemy surface ships -
especially aircraft carriers - and the delivery of nuclear blows
against the enemy's armed forces, military bases, port facilities
(92)
and defence industries. However, the admittedly important
naval role was not to be carried out by a 'balanced* fleet of the
kind which many naval officers desired. Instead, large conventional
surface forces were pronounced critically vulnerable and consequently
obsolete, requiring an intensified stress upon modern weapons
technology - emphasising nuclear power, sea launched missiles and
(93)
the submarine, '
The judgement that surface ships had become fatally vulnerable
to missile and submarine attack brought the cancellation of several
construction programmes, affecting cruiser, destroyers, escorts
(94)
and large submarine chasers. These outmoded vessels were to
be succeeded by destroyer-size ships designed to strike at enemy
(91) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit.. pp.197-199.
(92) Ibid.
(93) Ibid.. pp.200-201; George Hudson, 'Soviet Naval Doctrine
1953-1972' in MccGwire, ed., op. clt.. pp.247-250.
(94) Michel MccGwire, 'The Turning Points in Soviet Naval
Policy' in MccGwire, op. cit.. pp.164, 167-168*.
In 1967 as part of the policy of generally reducing
armed forces manpower and expenditures, the Eavy was
cut from 600,000 to something like 500,000 seamen and
375 warships were mothballed. (Donald ft. Mitchell,
A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power. New York:
Macmillan, 1974, p.477.
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surface units with long-range cruise missiles under the cover of
(95}
shore-based airpower. Conventionally armed surface ships were
modified and new destroyer and cruiser types designed and produced
as missile launchers.^6) ad.verse assessment of surface ships
finally quashed any idea of constructing aircraft carriers,
encouraging instead an improvement in naval aviation in the area of
fleet operations as part of a strategy which tied the suriace fleet
(97)
to shore-based air power. The numbers oi aircraft and naval
airmen were reduced but aircraft new to naval aviation were intro¬
duced, enlarging its anti-submarine and reconnaissance capabilities.
The ma.jor naval construction effort in this period was applied
to the subsurface fleet. Medium-class submarines programmes were
cancelled and additional resources devoted to the construction of a
modern missile armed force of ocean-going nuclear and diesel
(99)
powered submarines. The submarine was assigned two significant
missions: strategic interdiction and the delivery of nuclear
(95) MccGwire, op. cit.. p.164.
(96) KccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy*, in
MccGwire, ed., op. cit., pp.136-137; MccGwire,
•The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy1,
op. cit.. p.164; Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with
the United States and its Influence on Soviet Naval
Deployments*, op. cit.. pp.222-224.
(97) MccGwire, The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy, Ibid.. p.
(98) Asher Lee, The Soviet Air Force. London: Gerald
Duckworth, 1961, pp.152-153; Wolfe, Soviet Power and
Europe. 1945-1970. op. cit.. p.191 and Note 141;
Mitchell, op. cit.. pp.477-478.
(99) Wolfs, Ibid., pp.189=191.
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strikes.The interdiction mission was vital in view of
NATO's dependence upon trans-Atlantic re-supply support and the
deployment of large American aircraft carriers. The anti-carrier
mission was established as the first naval priority between 1957
and 1958.(101)
Enemy communications, as well as warships, were to be assaulted
by submarines firing torpedoes and missiles tipped with nuclear
warheads.Conventionally powered and conventionally armed
units were also added to the subsurface fleet.
Limited Warfare
While it was generally the Soviet view that the successful
limitation of any conflict involving the USA and the USSR was most
unlikely, if not entirely impossible, the degree of official
J*#;
certitude appeared to vary somewhat with the kind of conflict under
discussion. Some Soviet pronouncements in the mid-1950s seemed to
recognise the possibility of a major non-nuclear war between east and
west. Responding to questions on the use of atomic and nuclear weapons
in future wars, Marshal G.K. Zhukov said, in 1957: 'Neither I nor
anyone else can answer completely all those questions now because
all wars, major and small, are waged and end under specific political,
geographical and economic conditions.' Other statements by
(100) On the development of missile firing submarines and
missile systems, see pages Q.SI-l'Si.
(101) MccGwire, 'The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy',
op. cit.. p.175.
(102) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age.
op. cit.,pp.202-204.
(103) Michel MccGwire, 'Comparative Warship Building Programmes',
in MccGwire, ed., Ibid.. p.135.
(104) Garthoff, Ibid.. pp.102-103.
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senior Soviet commanders in this period implied that future conflicts
would involve nuclear exahanges if the west initiated the nuclear
phase.Although the Russians seemed to imply at least some
possibility of a major non-nuclear conflict between east and west,
Soviet statements later in the decade and the increasing nuclearisation
of the Soviet armed forces generally supported the view that a major
and prolonged conventional clash - particularly in Europe - would
prove unworkable. The maintenance of large conventional forces was
increasingly described as necessary - not for major non-nuclear wars -
but in terms of the heavy losses which could be expected in a
i (106)nuclear war.
The declaratory Soviet position', on local wars and limited nuclear
warfare was rather more clearly stated than the official stand on major
conventional conflicts. While it is possible to discover statements
made in the mid-1950s which appear to grant the possibility of local
wars between the great powers (wars confined to a single theatre of
operations), General G. Pokrovsky expressed the predominant Soviet
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view when in 1957 he said: 'The era of local war is over*.
The Russian attitudes on limited nuclear war remained consistent
through the Khrushchev period. Any use of nuclear systems would
inevitably lead to massive destruction, eliminating any peacetime
distinction between tactical and strategic weapons. American
reference to tactical nuclear warfare or the 'precision' use of imclear
weapons against military targets was dismissed as an attempt to
accustom public opinion to their use, a deceptive pretence that nuclear
(105) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Kuclear Age, op. cit..
pp.103-104.
(106) Ibid.. p.164; Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. 1945-1970,
op. cit.. pp.208-211.
(107) Garthoff, Ibid., pp.112-115.
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war could be conducted without tremendous damage to civilian centres.
The Russians argued that the first firing of tactical nuclear weapons
would 'lead to the mass use of atomic and hydrogen bombs'. The
proximity of so-called 'military targets' to population centres
tendered meaningless any idea of 'precision' attacks in nuclear
warfare. The use of tactical atomic weapons would 'inevitably result
(108)
in immense loss of life among civilians'.
Warsaw Pact
On May 14( 1955» following the admission of the federal Republic
of Germany to NATO, the Soviet Union and its European allies
(excluding Yugoslavia and, for the time being, East Germany), signed
a Treaty establishing the Warsaw Fact. The Pact - an organisation
only very roughly comparable to NATO - included a joint command and
a political consultative committee. As well as apparently bolstering
socialist defences against a western attack, the Pact provided an
additional basis for continued Soviet military deployments in
eastern Europe.in the first five years of its existence, the
(108) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op, cit..
pp.107-112.
(109) Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy. New York: P.A. Praeger,
1966, pp.149-150; The Russians had already signed a number
of bilateral defence agreements with eastern European countries
before the Warsaw Pact was created. Following serious
disturbances in Poland and Hungary during the 1950s, new
•status of forces* agreements providing for the deployment
of Soviet forces in the territory of Poland, Hungary and
Rumania were signed in 1956 and 1957. Soviet forces
were withdrawn from Austria in 1955 ana from Rumania in
1958. (Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. 1945-1970.
p.149).
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Warsaw Pact served largely as a political response to West Germany's
NATO membership, with little done to establish the alliance as a
powerful and integrated military organisation. Soviet armed forces
remained the effective barrier to any western invasion. Nevertheless,
measures were taken to provide the Pact with military substance.
An effort to standardise weapons and field doctrine along Soviet
lines was pursued. Each Pact member was assigned broadly drawn
strategic missions and some local arms production was encouraged.
In addition to the rather low-key programme for the military development
of the alliance, the modernisation of the national armed forces of its
members was continued. While east European military manpower was
reduced by almost one-third between 1955 and 1960,^^"^ the
modernisation process brought Soviet military assistance to its
European allies in the form of equipment and weapons deliveries.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Strategic Air Power
While the statements of some Soviet commanuers in the post-war
Stalin period reflected a positive re-evaluation of long-range aviation,
Stalinist air doctrine as a whole did not reflect any major improvement
in its status.By contrast the mid-1950s were marked by public
acknowledgement of the heightened significance of air power in the
muclear era.^11^ The great importance of air-nuclear forces was now
widely recognised, although the Russians continued to note that air
(110) Wolfe, (Bp. cit.. pp.148-149.
(111) Garthoff, Soviet iv'ilitary Policy, p.151.
(112) Ibid.. pp.134-152; Also see Roman Kolkowicz, 'Warsaw Pacts
Entangling Alliance', Survey. Spring 1969, pp.86-101.
(113) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit., pp.175-179.
(114) Ibid.. pp.179-192; Binerstein, op. cit.. pp.230-236.
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power was not the 'war-winner' and victory was still to be won 'only
by the combined efforts of all the armed forces and on the basis of
their co-ordinated employment in war',^^^ Further, after the
dramatic demonstration of the USSR's 1C3M capabilities in 1957,
Khrushchev occasionally delivered highly pessimistic assessments of
manned aircraf
Finally, while generally acknowledging an expanded role for
long-range aviation, the Russians clearly did not accept American
views on the decisiveness of strategic aviation or the urban-
industrial emphasis of US air strategy. American doctrine was still
accused of exaggerating the effectiveness of bombersand any
suggestion that the main objective of air power was the destruction
of an enemy's urban-industrial areas or his will to resist, was
firmly rejected. Attacks on economic and population targets were
only to complement the major assault on the rear of the enemy's armed
forces.in other words, from the American perspective, an
assault on Soviet air-nuclear forces was seen as necessary, if the
primary objective of destroying the enemy's economic and population
centres were to succeed, whereas the Russians regarded the destruction
of America's nuclear strategic capability, as well as other elements of
American military power, as in itself the highest strategic priority.^"^)
In accord with the improved status of strategic aviation, the
development of new bomber types in the early and mid-1950s proceeded
(115) Garthoff, op. cit.. p.180.
(116) See pages 308-301.
(117) Garthoff, op. clt.. pp.182-183.
(H8) Ibid., pp.180-182.
(119) Ibid.. pp.186-187; Bloomfield, op. cit.. p.42.
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apace, as a larger portion of the defence budget was allotted to
bomber R&D. With the settlement of the leadership question in
1955, the Soviet Union was faced with a number of development and
deployment options in long-range aviation. The record of Khrushchev's
policy was to reflect an apparent decision to develop a mix of long-
range and medium-range bombers, emphasising medium-range aircraft.
In 1954 the TU-16 twin-jet medium bomber or Badger entered
Squadron service and production of the four-jet M-4 Bison began.
beod" (121)
In the same period the turbo-prop TU-95 3adger also appeared.
By the closing years of the 1950s, reflecting an apparent emphasis on
medium-range aircraft and the European theatre, the USSR had deployed
only some 150-200 of the longer ranged Bear and Bison bombers, as
(122)
compared to 1,000 of the medium jet Badger aircraft. ' As well as
improving bomber quality by the middle of the decade, the Russians
also developed aerial refuelling techniques and were producing a
(123)
fleet of in-flight refuelling tankers. The strike capability
of strategic aviation against North America was further extended by
the construction of some thirty to forty new jet bomber bases in
the Soviet Union's Arctic regions, beginning in about 1955.^"^^
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles
The first Soviet IC3M tests elicited a number of not entirely
consistent public statements on the relative significance of the
strategic bomber and the long-range ballistic missile. Chairman
Khrushchev in 1957 expressed the view that the development of missiles
(120) Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1960. op. cit.. pp.178-179.
(121) Lee, op. cit.. pp.133-134.
(122) Ibid., p.179.
(123) Sir Philip Joubert, 'Long-Range Air Attack*, in nee, ed.,
op. cit.. p.109.
(124) Lee, op. cit.. p.137.
249.
made bombers 'obsolete'. Mr. Khrushchev declared: 'lighter ana
bomber airplanes can now be put into museums'.However, at
the same time other statements were published by Soviet commanders
which continued to acknowledge an important role for long-range
aviation. While missiles were generally regarded as the most
suitable weapon for stationary targets, bombers were still said to
be useful against mobile targets or targets whose location was not
precisely known, suggesting that the enemy's armed forces were the
most likely target assignment for strate£;,ic aviation.
A programme for missile research and development was vigorously
pursued after Stalin's death. By the middle of the decade most of
the German scientists involved in Soviet rocket research were withdrawn
(127)
from the programme, which was now entirely in Russian hands. At
this time the USSR had already succeeded in the development and
production of the T-l (or M-101) missile type, a derivative of the
German V-2. A single stage liquid-fuelled rocket, initially with a
range of 200-400 miles which was extended to some 600-775 miles in the
later half of the 1950s. The later version of the 'i'-l was mobile and
(128^
carried a nuclear warhead of perhaps 800 lbs. The USSR was
reported to have begun test firing an IRBM, the T-2 in 1954-1955» as
well as beginning small scale T-2 production in 1956, the missile which
(129 )
was to become the mainstay of the Soviet missile forces. This
weapon had a range variously estimated in the west at some 1,200 to
2,000 miles. Its liquid-fuelled engines powered two stages and an
atomic warhead of about 700 lbs. at a maximum speed of 5,000 m.p.h.^1"^
(125) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Huclear Age, op. cit.. pp.222-223.
(1.26) Ibid., pp.223-227.
(127) Albert Parry, Russia's Rockets and Missiles. London:
Macmillan, I960, pp.125-128.
(128) Ibid., pp.132-133.
(129) Lee, op. cit.. pp.139, 140, 235-236.
(130) Asher Lee and Richard E. Stockwell, 'Soviet Missiles* in Lee, ed.,
op. cit.. pp.146-159; Parry, op. cit.. p.133; Lee, op. cit..
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Work on missiles of intercontinental range was also vigorously
conducted during the mid-1950s. The three stages 1-3 U.-1Q4)
missile - based upon the 1-1 and T-2 weapons - was first successfully
test-fired in August of 1957. It had a range of some 5,000 miles,
a top speed of 15,000 miles per hour and was capable of delivering
a thermonuclear warhead estimated at somewhere between 700 and
2,200 lbs. It reportedly entered some order of production in
1958.^"^ A more advanced ICBk type, the T-3A. with a 6,000
(132)
mile range and 16,000 m.p.h. speed, was also under development.
In October of 1957 a variety of the T-3 and T-3a engines were used to
(133)
launch Sputnik I greatly alarming much of the western world.
During the mid-1950s the Russians proceeded with deployment of a
considerable number of its medium and intermediate range missiles in
the European theatre, eventually reaching a total of some 700-750 by the
time of Khrushchev's retirement.^34) with the clear demonstration of
an ICBk capability in 1957, it was widely assumed in the United States
that Mr. Khrushchev would approve the large-scale production a..d
deployment of ICBBts in the latter half of the decade. V>hile a major
deployment effort was not to occur, the first successful ICBM test in
1957, the launch of Sputnik I and II in the same year, the progress
of MRBM development, as well as evidence of a major re-allocation of
scientific and technical manpower to missile development in 1955 have
together been taken to suggest that missile development was placed
'on a crash basis' in 1955*^^^
(131) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit.. p.l35i Parry, op. cit.. p.141;
Lee, op. cit., pp.139, 236.
(132) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit.. p.155; Parry, op. cit.. p.141;
Lee, op. cit.. pp.139, 141, 236.
(133) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit.. p.158.
(134) Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. op. cit.. pp.183-184.
(135) Bloomfield, op. cit.. pp.41-43.
251
Submarines and Submarine-Launched iwissiles
Khrushchev's naval policy centred on the submarine. Public
expressions of confidence in the submarine-missile systems v.ere
accompanied by an effort to construct an enlarged diesel and nuclear
powered submarine fleet stressing ocean-going types while^ retiring
many coastal subs. 3oth conventional and nuclear submarines were to
be armed with either cruise or ballistic missiles.Soviet
doctrine in the mid-1950s spoke of the missile-submarine combination
as performing critical missions in attacking enemy surface ships
and in launching nuclear strikes.^^ Although the development of
the submarines as a nuclear delivery system was regarded as of great
significance in this period, in 1957-1958 Khrushchev was to approve
the establishment of the anti-surface ship mission - or more
specifically the anti-carrier role - as the short-term naval priority.
It was apparently also at this time that Khrushchev was to approve
the construction of an all-nuclear submarine force and the development
of new long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLdlus) systems,
as well as new short-range cruise weapons.^^8)
Work on several types of diesel powered missile firing
submarines was pursued in the first years after Stalin's death. The
Z-class submarines were originally intended as cruise missile launchers.
However, in 1949 its design plans were modified to accommodate
(136) Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. op. cit.. pp.189-190.
(137) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit..
pp.204-205; Parry, op. cit.. pp.153-154.
(138) MccGwire, 'The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy', op. cit..
p.175; Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States
and its Influence on Soviet Naval Developments', op. cit.. p.224.
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ballistic weapons instead, changing its designation to ZV-class.
In September 1955» a ZV-cla3s type achieved the first Soviet
(139)
SL3M* launch. As the ZV-class was underway the adoption of
the W-class submarine for the launch of cruise missiles was also
undertaken. &.ciass Longbin medium-type diesel
submarine, designed to carry four fin-mounted cruise missiles, was
approved for development and construction. However, the Longbin
was cancelled in 1957-1958, falling to Khrushchev's preference for
ocean-going types.The development of the G-class submarine,
planned in the 1940s as a ballistic missile launcher, was also
continued in the mid-1950s.^^2) in 1954 some seventy-two J-class
submarines, armed with cruise missiles, were planned. W/ork on the
J-class was also continued in this period, although only sixteen of
this type were to join the fleet in the 1960s.The ZV-class
was the only submarine type under development during the early and
mid-1950s which was ready for service in the same period, the first
(144)
of its kind appearing in about 1955*
The first nuclear submarine hull - an N-class vessel - was
reportedly laid down in 1956. In 1947 the h-class was designed to
fire torpedo-launched nuclear warheads at strategic range; however
the K'-class was switched to an anti-carrier role in 1957-1958.^^"^
Construction of H-class submarines may also have begun as early as
(139) MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy', op. cit.. p.134;
Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its
Influence on Soviet Naval Developments, op. cit.. p.225.
(140) Parry, op, cit,. p.159; Wolfe, op. cit,. p.225.
(141) MccGwire, op. cit.. p.134; MccGwire, 'The 'Turning Points in
Soviet Naval Policy', op. cit.. p.160.
(142) MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy', op. cit.. pp.133-134.
(1-43) Ibid., p.134.
(144) Ibid.
* Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile.
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1956, eventually becoming the first Soviet nuclear submarine capable
of the surface launch of ballistic missiles. jhe mid-1950s
also saw the laying down of the E-class nuclear submarine and the
beginning of development programmes for two generations of E-class
ships. The E-class was designed as a cruise missile launcher in an
anti-carrier role.^^^ In 1957-1958, it was decided to expand
building capacity for nuclear submarines by two to threefold.^^Q)
At the same time the nuclear C-class was approved for the surface
(149)
launch of cruise missiles against carriers and the design
decisions were taken for the nuclear powered Y-class submarines,
intended for the subsurface launch of long-range ballistic missiles.(^0)
Finally, in 1957-1958, the V-class design was approved. Torpedo armed,
it was to serve in an anti-submarine role.^"^ None of the nuclear
submarines types under development during the early and mid-1950s
wetieready for service until the later years of the decade, the H and N
classes first joining the Navy in 1958.^^^
In addition to the development of nuclear propulsion, the second
major submarine programme of the early post-Stalin period concerned the
production of cruise and ballistic missiles for subsurface launch.
Soviet interest in submarine launched missiles was reflected in early
post-war investigations into German plans for firing V-2 rockets from
submersible canisters towed by a submarine.^^3) wag rep0r-fcedly
(146) ftlccGwire, 'The structure of the Soviet Navy', op. cit.. p.133;
Wolfe, Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its
Influence on Soviet Naval Developments', op. cit.. p.226.
(147) MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy', op. cit., p.134.
(148) MccGwire, 'The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy',
op. cit.. p.165.
(149) NiCcGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy', op. cit.. p.134.
(150) Ibid., p.133.
(151) Ibid., p.135.
U52) Ibid., pp.133, 135.
(153) Parry, op, cit.. pp.153-154.
254.
decided in approximately 1949 to install ballistic missiles aboard
submarines. A 300 mile MRBM* was developed by 1949-1950 for that
purpose.(-*-54) Ballistic missile development decision affecting sea
launched weapons suitable for land-based targets reportedly pre-dated
(155)
those concerning anti-shipping systems. The earliest of the
Soviet submarine ballistic systems, the SS-N-4. was first test-fired
from a ZV-class submarine in 1955• Surface launched and capable of
a perhpps 300-350 nautical mile range, it was later fitted aboard
G-class and H-class submarines. Research was also in progress on the
SS-N-5. a ballistic missile capable of underwater launch and a 650
nautical mile range. The SS-N-5 was also destined for Q-class and
H-class service. In the cruise field, work on the SS-N-3. offspring
of the land-based Shaddock missile, was underway.^■)^)
Strategic Defence
As well as increasing the declaratory position and strength of
strategic aviation, the status and capabilities of air defence were
also improved in the mid-1950s. In 1956 Marshal Zhukov stated:
'The relative weight of air defence forces in the composition of the
armed forces has grown significantly ... the task of defence of the
rear of the country has faever loomed so large as under contemporary
conditions. ^^7) Air gefences were strengthened in the first two
(154) MccGwire, 'The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy',
op. cit.. p.174.
(155) Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its
Influence on Soviet Naval Developments', op. cit.. pp.224-225.
(156) MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy', op. cit..
pp.140, 141; Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United
States and its Influence on Soviet Naval Developments,*
op. cit.. p.225.
(157) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, op. cit.. p.190.
* Medium Range Ballistic Missile.
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years after Stalin's death and its continuing improvement was
established as a high order strategic priority after the first
post-Stalin leadership erisis. The increased significance attached
to air defence was clearly reflected in a major re-organisation of the
nation's air defence forces (PVO). In 1955 the air defence command
was established as an independent armed service. Its new Commander-
in-Chief, S.S. Biriuzov, was granted the rank of Marshal and Deputy
Minister of Defence. As C-in-C, Marshal Biriuzov was given control
of air defence policy and administration. ^^8)
Organisational changes were accompanied by vigorous efforts to
(159)
improve the quality of PVO aircraft and developing new lighter types.
The PVO in the mid-1970s also began to benefit from the missile research
of the Stalin period, as the first surface-to-surface and air-to-air
missile joined the air defence forces.In addition to growing
numbers of missiles, the Russians maintained several thousand radar-
guided anti-aircraft guns during the 1950s.Finally, an effort
was made to improve the nation's radar-warning system, still
inadequate for air defence purposes.^^2)
(158) Lee, op. clt.. pp.120-122.
(159) These aircraft included the twin-engined fak-25. The first
Soviet jet fighter, it entered service the FVQ in 1955 and
was succeeded by a supersonic version in later 1950s. The
MG-17. a subsonic turbo-jet fighter which began to replace
the M1G-I5 in 1953 or 1954, entered large scale production
in the mid-1950s. The MiG-19 - The USSR's first supersonic
day fighter - joined the PVO in 1955. By 1957-58 the hiG-19
was beginning to be replaced by the MiG-21. powered by a turbo¬
jet engine able to reach a top speed of something like twice the
speed of sound. (Lee, op. cit.. pp.119, 120, 122, 139, 168, 169;
Green, op. cit.. pp.140=143).
(160) Asher Lee, 'Strategic Air Defence* in Lee, ed., op. cit.. pp.124,
125, 128; Lee, op, cit.. pp.120-123, 233; Aolfe, Soviet Power
and Europe. 1945-1970. op, cit.. p.185.
(161) Lee, op. cit.. p.125.
(162) Lee, *Strategic Air Defence?, op. cit.. pp.126-127.
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While Soviet statements on ballistic missile defence during, the
mid-1950s did not appear to expect the imminent deployment of an
effective anti-ballistic missile system capability, the Russians
professed to believe that a BMD* system would eventually be
constructed.Major-General of the Engineering Technical Services,
G.I. Pokrovsky, recognising the formidable capabilities of the 1CBM,
nevertheless stated: 'In principle, a defensive anti-missile missile
is possible1.Despite the daunting technical difficulties, BmD
research was pursued, beginning, according to Khrushchev, at the
^ x , (165)
same time as a major ICBffi programme was undertaken.
Assessment of Action-Reaction's Influence in
the Early Post-Stalin Period
Evidence of Reaction
Re-assessment of Euclear Weapons
On scanning the range of developments in Soviet strategic doctrine
and deployments during the early post-Stalin period, a number of
instances of apparent Soviet reaction to American actions can be
identified. After several years in which 'Stalinist Military Science*
had enforced a highly unadmiring view of atomic and nuclear weapons,
Stalin's death was followed by a re-examination oi the new technology
which greatly enhanced its doctrinal status and operational role.
While Soviet exerience with the development and testing of nuclear
weapons alone would probably have convinced the Russians of the need
(163) Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Kuclear Age, op. cit. pp.22S=231«
(164} Lee, op. cit.. p.125.
(165) Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe. 1945-1970. op. cit.. p.186.
* Ballistic Missile Defence.
for a revision of Stalinist doctrine, it is more than likely that the
Soviet re-evaluation of nuclear power during the 1950s was strongly
encouraged by developments in American weapons and doctrine. From
the beginning of the post-war period the United States had steadily
strengthened its strategic arsenal, increasing the quantity and
quality of its weaponry and improving the capabilities of its
delivery systems. The Eisenhower Administration had also publicly
declared its commitment to massive air-nuclear power as the basis of
American defence policy. In such circumstances the USSR was sharply
motivated to reconsider its own estimate of nuclear technology.
Re-assessment of Surprise
The orthodox Stalinist view of surprise attack very probably
impressed many Soviet commanders as extreme, even in the late 1940s.
The extensive Soviet experience in nuclear weapons development during
the following decade and the presumably deepening insight into their
capabilities would have all but compelled a modification of the
doctrine on surprise. The writings of several Soviet commentators
in the early ana mid-1950s clearly acknowledged that modern weapons
technology required a re-assessment of the concept. However, the
rapid growth of American air-nuclear strength must have served as
a powerful stimulus to a re-evaluation of surprise.
In the course of the «;alenkov-Khrushchev debate, the Party
Chairman argued that America's development of nuclear weapons had
increased the probability of a sudden American attack, a danger
allegedly underscored by the 'massive retaliation' doctrine.
Similarly, the first public discussion of pre-emption may also have
been encouraged by US air-nuclear force levels. Certainly the
already established margin of US nuclear superiority suggested that the
United States might be attached to a strategy of surprise and proposed
pre-emption as a means by which the Soviet Union's inferior nuclear
forces could avoid destruction at the very outset of a futui'e war.
Role of Strategic Aviation
The early and middle 1950s were also marked by an improvement
in the doctrinal status of strategic aviation, as well as a vigorous
effort to develop long-range aircraft. The improvement in both the
declaratory and operational fortunes of strategic aviation was very
probably encouraged by American actions. The United States had
steadily expanded the capabilities of its strategic air power from
the end of the Second World War, an area in which the USA already
enjoyed an important advantage. The established American emphasis on
bombers was further accentuated by the 'hew Look' massive retaliation
policy which largely entrusted US security to the Strategic Air Command.
However, while US doctrine and deployments may have encouraged
the Russians to look upon their Long-Range Air force with new respect,
they clearly were not induced to adopt American air doctrine. They
continued to reject the notion that strategic aviation would prove
decisive in a future war and maintained a targeting doctrine which
established the destruction of the enemy's armed forces as the first
combat objective.
The Russians also failed to emulate US force structure in its
emphasis on intercontinental bombers. Instead, Soviet deployments
heavily favoured medium-range aircraft. This medium-range bias
25S.
reflected the traditional Soviet concentration on the European
th&atre, an emphasis reinforced in this period by the growing
American air-nuclear involvement in Europe. The decision to deploy
a large number of medium bombers may also have been inspired by the
judgement that the ballistic missile promised a more effective means
of delivering intercontinental nuclear strikes. The strain on
resources which a heavy investment in both strategic bomber and
missiles would have imposed, may also have argued against, large
scale long-range bomber production, along with the technical short¬
comings of the Bear and Bison aircraft. Nevertheless, a relatively
small force of strategic aircraft was deployed, perhaps as a hedge
against the possible failure of the ICBM programme.
Land-Based kissiles
The intensive Soviet development of both medium and long-range
missiles in the mid-1950s was a continuation of a pioneering
Stalinist R&D programme, rooted in the independent Soviet judgement
that the ballistic missile represented a dramatic advance in delivery
systems. However, the rapid acceleration of missile development in
the mid-1950s was very probably stimulated by the Eisenhower commitment
to a heavily nuclearised doctrine, as well as the continued expansion
of US strategic power. It was clearly essential for the Sovier Union
to develop a long-range nuclear capability and the ballistic missile,
a weapon in which the USSR enjoyed a clear advantage over the USA,
was evidently seen as offering a major contribution to Soviet nuclear
requirements.
(166) '/(Olfe, op. cit.. pp.178-181
Despite the urgent need for a strategic nuclear reach
equalling that of the United States^the structure of Soviet missile
forces/only just beginning to take shape in the early and mid-1950s,
would eventually reveal a heavy bias in favour of medium-range systems
assigned to European targets. The concentration on weapons ox less
than trans-Atlantic range was probably the consequence of the technical
difficulties which were to play an important part in confining the
Russians to a minimal ICBM force until the early 1960s. however,
technology aside, the American decision to add tactical nuclear weapons
to its NATO contribution provided a strong case for a large 1/mRBk
. . . (167)
deployment.
Strategic Defence
A clear and direct Russian reaction, or perhaps more accurately
continuing reaction, to American actions in this period appeared in
Soviet air defence policy. In the face of America's expanding strategic
capabilities, including a number of air cases located uncomfortably
near to Soviet territory, as well as the deployment of US aircraft
carriers and a 'New Look* doctrine strongly emphasising air power, the
USSR further strengthened its air defences during the mid-1950s and
boosted the doctrinal and organisational status of the air defence
forces. Each of the measures taken can be regarded as responsive to
US policy ard deployments. Similarly^the intensified interest in
civil defence represented a heightened post-Stalin awareness of the
American nuclear * threat'. as well as a recognition of the failings of
(167) T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. op. cit..
pp.141-143; Herbert York, hace to Oblivion. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970, p.95; Colin S. Gray,
'Predicting Arms Race Behaviour', Future. October 1974, p.384.
even the best of defensive systems and a firm determination to limit
the damage inflicted by a msssive air strike.
Soviet research into the problem of ballistic missile defence
during this period marked an aspect of the strategic defence effoit
which may have had deeper domestic roots than either air or civil
defence. As it appears that BMD development and IC0M research began
simultaneously,or^ other words, consideiably before any large-
scale American missile programme, the BMD problem was evidently posed
to the Russians by their own experience with long-range missiles.
Subsequent research during the early 1950s was unlikely to have been
pursued in direct response to an American ballistic missile programme
which was inferior to that of the Russians in the quality of its
technical achievements, as well as in the urgency and domestic status
of its work. However, President Eisenhower's decision to accelerate
the American ICBM programme in 1955 may have had some Affect on the
Soviet BMD effort. ^
Sea Power
The increasing significance of the Soviet Navy during the mid-
1950s can fairly be described as responsive to western actions. The
deployment of large American aircraft carriers was certainly among the
most important stimulants behind the expansion of the Soviet Ravy's
strategic role. The destruction of these great ships beiore the launch
of their nuclear armed aircraft obviously constituted a major strategic
(168) Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. op. cit.. p.186.
(169) Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p»53»
objective. The seriousness with which the Russians regarded the
carrier threat was reflected in a reported re-ordering of naval
missions in 1957-1950, establishing the elimination of US aircraft
carriers as the first priority of Soviet sea power.
The plan for the wartime reinforcement and supply of NATO
forces by the US Navy was also among those western actions which
enhanced the importance of the Soviet fleet. Clearly the interdiction
of HATO supply and communications was essential for any successful
war effort in Europe. The development of nuclear powered submarines
in the Soviet Union began no later than 1953. However, the launch
of the first American nuclear submarine in 1954 probably acted to
intensify Soviet efforts in this field.The adaption of the
submarine as a missile launcher seemingly required no encouragement
from abroad. Soviet research on submarine launched missiles began
soon after World War
While the increased status of the Soviet Navy was clearly
stimulated by western actions, the Russians clearly did not responc/ t^
the growing seaborne 'threat* by constructing an imitation of western
'balanced' fleets. instead, Khrushchev presided over a shift in
naval policy reflecting a strong preference for the submarine over
large conventionally armed surface ships. Stalin's programme for
surface ship construction was replaced by plane for relatively light
missile firing surface ships and a large force of ocean-going submarines
This major change in Naval policy, although fundamentally inspired by
(170) Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States
and its Influence on Soviet Naval Developments', op. cit..
pp.225-226.
(171) Ibid., p.225.
the need to resist western Navies, was motivated by the independent
Soviet judgement that surface ships had become critically vulnerable
to missile and submarine attacks. The move may also have been prompted
by a desire to curtail the costly Stalinist naval programme in a time
when the sophisticated weapons requirements of the other armed services
were already making heavy demands on the nation's resources. A
combination of the vulnerability and economic factors, added perhaps
to technical difficulties, probably worked to kill off the idea of
(172)
deploying a Soviet force of aircraft carriers.
Ground Porces
As the process of de-Stalinising Soviet doctrine proceeded from
1953 to 1957, the year which Khrushchev finally secured his personal
political position^ the strategic mission of conventional forces
sufferes a decline implicit in the public acknowledgement that strategic
nuclear weapons were of major, perhaps in some circumstances even
decisive significance. This recognition marked the beginning of a
new trend in Soviet doctrine which was not to be fully developed until
some time after Khrushchev had secured both the Party and state leader¬
ship. While conventional forces in the mid-1950s may not have enjoyed
quite the position of pre-eminence which Stalin had assigned to them,
a large and effective Army was still said to be absolutely essential to
the successful outcome of a future war. The sincerity of their public
assertion was reflected in a vigorous effort to strengthen and further
modernise the ground forces during the 1950s.
(172) Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States
and its Influence on Soviet Naval Development', op. cit..
pp.222-223.
It is perhaps conceivable that the USSR's development of nuclear
weapons in itself would have proven sufficient to persuade many
Russians that the traditional assessment of the significance of ground
armies - particularly in its full-blown Stalinist form - required
modification. However, it is all but impossible to imagine that
America's strategic posture in the 1950s, with its very pronounced
nuclear slant, did not strongly argue for a corresponding readjustment
in Soviet defence planning. Whatever its origins, by the middle of
the decade there was already evidence of a re-allocation of defence
expenditures and weapons research which rapidly accelerated the devel¬
opment of strategic nuclear systems at the expense of conventional
(173)
forces. The first of Khrushchev's reductions in military man¬
power levels, while motivated in part by the Party Chairman's economic
objectives, was also an indication of a changing strategic emphasis.
However, despite the first signs oi an emerging shift in policy,
the Army retained a very significant place in strategic doctrine.
This was in some considerable degree the result of those geo-political
factors which, with or without an American adversary, had established
the maintenance of large ground forces as a Russian tradition. This
tradition was further secured by the east-military confrontation
following the Second World War, as well as the importance of Army
support for the Khrushchev cause in the post-Stalin leadership contest.
The preservation of the Army's position was also served by the demands
of a 'hostage Europe' policy which remained valid in a time when the
USSR was still very far from achieving anything like nuclear equality
with the United States.
(173) Bloomfield, op. cit.. pp.41-43
The effort to modernise and strengthen the ground forces in
this period represented a continuation of a process begun by Stalin
immediately after World War II. However, the further improvement
of Army effectiveness no doubt received sharp stimulation from western
measures intended to strengthen NATO, including alliance membership
for a rearming West Germany. The very much intensified Army
preparation for combat on a nuclear battlefield was surely spurred by
the overall nuclear bias of US strategy and western acceptance of a
tactical nuclear solution to the problem of Soviet conventional
superiority in Europe.
Warsaw Pact
The creation of the Warsaw Pact in 195S> marked a direct Soviet
reaction to western actions. After unsuccessful Soviet attempts to
prevent the admission of West Germany to NATO, as well as to block
German rearmament, the Federal Republic was admitted to the alliance
in 1955. The Soviet response came in the signature of the Warsaw
Pact. However, this reaction did not at once assume great operational
military substance. For the time being the Pact largely represented
a political reaction to NATO developments.
266 •
Evidence of Other Factors Influencing
Soviet Doctrine and Policy
No Doctrinal Revolution
Before awarding the United States full responsibility for early
post-Stalin strategic developments, a few qualifying notes should
perhaps be added. First, although Russian policy experienced a
major modification in thai period, it was not entirely revolutionised,
despite the pressures of American actions. The relaxation of Stalin's
grip on doctrine permitted reform but did not license total destruction.
Elements of Stalin's doctrine survived. The 'permanently operating
factors' were greatly devalued but were not entirely eliminated, at
least not until the second half of the 1950s. The 'combined arms'
principle remained in force as the Russians continued to reject the
notion that any single armed service or individual weapon - including
those of the nuclear type - would provide for the defeat of an enemy.
The ground forces in particular, although facing darker days in the
late 1950s, retained a powerful position in declaratory and operational
doctrine.
The 'Thaw'
Further, those aspects of Soviet doctrine and policy which were
modified in response to American action were also affected by internal
Soviet influences and judgements. The doctrinal 'thaw' after 1953
undoubtedly acquired an intense urgency as a result of American actions.
However, it was all but inevitable that the virtual ban on strategic
thought imposed after the Second World War would end with the Stalin era.
The unnaturally sterile environment of the post-war period had been
maintained largely in support of Stalin's personal political position,
an objective which ceased to be of vital significance with the death
of the wartime leader. Doctrinal reform was also fated by the
obvious inadequacies of Stalinist military science. It was surely
difficult to convince battle-tested commanders that the sum total of
timeless strategic wisdom could be expressed in five rather unoriginal
observations labelled 'permanently operating factors'. It was
similarly difficult to argue that these principles constituted a
unique insight into warfare of which western soldiers had no knowledge,
or that this or any other 'short list' would inevitably guarantee
Soviet victory. In short, it is highly probable that the Stalinist
•freeze* on doctrine would have begun to 'thaw' after a change in the
nation's political leadership, regardless of American actions.
Domestic Politics
While the Malenkov-Khrushchev debate which followed the onset of
the post-Stalin 'thaw' was obviously concerned with the growing air-
nuclear 'threat* to the Soviet Union, it was also significantly
influenced by factors other than Pentagon planning, as each of the
contestants attempted to gather support for his domestic political
position. The very considerable political utility of Khrushchev's
arguments in particular, as well as his rapid change of mind after the
defeat of Ealenkov, certainly suggest that the Party Chairman's view
was determined by more than American force levels. Charges of
defeatism and opposition to reductions in the Soviet defence effort,
as well as to a nuclearisation of Soviet strategy which implied a
diminished role for conventional forces, were all attitudes guaranteed
to win vital political support from the armed services.
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Some degree of retrospective insight into the role of domestic
politics on Khrushchev's public posture in this period is perhaps
provided by the shift in the Party Chairman's position soon after
Malenkov's resignation when, in a tone recalling that of the former
Premier, Khrushchev explained that the reality of socialist military
power had modified the BSarxist law on the inevitability of war between
Imperialism and Communism. Khrushchev's suddenly more optimistic
outlook probably reflected his still insecure domestic political
position, rather than a response to newly peaceful American intentions
or an upsurge in Soviet strength. A more confident assessment of the
international situation and the effectiveness of Soviet defence may
have proved useful in asserting that the danger of war had receded
under Khrushchev's leadership. Certainly any criticism of Soviet
foreign policy would have been particularly unwelcome in a time when
the Chairman's de-Stalinisation programme appeared to have stimulated
violent eruptions in eastern Europe. Subsequent gyrations in
Khrushchev's assessment of the likelihood of war and the stabilising
affects of nuclear weapons during 1956 and 1957 also seemed to be
related to his domestic political fortunes.'^4) Clearly, in 1957
when he had again adopted a rather pessimistic view of the world
scene and was firmly in support of economic and defence policies
acceptable to the professional military, the favour at the armed
forces proved invaluable in resisting the efforts of the 'anti-
Party* group to remove Khrushchev from office.
(174) Dinerstein, op. cit.. pp.132-163
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Weapons Development
The general re-evaluation of modern weapons technology after the
death of Stalin was greatly stimulated by developments in the United
States, but v.as also the product of the early Stalinist commitment to
intensive weapons research. The programme for the development of
Ballistic missiles, land-based and seaborne, represented an independent
Soviet research initiative based upon an estimate of the strategic
significance of these weapons which the United States was not to
share for some time. Similarly, the investigation into the problem
of ballistic missile defence was begun as a Soviet initiative,
suggested by the USSR's pioneering insight into the strategic
potential of offensive missile systems.
Soviet Solutions
Finally, it is important to recall that those features of Soviet
doctrine and policy which were modified in reaction to US actions,
often failed to produce reactions on anything like the American
'model1. They did not produce emulations of United States policy
but instead stimulated native Russian solutions to the problems
posed by the developing American 'threat'. While the public
recognition of the significance of nuclear weapons and the urgent
effort to deploy powerful strategic nuclear forces was in large part
fuelled by the massive American nuclear capability, the Russians did
not immediately proceed, after the American fashion, to establish air-
nuclear system as the centrepiece of Soviet strategy, but instead
continued to accord conventional forces a major strategic role.
Similarly, although the post-war development of the Strategic
Air Command may have advanced the cause of strategic aviation in the
USSR, the Russians continued to spurn American air doctrine and did
not attempt to deploy a bomber force rivalling SAC. They continued to
deny the Long-Range Air Force a decisive role and rejected the urban-
industrial emphasis of US targeting strategy. This period also
produced the first highly positive judgements of the ballistic missile
as the successor to the strategic bomber, a view foreign to American
air doctrine. The mid-1950s also witnessed a Soviet response to the
growing threat of US sea power, but neither American naval strategy nor
American naval force structure was adopted. For a variety of political,
economic, technological and other reasons, the USSR did not embark
«P-
upon the construction of an ocean-going •balanced1 fleet. Large
surface ships were found to be vulnerable and obsolete, including the
aircraft carriers in which the Americans were investing heavily.
Instead, the fihissians chose to meet the carrier •threat' in particular
and the problem of surface ships in general with a force of their
own design.
The Emergence of 'Deterrence'
The mid-1950s produced a Soviet statement of the nuclear
'deterrence' concept. Although 'deterrence' was apparently rejected
by Khrushchev in his conflict with Malenkov and endured a number of
official attacks after Kalenkov's resignation, the so-called 'lag* or
'gap' between Soviet and American doctrines over the deterrence
principle was at least narrowed by Malenkov's expression of the concept
and Khrushchev's halting acceptance of the view that Soviet nuclear
strength had reduced the likelihood of war.
As public discussions of 'deterrence* during this period were
greatly affected by the domestic political context - perhaps
particularly so in the case of Khrushchev - it is difficult to
determine conclusively the Soviet assessment of deterrence or to
confidently expound on its origins in the USSR. The problem is
further complicated in the first two years after Stalin's death by
the absence of any fully articulated and firmly accepted Soviet
deterrence doctrine. Nevertheless, Nalenkov's statements on the
significance of nuclear weapons and his apparent support for something
like 'mutual deterrence' were reminiscent - although perhaps only
vaguely so - of views earlier expressed in the United States. It
is certainly possible that the Premier's strategic viewpoint
represented an emulative reaction to US doctrine. American statements
on the horrors of nuclear war and the Eisenhower commitment to
deterrence may have persuaded Malenkov and others that modern weapons
provided a reliable basis for the concept, as well as providing
evidence of Washington's recognition of a deterrence relationship
with the USSR.
However, it is also conceivable that xAalenkov's position was in
large part motivated by judgements not unlike those which had inspired
the rough American equivalents to some of the Premier's conclusions.
It is at least possible that fcialenkov's views on the revolutionary
strategic significance of nuclear weapons were the result of a
personal judgement borne of the Soviet Union's experience in the
development of the new technology. Similarly, Malenkov's confidence
in the reliability of 'deterrence' may also have been suggested by an
independent assessment of the implications of nuclear power for modern
warfare. In short, technology, alone and unaided, may well have played
a major role in shaping the Kalenkov thesis. In any case, even if
the example of American policy played a part in moving Ealenkov to
the deterrence principle, his recommendation of something like
'minimum deterrence* and his rejection of any possibility of success¬
fully waging a nuclear war, clearly did not mark a faithful emulation
of the American *New Look* policy of 'massive retaliation*, a
strategy which held little in common with 'minimum deterrence*.
In addition to the suggestive powers of technology, the views of
Malenkov and his colleagues were also apparently prompted by internal
economic objectives not unlike those which were affecting Eisenhower
policy at the same time, moving the United States to a heavy nuclear
deterrence bias. While many Americans were arguing that nuclear fire¬
power made a general reduction in US conventional forces possible,
as well as a reduction in defence spending, Malenkov contended that
nuclear weaponry had substantially increased Soviet strength,
greatly reducing the likelihood of a future war and permitting a much
increased investment in the civilian or light industrial sect or of
the economy. Once again, this view may have been suggested by a
personal assessment of the significance of nuclear weapons and a desire
to develop a long neglected area of the national economy. Finally,
Malenkov's public confidence in the stabilising affect of nuclear
weapons may also have been advanced by the Premier*s personal political
difficulties. Engaged in a struggle with the Part;y Chairman, it was
not undesirable to appear responsible for an expansion in Soviet
military power so great as to compel the united States to abandon
any idea of war.
Khrushchev's *anti-deterrence' views from 1953 to 1955 may have
reflected a frank analysis of American intentions and the significance
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of modern weapons technology. In the USSK's position of very marked
nuclear inferiority during the early 1950s, there certainly were
grounds for questioning the reliability of deterrence, if only because
the Soviet Union lacked the forces to implement the concept effectively.
However, the heated leadership battle then in progress makes an
evaluation of the origins of the Party Chairman's argument and its
origins extremely difficult. The erratic character of his public
statements between 1955 and 1957 strongly suggests an intimate
relationship between Khrushchev's assessment of the strategic nuclear
weapons and his personal political ambitions.
After 1*955» Khrushchev's wavering public judgements included the
view that Soviet nuclear power had amended the maxim on inevitability
of war, constricting the military option available to the United States.
His halting approach to something like 'deterrence' may have been
prompted by the examples of its acceptance in the United States.
Surely in a period of dramatic nuclear imbalance, America was to be
encouraged in a commitment to any principle which recognised that the
Soviet Union's nuclear capability compelled the avoidance of war.
However, as tfith Malenkov, those of the Party Chairman's statements
which credited nuclear weapons with a stabilising or 'deterring'
affect, may also have been urged by Khrushchev's personal analysis
of the significance of strategic nuclear system for modern warfare,
unaided by a prior reading of American strategic doctrine.
Chapter 3
The United States and the 'Hew Hew Look*
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The Heed for a Second New Look
The Limitations of Massive Retaliation
The New Look-massive retaliation policy enjoyed only a very brief
period of acceptance before several of its supporters within government
began to consider the need for another re-examination of United States?
defence policy. The disastrous situation in French-Indochina was one
of the factors pointing to the limitations of massive retaliation.
The massive retaliation concept was also undermined by the Soviet
Union's unexpectedly rapid development of an operational air-nuclear
capability. In sharp defiance of American productions, the USSR
acquired a significant thermonuclear arsenal b,y the middle of the
decade. Any future US reliance upon massive nuclear retaliation
either to deter or to wage nuclear war would, therefore, have to be
reconciled with the knowledge that the Soviet Union commanded
expanding strike forces.A major Soviet nuclear capability also
promised to inhibit any American attempt to dissuade the USSR from
limited conventional aggression. An American threat of massive
retaliation in response to a limited conventional advance would retain
little credibility in a world of two highly developed nuclear powers.
The dawning strategic 'realities' of the early 1960s, therefore, urged
a second comprehensive re-examination of American defence policy.
In December of 1955, Secretary Wilson, in effect, ordered the beginning
of a 'New New Look' when he instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
conduct a 'complete and careful' review of the nation's defence needs
for fiscal years 1958 through 1960.^^
(1) Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961, pp.88-90.
(2) Ibid., pp.91-92.
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Defence Spending, and the Economy
In response to the Secretary's order, the Joint Chiefs reported
no need for major changes in military manpower levels or defence
programmes. There was also general agreement among both the uniformed
and civilian leadership that, while defence spending would have to
rise above the 0 37 billion mark for FY 1956, it need not exceed a
ceiling of 0 38 billion.The stunning Republican Presidential
victory in 1956 appeared to endorse the New Look strategy ana the
continuation of its emphasis on stability in military spending during
(4)
the second phase of New Look policy. The President spoke of the
need for heavier investment in the civilian economy. It was time,
he advised, for 'new and expanded programmes' in such domestic
projects as education, highways, housing, civil aviation, the merchant
marines and 'the expansion of research and training in science,
(5)
health and agriculture'.
Budgetary Stability v Strategic Superiority:
The New New Look Solution
'Sufficiency'
The expansion of Soviet strategic capabilities durin6 the New
New Look period placed the Eisenhower Administration under pressure
from those urging action to preserve America's absolute strategic
superiority either by a further increase in US nuclear strength at the
cost of its already diminished conventional forces - the so-called
Radford Plan - or by increased defence expenditures which would permit
(3) Huntington, op. cit.. p.93.
(4) Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defence and Congress. 1945-1963.
Ohio State University Press, 1966, p.239.
(5) Huntington, op. cit.. p.91.
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higher nuclear force levels without reductions in US general purpose
(6)
forces. The administration was not persuaded to adopt either of
these alternatives. Increased air power with undiminished
conventional forces was entirely unacceptable if defence spending was
to be kept under firm control. On the other hand, the 'thrifty'
route to continued superiority offered by the Radford Plan was
rejected ori both economic and strategic grounds. Clearly the
tremendous cost of maintaining absolute superiority across the full
range of weapons systems would eventually consume any savings on
conventional costs. The maintenance of overwhelming strategic
nuclear superiority in competition with a nation of the USSR's
resources would be impossible without endlessly rising defence budgets.
Further, the magnitude of Soviet potential - economic and technological -
as well as the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons, even
when deployed in relatively small numbers, drastically reduced the
value of any quantitative or arithmetical American advantage. Hven
with absolute superiority, the United States would be unable to prevent
the Soviet Union from seriously damaging urban America in a future war.
Hereafter, the Soviet-American strategic relationship would rest upon
(7)
a 'balance of terror'.
The administration's solution to the problem of restraining
defence spending while effectively providing for deterrence was to
abandon absolute superiority as a long-term objective in favour of a
policy of 'sufficiency'. Rather than squander vast sums on the
preservation of a pointlessly long quantitative lead over the USSR,
(6) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.99-100.
(7) Ibid.. pp.101-102; Albert Wohlstetter, 'The Delicate
Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs. January 1959» pp.211-234.
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America would in future deploy only those forces •sufficient* to
deliver a devastating retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union.
The precise requirements of sufficiency would, of course, change as
the USSR improved its strategic capabilities. Increases in Soviet
strength would meet with appropriate American responses, but there
would be no effort to maintain any •magic* number of aircraft wings
or to continually top all Soviet air-nuclear totals regardless of
(8)
America's actual security needs.
However, even under the sufficiency concept, the US Air Force
retained the view that American force levels must be sufficient to
(9)
•win' as well as to deter a future war. In support of this 'war
winning1 objective, the administration remained formally committed to
a mixed targeting doctrine which included a large counterforce element.
Enemy airfields and missile sites were, therefore, prime targets.
In the words of Vice-President Richard k. Nixon, *1 do not believe that
a force capable of devastating only cities would be adequate to deter
the launching of an attack by those who are now in control in the
Kremlin*.America required the power 'to destroy the war-making
ability of an enemyIn addition to the counterforce mission,
the Air Force also argued that a successful war effort required a
'pre-emptive* strike capability limiting the damage which would result
from a Soviet attack after intelligence sources had confirmed that a
Soviet 'first-strike' was imminent. A^ain quoting the Vice-President,
an attack 'to destroy or blunt a large portion' of Russia's strategic
forces immediately before launch was 'essential to our survival as a
nation'
(8) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.101-102.
(9) NYT. November 27, I960, Section IV, p.5.
(10) NYT, October 30, I960, p.l.
(11) Ibid.
(12) NYT. November 2, I960, p.30; Also see NYT. December 1,
I960, p.16; NYT, January 14, 1961, p.7.
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Missile-Deterrent Gap.
As well as coming under fire for its attachment to sufficiency,
the administration was also criticised in the hew hew Look period for
failing to provide adequately for its now only 'sufficient' requirements.
Eisenhower planners were charged with having failed to deploy
sufficient strength to deny the USSR a first-strike counterforce
(13}
capability. These charges were seemingly substantiated in
August of 1957 when the Soviet Union successfully launched a long-
range ballistic missile and again on October 4- of the same year when
(14 )
the USSR orbited an earth satellite. Sputnik 1 proved a
shattering experience for many Americans, ending the assumption of
permanent US technological primacy and seeming to portend a highly
(15)
dangerous shift in the balance of power. The Soviet ICBte coup
gave rise to a number of predictions of a perilous 'missile gap'
(16)
or 'deterrent gap' between the United States and the USSR.
(13) Huntington, op. cit.. p.104. On the debate over the
requirements of deterrence - 'maximum' counterforce strategy
versus 'minimum countercity* - see Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear
War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, I960;
Henry Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, hew York: Harper,
I960; Huntington, op. cit.. pp.102-104; Robert Gilpin,
American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1962, pp.279-289; RYT. February 1,
1959, Section IV, p.3; HYT. Kay 4, 1959, p.23; KYT. January
12, 1961, p.12.
(14) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.108-109.
(15) Kolodziej, op. cit.. p.251.
(16) On the 'missile gap*-'deterrent gap', controversy, see
Herbert York, Race to Oblivion. Lew York: Simon and Schuster,
1970, pp.125-146; Edgar M. Bottoms, The Balance of Terror.
Boston, mass.; Beacon Press, 1971, pp.39=73; Elizabeth Young,
A Farewell to Arms Control? Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972,
pp.167-175; George Quester, Buclear Diplomacy. Lew York:
Dunellen, 1973; NYT, -January 29, I960, p.6; LYT, April 5, I960,
p.22; HYT. October 24, I960, p.7. The Reports of the Gaither
Committee and the Rockefeller Brothers Puna in 1957 appeared to
substantiate the predictions of America's decline to the rank of
a second-class power. See morton H. Halperin, 'The Gaither
Committee and the Policy Process', World Politics. April 1961,
pp.360-384; Huntington, op. cit.. pp.107-108; Gilpin, op. cit..
p.172; Kolodziej, op. cit.. pp.274-275.
279
Responding to the •missile gap* accusations, the Pentagon
admitted a Soviet lead in ICBM development, but expressed no great
alarm at the prospect of Soviet superiority in long-range missiles.
Defence Secretary Neil McElroy explained that America was not going
to enter into any quantitative ICBM competition with the USSR,
arguing that even a three-to-one Soviet advantage in the early 1960s
(17)
was not unacceptable. In I960 the administration seemed
increasingly reluctant to concede the existence of a •missile gap'.
Although spokesmen sometimes appeared to make qualified admissions of
US inferiority, at least implied 'missile gap' denials were also
issued. Mr. McElroy's successor as Secretary of Defence, Thomas
Oates, cast doubt on the 'missile gap' charges on more than one
occasion, but conceded that should the Soviet Union choose to produce
ICBMs at its full estimated capacity, the USSR could achieve and
(18)
maintain a 'moderate numerical superiority' for perhaps three years.
However, soon thereafter, he announced that intelligence sources
indicated that the USSR had not begun a 'crash programme' to
produce ICBMs.
Whether or not an operational 'missle gap* already existed or
would soon develop, the administration consistently denied that such
a gap would affect America's very substantial overall strategic
superiority. Even with a 'missile gap*, there certainly would be no
'deterrent gap', as the basis of American supremacy lay in the over¬
whelming power of a 'balanced weapons mix. President Eisenhower
(17) Huntington, op. cit.. p.104.
(18) KYT, January 22, I960, p.4.
(19) NYT, March 17, I960, p.l.
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described US military strength as representing 'an indestructible
force of incalculable power', composed of hundreds of bombers,
Atlas intercontinental missiles and the first of an emerging fleet
of Polaris submarines (the strategic 'triad'). The President
rejected any need for catching up with the Russians in strategic
power, sayings 'A deterrent has no added power once it has become
completely adequate for compelling the respect of any potential
opponent' Secretary Gates also frequently refuted the
'deterrent gap' charge, explaining that there was no need for America
(21)
to match the Soviet Union weapon for weapon.
'Missile Gap' Force Levels
In the FY 1958 defence budget, the Air Force suffered a
reduction in its total strength from 137 to 128 wings, a cut which,
however, only disadvantaged Army missions. By the end of 1958
the Air Force was to command 603 B-52 bombers, a force to be augmented
by an accelerated ICBM and IRBM effort. Two billion dollars were
assigned to missile purchases and another #4.2 billion to aircraft
procurement, marking a small reduction from the figures of the
(22)
previous year. ' The major budgetary reaction to Sputnik came in
a #1.37 billion supplemental bill to the FY 1958 defence budget which,
in fact, appeared after the submission of FY 1959. The additional
money was assigned to speeding the development, procurement and
dispersal of strategic bombers as well as alert systems and air defence
communication and control equipment. There was also to be an
(20) KYT, February 4, I960, p.l.
(21) KYT, March 17, I960, p.l.
(22) Kolodziej, op. cit.. p.241.
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(23)
intensification of the Atlas, Polaris, Jupiter and Ihor programmes.
The FY 1959 budget proposals totalled 0 39.1 billion in
appropriation and 0 39.8 billion in expenditures, marking only a small
increase over FY 1958, regardless of the disquieting news from the
USSR, The general shape of the FY 1959 proposals did not dramatically
differ from that of FY 1958. Weapons, ships, planes, missiles,
atomic energy, research and development, were all to be supported by
$ 21.6 billion, marking an increase of one billion dollars over the
(24)
previous year. Subsequent appropriation requests included
0 1.75 billion in new obligational authority, plus another 0 600
million in June of 1958. Expenditures for FY 1959 eventually
(28)
surpassed those of FY 1958 by about 0 1.7 billion.
Despite the proven Soviet 1CBM capability, the administration's
defence programme for FY I960 stressed strategic air power, improved
through increased aircraft and airborne weapons deliveries, as well as
the retirement of obsolescent bombers. Eleven heavy bomber wings of
forty-five B-52s each were to be in service during FY I960 and a
twelfth was in the planning stage. There was to be an increase in
aircraft authorisation from $5.9 to $6.2 billion, but a fall in
obligational authority for missiles from $4.2 to $3.5 billion. The
USSR was thought effectively deterred by forty-three strategic bomber
wings, along with IRBMs on sites in Turkey, Italy and the U.K. The
administration conceded Soviet superiority in long-range missiles, but
explained that the flagging Soviet ICBM programme reduced the USSR's
lead to less than critical significance. In any ease, the United
States did not intent to ' match the Soviet Union missile
for missile.




In about 1959 the United States decided against any heavy
deployment of its first-generation liquid-fuelled IC£«.. The Atlas
was judged to be expensive and, as a result of its lengthy fuelling
procedure, vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike. The solid fuelled
Kinuteman, then under development, was instead chosen as the mainstay
of American land-based missile forces. In the period before the
large-scale deployment of ballistic missiles, the US nuclear
deterrent would be entrusted to American bomber aircraft and a small
(27)
force of first-generation ICBikis.
Overall defence spending for PY 1961 closely resembled the FY
I960 budget. As concerns strategic airpower, SAC suffered yet
another reduction in its force levels, falling from forty to thirty-
eight wings. The total number of combat wings was to sink from
ninety-six in PY I960 to ninety-one in FY 1961. This compared with a
force of 105 wings in FY 1959. R&D programmes were to be supported
by #3.9 billion, approximately the figure for the previous year.
The nation's ICBM capabilities were to be strengthened by fourteen
Titan and thirteen Atlas squadrons, for an increase of seven squadrons
over FY I960, an improvement partially financed by additional funds
appropriated by Congress in FY I960. Six Polaris submarines,
combined with another six approved in April, were to .join a fleet
of twenty-one nuclear submarines. Additional ICBM appropriations
further enlarged the Atlas and Minuteiaan programmes. The administration
also announced the approval of a Pentagon effort to 'begin to acquire
a standby alsni capability ion bsavy bombs is *« Hovvsvs in Apnil
President Eisenhower also approved a # 600 million reduction in funds
provided for the BOLARC missile and the Semi-Automatlc Ground
(27) Bottome, op. cit.. p.47; Quester, op. cit..
pp.193-194.
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Environment (SAGE) air defence system. The B-7C bomber project was
to proceed no further than the developmentuof two prototype
aircraft.
The administration did not concede the existence of an
operational 'missile gap', but admitted that intelligence sources
indicated a possibility, albeit unlikely, of a three-to-one Soviet
ICBM superiority between I960 and 1963. Even in such circumstances,
however, no 'deterrent gap* would develop as America's balanced mix
of bomber and missile forces would remain heavily superior to Soviet
(29)
strength, thus assuring an effective US deterrent. On August 1,
I960 the B-70 bomber, the Samos and the Polaris, along with the
Army's reserve and modernisation programmes were awarded another
0 476 million of $ 1.097 billion which had formerly been frozen. Of
this # 476 million, $ 164 million went to enlarge the number of fully
and partially funded Polaris submarines to five ships in each category.
The remaining portion of the 0 1.097 billion was to remain frozen and
another 0 979 million was to be temporarily frozen pending a review of
FY 1961 programmes. October 1 brought another #169 million to
Polaris. Samos and Army modernisation, followed by additional funding
for anti-submarine warfare and the 3-70 bomber, now advanced from a
prototype status to that of a complete weapon system. The
President's proporals for FY 1962 requested 0 358 million for the B-70
project.
At the close of the Eisenhower Administration, the United States
commanded nearly 600 B—32 bombers, some 1,200 3-47s capable of in¬
flight refuelling, more than 200 aircraft based aboard fourteen attack





carriers and an unknown number of fighter bombers able to deliver
nuclear weapons from a network of US bases around the world.
The Shark cruise missile with a range of 5,000 miles had also been
developed but was cancelled after the production of only thirty
(32}
weapons. Four Thor squadrons and three Jupiter squadrons were
produced for deployment in Britain, Italy and Turkey. The Atlas
ICBfi'. had reached operational status. The T1 tan ana mdnuteman missiles
were under development and a programme for the hardening of ICBk sites
(33}
was initiated. About seventeen of the surface launched hegulue
cruise missiles, with a 500 mile range, were fitted aboard five
(34)
submarines, while others were deployed aboard surface ships.
Finally, the first Polaris missiles were deployed aboard the
(35)
George Washington in November of I960.
Strategic Defence
The administration's policy on air defence in the late 1950s
showed no remarkable sense of urgency. Each year the Air Force cruise
missile Bomarc entered into a competition for defence funds with the
Army's Nike-Hercules. Nike-Hercules and the earlier Nike-A.iax had
received 3 3.9 billion by the close of 1959, while $ 1.9 billion had
been invested in Bomarc^^) Under Congressional pressure to choose one
of the other system for FY I960, the administration decided to reduce
(31) Bottome, op. cit., pp.51-52.
(32) Quester, op, cit.. p.158; Ernest G. Schwiebert, A History of
the US Air Force Ballistic Missiles. New York: F.A.
Praeger, 1965, pp.52-53.
(33) H.3. ifoulton, From Superiority to Parity. Ytfestport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1973, p.41.
(34) Quester, op. cit.. p.158.
(35) Also on Eisenhower missile development, see Charles H. Donnelly,
The United States Guided missile Programme. Y/ashington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1959; James Barr and Ytillian Howard,
Polaris. New York: Harcourt Brace, I960; John C. Chapman,
Atlas: The Story of a Missile. New fork: Harper and Bros.,
I960; York', op. cit.. pp.94-101.
(36) Kolodziej , op. cit.. p.304.
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spending on anti-bomber defence, while recommending a Bike-Hercules
and Bomarc deployment mix, with Nike-Hercules playing the greater
role.^"^ Proposals for the FY 1961 budget brought a reduction of
nearly $ 600 million in the funds for the Bomarc and SAGE systems.
These reductions, plus the cancellation of the F-108 fighter
programme were made possible, Defence Secretary Thomas Gates explained,
by the failure of Soviet bomber strength to expand as rapidly as had
(38)
been expected.
American research into anti-missile defence began in the early
1950s. By 1956 the United States army was prepared to deploy its
Nike-Zeus anti-missile system, with its elaborate, primitive and
mechanically operated radars, incapable of dealing with more than
one re-entry vehicle at a time, and highly vulnerable to saturation
(39)
attacks. ' While the Eisenhower Administration was prepared to
support the Nike-Zeus project with research funds, it consistently
refused to authorise anything more than an R it D effort. It annually
rejected any suggestion of deployment or advanced production as well
as General Maxwell Taylor's argument that at least those Nike-Zeus
components requiring a long lead time be placed into immediate
production. The administration view remained that the high
projected deployment costs, as well as the very dubious effectiveness
Nike-Zeus, warranted no more than a research and development
programme. However, the installation of the Ballistic missile Early
Warning System (BMEWS), designed to provide a twenty minute warning
of an ICBM attack, was accelerated.
(37) Kolodziej, op, cit.. p.306.
(38) NYT, April 22, i960, p.8.
(39) The Safeguard ABM System. Washintton, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, June 2, 1969, p.2.
(40) R.£. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt. New York: Cowies Book Co.,
1970, pp.39-40; York, op. cit.. p.120. On the controversy
over strategic defence in this period, see NYT. May 31, 1959,
Section IV, p.4; NYT, April 21, I960, p.7.
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Limited War Capabilities under the New New Look
The Need for Increased Capabilities
Although the Eisenhower administration never abandoned its
commitment to massive nuclear power as the basis of America's deterrence
strategy, U.S. policy affecting nuclear weapons and the massive
retaliation concept were modified to include the concept of 'graduated
(nuclear and non-nuclear) deterrence*, or 'the capability of making the
(41)
punishment fit the crime'. In 1955 Eisenhower planners acknowledged
•for the first time ... the possibility of a condition of mutual
deterrence and the importance in such a period for the United States to
have versatile, ready forces to cope with limited aggression' .^2)
In January of 1959 the President formally modified the massive
retaliation strategy in its heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons as a
near cure-all for every conceivable security problem. The President
described American defence policy as striving 'to prevent war in any
place and in any dimension', meaning the capability to fight at all
/ i o \
combat levels. ' This pronouncement initiated at least in form, if
not in substance, a further official move from the Dulles position which
(41) KYI. November 27, I960, Section IV, p.5.
(42) Huntington, op. cit.. p.105.
(43) NYT. January 11, 1959, p.14; This presidential statement in
1959 was by no means the first qualification of the massive
retaliation doctrine issued by an administration spokesman.
In Karch of 1954, John Foster Dulles denied that the new
policy implied that the United States was committed to an
automatic nuclear response to any act of aggression but only
required that the United States maintain the capability for
instant nuclear retaliation (NYT. March 17, 1954, p.l).
In the following year the President explained that the
United States would not normally use nuclear weapons in
a 'brush-fire* war (NYT. January 13, 1955, p.l).
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had appeared to oppose any serious preparations for wars of less
than nuclear scope.At the same time, Secretary of Defence,
Neil McElroy, asserted that the United States had sufficient
conventional power to 'sit in', contain the fighting ana stop the
(45)
spread of local warfare.
However, despite the recognition of the need for conventional
forces and frequent assertions of America's already adequate non-
nuclear capabilities, the administration did not provide the increased
strength required to support its growing official awareness of the
limited war problem. Rather than act upon the counsel of those
arguing for a conventional build-up, in FY 1958 Army manpower was
(46)
scheduled to fall below the one million-man mark. FY 1959 saw
further cuts in military manpower including the Army's loss of a
division, the disappearance of several tactical air wings and cuts
(47)
in the troop levels of all the military services. These
reductions, the President again explained, were made possible by -
•The greatly increased firepower of modern weapons and the continuing
increase in efficiency Fy I960 brought a distribution
of defence funds among the services similar to that of the previous
fiscal years 46% of the military budget for the Air Force; 28% to
the Navy and Marine Corps; and 23% for the Army - approximately the
(49)
same apportionment in effect since FY 1955* A proposal by
General Taylor for an Army of 925,000 men organised into fifteen
divisions was undercut by 55,000 troops, resulting in the dissolution
(44) NYT, January 11, 1959, p.14.
(45) NYT, January 17, 1959, p.l.
(46) Kolodziej, op. cit.. p.239.
(47) Huntington, op, cit.. p.110.
(48) Kolodziej, op. cit.. p.278.
(49) Ibid., pp.287-288.
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of an Army division. Of the four divisions held in strategic
reserve in the USA, one was eliminated and two others assigned to
training. The administration proposed a 10?!- cut in the reserve and
reduced the deployment rate for surface-to-air missiles intended to
provide air defence for ground troops.^0) jn Fy there were
no significant changes in administration policy. The defence




While the growing official recognition of the limited war
problem in the New New Look years did not result in an increase in
US conventional forces, it did bring a modification in the role of
nuclear weapons. In the New New Look period, the administration
completed the move - already begun earlier in the decade - to tactical
nuclear weapons as the answer to the need for a substantial limited
war capability. In place of large and highly expensive standing
armies and tremendous reserves of troops and equipment, the
administration chose to rely on what was thought to be the tremendous
'combat capability' of the latest refinements in nuclear weapons
(52)
technology. " In March of 1955 statements by both the President and
(50) Kolodziej, op. cit.. pp.293-294.
(51) Ibid.. p.311. Works dealing with the limited war issue or
commenting on administration policy include, Robert £. Osgood,
Limited War; Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy. New York: Harper and Bros., 1957; Thomas C. Schelling,
'Bargaining, Communication and Limited War', Journal of Conflict
Resolution. March 1957, pp.19-36; Dean Acheson, Power and
Diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958;
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1959; General James Gavin,
War and Peace in the Space Age. London: Hutchinson, 1959;
General M.D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet. New fork: Harper
and Bros., 1959; Hanson W. 3aldwin, 'Limited War* in Walter
F. Hahn and John C. Neff, eds., American Strateg:> for the
Nuclear Age. Garden City, New York: I960; Henry A. Kissinger,
•Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear?', Daedalus. Pall I960,
pp.800-817; Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963; Also see the NYI. March 21,
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the Secretary of State described a doctrine of 'limited' atomic
war to be implemented by tactical or 'precise' weapons launched
against military targets, marking a further elaboration of the
responsibilities of atomic weapons and an increasing reliance upon
(53)
atomic power. Speaking of the capabilities of tactical atomic
weapons, President Eisenhower expressed full confidence in the ability
of American armed forces to employ atomic power with a high degree ox
precision. The President explained: 'Where these things (tactical
atomic weapons) are used on strictly military targets and for strictly
military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just
(54)
exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else'. In 1957,
Secretary Dulles said:
Recent tests point to the possibility of
possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness
and radiation affects of which can be substantially
confined to predetermined targets. In the future,
it may thus be feasible to place less reliance
upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It
may be possible to defend countries by nuclear
weapons so mobile or so placed, as to make
military invasion with conventional forces a
hazardous attempt. (55)
In the same year, Defence Secretary Charles E. Wilson
described American defence policy as:
1955, p.l} January 12, 1959, p.l; April 18, 1959, p.6;
June 17, 1959, p.l; July 5, 1959, p.36; January 2, I960,
p .2.
(52) KYT. January 2C, 1957, Section IV, p.9.
(53) KYT, larch 17, 1955, p.5.
(54) Ibid., p.l.
(55) William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, hew York:
Harper, 1964, p.26.
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... based on the use of atomic weapons in a
major war and is based on the use of such
atomic weapons as would be militarily feasible
and usable in a smaller war, if such a war
should be forced upon us. In other words, the
smaller atomic weapons, the tactical weapons, in
a sense, have now become the conventional weapons. (56)
Speaking of 'measured retaliation', Air Force Secretary Donald
A. Quarles warned that an American nuclear response to Soviet
aggression must not involve 'excessive action*. He advised: 'fie
must not be triggered automatically into widespread atomic reaction
by limited aggression. Rather we should choose our weapons carefully,
place them accurately on forces directly engaged in aggression and
(57)
cease their application as soon as aggression is defeated*.
Quarles rejected the charge that the use of atomic weapons in a
limited war would necessarily lead to a full-scale thermonuclear
exchange. Far from enlarging a limited struggle, the use of atomic
weapons at relatively low combat levels was - '... a programme to make
a short war out of one that might otherwise drag on, as in Korea,
until America suffered more than 140,000 casualties and our friends
/ CQ \
fighting to preserve their freedom suffered over a million casualties'.
Aware that those services with an atomic role were those most
favoured ih administration defence budgets, Army commanders did not
resist the introduction of tactical atomic weapons into the ground
forces. Indeed, General Maxwell Taylor spoke of the re-organisation
of the Army into pentomic units, and in 1958 explained: 'We must
always have these smaller weapons because the big atomic bang would
(59)not be applicable to all situations by any manner or means*.
(56) William W. Kaufmann, op. cit.. p.25.
(57) KYT, September 27, 1956, p.19.
(58) Ibid.
(59) Kolodziej, op. cit.. p.247.
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As early as 1954 the North Atlantic Council advised NATO
commanders to plan for the defence of Europe on the assumption that
tactical nuclear weapons would be used by the West. In 1956
President Eisenhower formally issued a similar directive to American
strategic planners, the same year in which the United States announced
the activation of its first Army division capable of fighting with
nuclear weapons. In 1957 NATO made clear that its ground armies
were 'nuclear' forces and approved the introduction of American
controlled nuclear weapons into NATO forces in Europe. By the end
of President Eisenhower's tenure, tactical nuclear power occupied a
central position in NATO strategy, representing an allegedly
effective and economical response to Soviet conventional 'superiority'
in the European theatre.
Forces-in-Being
The New New Look was also marked by an increasing commitment to
a forces-in-being deterrence posture, as opposed to the traditional
mobilisation base concept. Stores of weapons ana equipment were
reduced and alternatives supply sources abandoned as the 'traditional
concept of a prolonged industrial build-up after attack' was replaced
by 'a "readiness" programme'. The emphasis on readiness and
economy also brought change in the official attitude toward reserve
forces. Whereas in the early New Look they were regarded as a
money-saving altennative to large active armies, in the New New Look
they appeared far less economical than had been hoped. As a result,
(60) NYT, January 20, 1957, Section IV, p.9; Alain C.
Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How aluch is Enough?
New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp.120-121.
(61) Huntington, op. cit.. p.97.
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in December of 1956 the administration declared its intention to cut
the numbers of reserve troops and to improve the quality of those
/ go}
remaining. This was to be done in recognition of the fact that
•new strategic plans and concepts make obsolete many previous plans
for development and utilisation of Reserve Forces'. The reserve
system had to be reformed 'in order to prevent runaway costs and to
bring Reserve and Guard units into line with current military
planning and requirements'.^"^
Assessment of the Role of 'Action-Reaction* in the
Development of the tiew Eew Look
Evidence of Reaction
Much that can be labelled as responsive to Soviet actions in US
defence policy during the later 1950s, can be so described if instances
of American reaction are permitted to include 'responses' based upon
estimates of the USSR's strategic potential, estimates derived from
demonstrated Soviet capabilities. In other words, although the
Soviet Union may not have fully attained a given capability, or may
never have intended to act in deployment terms as anticipated by US
analysts, the assumption that the USSR would fully exploit an already
existing capability often affected American decision-making on defence
issues.
(62) Huntington, op. cit.. pp.98-99.
(63) Ibid., p.98.
Motivations for a New New Look
Although the heavy Eisenhower emphasis on nuclear weapons came
under critical fire from the birth of the hew Look, during the latter
half of the 1950s the case for a revision of American policy was
clearly strengthened by external events. The still recent French
defeat in Indo-China, added to America's Korean experience, argued
for larger conventional forces. More important, the progress of
Soviet strategic development stimulated a re-examination of US policy.
The expansion of the Soviet strategic arsenal during the 1950s and the
obvious Soviet capacity for further growth, moved American planners
to reconsider a strategy based upon absolute strategic superiority
and the ability to deliver a massively destructive, largely
disarming, nuclear strike. In other words, the re-assessment of US
defence policy resulting in a New hew Look was, in part, a reaction
to increased Soviet nuclear strength or, at the very least, a
reaction to a demonstrated Soviet capability, added to American
estimates of the USSR's potential for development as a fully
qualified strategic nuclear power.
Sufficiency
The course of Eisenhower defence policy after the initiation of
a second hew Look remained largely faithful to the administration•s
original objectives. Nevertheless, the hew hew Look displayed
evidence of responsiveness to Soviet actions and potential capabilities
during the latter half ox the 1950s. The rejection of the Radford
Flan and absolute superiority stemmed from the view that the Soviet
Union could no longer be denied a major nuclear strike capability,
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leaving the United States with only a numerical advantage of limited
value. Even from a position of substantial superiority, the United
States would be unable to prevent the USSR from seriously damaging
America's largest cities. The New New Look, therefore, 'responded'
to Soviet nuclear development by declaring that, in future the USA
would only seek to maintain force levels 'sufficient' to deliver a
shattering retaliatory blow. V«hile any increase in Soviet force
levels would be met with corresponding American countermeasures in
support of sufficiency, the United States would not attempt to
retain absolute superiority for the saJse of superiority or engage in
a pointless effort to surpass the totals of all Soviet strategic weapons.
In addition to appearing effectively unobtainable, superiority
also appeared undesirable as it violated the administration's most
important domestic principle - balanced national budgets through
tightly restrained defence spending. In the first Eisenhower term,
reliance upon overwhelming atomic superiority seemed the surest route
to economy. In the second term, the Soviet Union demonstrated that
overwhelming nuclear superiority would require unending increases in
defence spending which would prove anything but an exercise in thrift.
Sufficiency was, therefore, the only means to both military and
economic security.
Although the United States in the New New Look period shifted its
declaratory position on the superiority issue, in operational terms
America was to retain a long air-nuclear lead over the USSR throughout
the 1950s. Indeed, the United States was not to reach the hifch point
(64) Huntington, op. cit.. p.102.
of its overall advantage until the early 1960s. However,
continuing American superiority in the Eisenhower years may have
had as much or more to do with Soviet inaction or moderation as
any American attempt to remain top of the nuclear league. While
the acceptance of sufficiency might, therefore, be regarded as an
important stage in the development of US doctrine and a significant
modification of the American deterrence concept, it did not alter
the realities of the strategic nuclear 'balance'.
The 'Missile Gap' and US Force Levels
Eisenhower policy affecting US force levels after the launch
of the Soviet Union's first ICB&s revealed clear evidence of
responsiveness to Soviet actions both in those 'counter-balancing'
measures which the administration chose to adopt, as well as in
those which it chose to reject. In reaction to the Soviet lead in
missile technology, and the general uncertainty as to Russian
deployment plans, the administration ordered the acceleration of
those American missile programmes already in progress and deployed
a number of IRBMs in Europe. The alert status of the Strategic Air
Command was increased and the quality of SAC's bomber force improved.
Nevertheless, the Defence Department refused to grant the existence
of a 'missile gap' in operational terms, arguing that the USSR had not,
in fact, undertaken a crash programme of missile production. In the
absence of an all-out Soviet effort, the administration declined to
'react' to an ICBM 'threat' which was largely confined to the pages
of the American press. Indeed President Eisenhower not only rejected
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demands for frenzied missile production but decided against any
major deployment of American first-generation liquid-fuelled weapons.
He instead chose to rely on SAC as the basis of the nation*s
deterrent until second-generation ICBw's and Polaris missiles became
operational in the 1960s. Convinced by its assessment of Soviet-
American force levels that the US strategic advantage remained enormous,
and required no major reinforcement, the Eisenhower Administration
responded to the meagre level of Soviet deployments by refusing to
bolt from its established policy.
Miaed Targeting Doctrine
The American commitment to a mixed targeting doctrine was the
product of several factors. These included the proximity of
military bases to civilian centres and the conviction that both
credible deterrence and effective war-waging required the ability to
deliver a devastating assault on the foundations of an enemy
society. A narrow concentration on a single target type was
inadequate for maintaining the peace or 'winning' a war. However,
US adherence to a mixed targeting doctrine can also be explained as
in some measure, a response to Soviet strategic development which,
it was suspected, involved the concealment of military installations
throughout the vast expanse of Soviet territory. A counter-force
strike was plainly unworkable if the Strategic Air Command could not
locate all of the USSR's bomber and missile sites. further, even
if their locations were suddenly to be discovered, the projected
expansion of Soviet missile forces was expected to make any truly
effective counterforce blow impossible. Nevertheless, for the time
being, the Soviet deployment of a nuclear capability which was certainly
significant but not yet equivalent to that of the United States argued
for the retention of a substantial number of counterforce operations
in a damage limitation role.
3omber Defence
In the latter half of the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration
refused to satisfy demands for much improved air defences. Despite
armed service pressure, defence budgets in this period failed to
include large anti-bomber expenditures, offering evidence of American
responsiveness to an unexpectedly low level of Soviet investment in
long-range aviation. While approving considerable spending for
research into anti-air systems, the final Eisenhower budget
(FY 1964), reduced air defence expenditure and cancelled the F-1Q8
aircraft on the grounds that the Soviet bomber force had not
expanded at the rate anticipated by American analysts earlier in
the decade.
Limited War
The modifications of at least the declaratory American doctrine
affecting limited war - publicly accepting the need for a wider
range of military capabilities - can also be seen as a reaction to
the USSR's growing nuclear strength coupled with her still large
non-nuclear forces. Since its first unveiling, the Lew Look had
been attacked for its strategic nuclear 'obsession'. The force of
these attacks was certainly increased by the apparently imminent
emergence of the USSR as both a major nuclear and conventional power.
However, while the Soviet Union may well have spurred a further
refashioning of the earliest form of the massive retaliation doctrine,
""C uuuiuu vui u/o. uua u wwuxxxwa bxvu buun. cx uio tiub 11^ riUjciXUd.fl UJ."
Eisenhower form, failing to emulate Soviet doctrine or deployments.
The improvement in the declaratory status of limited war forces
was not matched by a corresponding increase in non-nuclear defence
spending or deployments. On the contrary, defence budgets under
the Lew New Look largely maintained general purpose expenditures at
established levels, while authorising reductions in manpower and
tactical aircraft. Rather than •match1 Soviet conventional strength,
an option firmly prohibited by the administration's economic
objectives, the United States instead increased its already consider¬
able reliance on nuclear weapons, placing the additional fire-power
of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as theories of limited nuclear
warfare, in the balanced against the Soviet Union's conventional
forces. In so doing, the administration 'responded' to its
perception of Soviet developments in a manner faithful to both its
technological and economic convictions.
Evidence of the Influence of Domestic factors
in the Formation of Mew New Look Policy
Budgetary Principles
Although there is clear evidence of American responsiveness to
Soviet actions in the Lew Lew Look period, US strategic doctrine and
deployments clearly did not amount to a reflexive reaction or
emulation of Soviet Policy. It obviously would not have served
the domestic political interests of President Eisenhower and his
colleagues to display great concern over Soviet missile developments,
particularly as the I960 election approached. Levertheless, the
administration, in fact, held to the broad outlines of its established
policy in the face of dramatic Soviet actions which provoked intense
299.
criticism of Eisenhower policy and a general state of alarm in
the United States. Under heavy public pressure to rush into the
breech of missile and deterrent 'gaps', the administration refused to
abandon its commitment to restraint in defence spending. Throughout
the entire course of President Eisenhower's tenure defence spending
never rose more than $ 7 billion over the early New Look limit, or
more than $ 3 billion over the New New Look ceiling set before the
launch of Sputnik I. Further, approximately half of the increase in
defence expenditure over the # 38 billion lebel from FY 1958 to
FY 1961 was the result of inflation rather than programme expansion.
Continuing Nuclear Bias
During the New New Look period the general character of American
defence policy and the state of the deterrence concept in particular,
retained - in fact increased - its strong nuclear bias. Throughout
the Eisenhower years the American concept of deterrence was expressed
largely in air-nuclear terms, as the administration persistently
refused to increase the nation's conventional strength and assigned
a major 'conventional' role to tactical nuclear weapons. Indeed
even the New Look's commitment to reserve forces as an economical
substitute for active manpower was diminished during the latter half
(66)
of the 1950s. Both deterrence and effective national defence
were now all but universally seen to require the permanent maintenance
of combat-ready forces-in-being. The final completion of the shift
to nuclear deterrence was largely motivated by the same technological
and economic motives which had originally inspired the New Look policy
during the first Eisenhower term.
(65) Huntington, op. cit.. p.97.
(66) Ibid., pp.97-99.
US Force Structure
As well as declining to lurch into a major build-up of US
nuclear forces, the Eisenhower Administration also remained
faithful to its plans for a •mix* or ♦triad1 of strategic systems -
offering a blend of land-based missiles, submarine launched weapons
and long-range bombers as the basis for its confident rejection of
the 'deterrent gap'. Despite the view that Sputnik 1 had foretold
the obsolescence of manned bombers, the United States held to the
judgement that strategic aviation retained a high degree of effect¬
iveness which, together with the nation's emerging arsenal of ground
and sea launched missiles, provided a 'balanced' and invulnerable
deterrent force. This balance, far from allowing for even the
prospect of America's strategic inferiority, confirmed the United
States as the superior strategic nuclear power.
Ballistic Missile Defence
During President Eisenhower's second term of office the United
States also consistently adhered to its unenthusiastic assessment of
ballistic missile defence, despite the Soviet Union's heavy stress on
the ICBM as its major nuclear delivery vehicle. Although the
administration's generally negative attitude to anti-ballistic missiles
was surely influenced by its clear and comforting understanding of the
USSR's actual operational ICBifc capability, the refusal to deploy an ABm
system or even to produce its long lead-time components, was to a
significant degree, based upon the cost estimates of missile defence
and the still formidable technical problems involved in resisting a
ballistic missile attack.
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State of the American Deterrence Concept during
the New New Look and the Role
of Action-Reaction In its Development
The New New Look and Deterrence
Although there were strong similarities between the New Look and
the New New Look policies, during the later 1950s important
modifications were introduced into American deterrence doctrine,
further refashioning the original massive rataliation strategy.
The Eisenhower presidency had begun with a commitment to over¬
whelmingly superior offensive strength designed to destroy and largely
disarm the Soviet Union in a massive nuclear strike. In contrast
the New New Look's doctrine of sufficiency satisfied itself with
forces enjoying some margin of general or overall superiority, but
not necessarily exceeding Soviet force levels in every weapons category.
More important than the alleged end of the 'numbers game', the
abandonment of absolute superiority conceded that the United States
would soon be unable to deny the Soviet Union a massive strike
capability. In so doing, the Eisenhower Administration shifted the
basis of American deterrence. In the early 1950s, deterrence had
been expressed in the ability to crush and instantly disarm the USSK
without great risk to the United States or, in other words, upon the
capacity to decisively and unequivocally 'win' a full-scale nuclear war.
During the New New Look period, deterrence continued to be supported
by still vastly superior nuclear forces, providing the United States
with the safety and satisfaction of a broad, although diminished,
margin of strategic advantage and a still undeniably effective war-
waging capability. However, the doctrine of sufficiency acknowledged
that 'absolute security' through absolute superiority was no longer
obtainable. American vulnerability to nuclear attack was already
established and would inevitably increase with the expansion of the
USSR's strategic forces. In future, the United States would no
longer simply 'deter' but would itself be 'deterred' by the Soviet
Union. Clearly therefore, the only realistic basis for American
deterrence in the 1960s would be a Soviet-American relationship
of 'mutual deterrence' founded upon a 'balance of terror'.
The New New Look's conception of deterrence was further modified
by the emergence of theories of limited warfare. In the first
burst of its New Look policy, the administration seemingly regarded
strategic nuclear power as providing for most of the nation's
deterrence and defence needs. The later 1950s brought a clearer
official acknowledgement of the need for capabilities below the
level of full-scale conflict which was much encouraged by the
implications of the Soviet Union's accelerating strategic capabilities.
The gradual erosion of American superiority critically undermined
any exclusively nuclear barrier to a Soviet conventional challenge.
A major expansion in US general purpose forces would have marked a
direct emulative reaction to the apparently deteriorating effectiveness
of nuclear deterrence. However, rather than attempt to deter or
prepare to wage limited war with enlarged conventional forces, the
New New Look instead chose to confer conventional status on nuclear
weapons of the tactical type, injecting nuclear fire-power into
ground Army units in place of additional manpower.
Action-Reaction
Clearly the ovist role in the development of American
deterrence doctrine during this period was very considerable. The
disconcertingly rapid growth of Soviet strategic capabilities and the
prospect of something like nuclear parity emerging between the USSR and
the USA strongly urged a modification of the original New Look -
massive retaliation policy. The expansion of the USSR's strategic
nuclear forces not only suggested the need for a revision of doctrine
affecting full-scale conflicts, but also compelled a review of limited
war planning. Some kind of change was all but unavoidable; however,
the nature of the specific modifications eventually adopted by the
United States was not determined by Soviet actions and strategic
potential alone.
The United States could have responded to the USSR's growing
nuclear strength in the manner proposed by some of the New New Look's
critics. It could have accepted substantial increases in American
nuclear forces designed to retain a dramatic margin of superiority,
while maintaining or even expanding US general purpose forces.
Instead the administration chose to renounce superiority and further
reduce its conventional forces - both active and reserve. Far from
helplessly re-drawing its defence policies at the direction of the
Soviet leadership, the United States was in large part, moved by its
owa domestic objectives and priorities to accept 'sufficiency' and a
'conventional' strategy incorporating tactical nuclear weapons.
In other words, the Eisenhower administration was encouraged to
declare limits to the proportions of US strategic nuclear forces, as
well as to expand the responsibilities of tactical nuclear weapons by
the very firm conviction that the national security demanded a tight
grip on defence spending. The failure to enlarge US general purpose
forces W3S even more clearly a consequence of the administration's
budgetary pre-occupation than was its relative nuclear restraint.
Despite the undiminished validity of such concepts as superiority and
victory within the context of conventional warfare, the New New Look again
chose to honour the budget before the example of Soviet policy by adopting
tactical nuclear weapons as an 'economical' alternative to the allegedly
more powerful ground armies of the USSR.
Chapter 4




The domestic political difficulties which likely encouraged
Khrushchev's temporary return to an alarmist view on the likelihood of
an east-west conflict - after a period of relative optimism in 1955
and 1956 - reached a climax in June of 1957 when Khrushchev defeated
the ^anti-Party group' within the Central Committee of the Communist
Party. With his leadership largely secure, the Party Chairman
again altered his assessment of the prospects for peace, returning to
the more optimistic judgement that Soviet strategic power would
effectively restrain the west from attack. His public pronouncements
also seemed to indicate that a nuclear war would prove a great
disaster far all concerned, 'a future war' he warned in 1958, 'would
(2)
cause immeasurable harm to all mankind'. The revival of confidence
in the 'deterrent' effect of Soviet strength and the emerging argument
that nuclear weapons had robbed warfare of much of its utility or
rationality were only two of several modifications in policy and
declaratory strategic doctrine which Khrushchev initiated in his first
few years of unchallenged leadership.
Perhaps the most radical of these reforms during the years 1957
to I960 was the gradual displacement of ground armies by nuclear armed
missiles as the dominant factor in Soviet doctrine. This revolutionary
(1) See above Section II Chapter 2
(2) H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union. New York:
F.A. Fraeger, 1962, pp. 96, 163; Thomas W. Wolfe,
Soviet Power and Europe 19li5-1970. Baltimore J Hopkins Press,
1970, pp. 156-159:Roman Kolkowicz, 'Strategic parity and Beyond',
World Politics, April 1971» p. h33-
shift, modestly begun in the early post-Stalin period, rapidly
accelerated in the latter half of the decade, eventually producing
an intense controversy in the early 1960s over the significance of
missile-nuclear forces. However, for the time being - roughly 1957
to I960 - Khrushchev was allowed to set about the modification of
(3)
Soviet strategic doctrine without serious opposition.
- Strategic Missiles
Soon after the death of Stalin, the Soviet assessment of the
significance of strategic missiles acquired a steadily more generous
quality, eventually reaching a high-point in I960. Soviet military
commentators in the later 1950s oommended the ICBM for its speed,
accuracy, devastating payload, all but invincible offensive capability
and tremendous range - for the first time threatening the United
States with direct attack. In the words of Marshal of Aviation
K.A. Vershinin: 'Inter-continental ballistic missiles can deliver the
most terrible weapon, the hydrogen bomb, instantly to the remotest
regions of any continent on earth'. In 1958, Major General
N. Talenskii abandoned the customary Soviet prohibition against
assigning decisive capabilities to any single weapon, describing the
ICEMs as the 'decisive weapon of our time'. He went on to explain:
(3) For a discussion of the so-called 'modernist-traditionalist'
debate, see below Section III Chapter 2
(If.) Dinerstein, op. cit.. p. 226.
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The military significance of having solved the
problem of creating a powerful super long-range,
ballistic missile, capable of entering cosmic
space and hitting any designated point, is
exceptionally great. It is not only a
quantitative increase in the potentialities of
military strategy; it is a qualitative leap which
fundamentally changes the methods and forms of the
armed conflict. The inter-continental ballistic
missile changes military strategy and its
potentialities to an immeasurably greater degree
and much more rapidly than, for example, the
appearance of firearms or of aircraft in the past. (5)
Khrushchev's assessment
In the autumn of 1957, following the October h launch of Sputnik I,
Premier Khrushchev became the nation's chief spokesman on the Soviet
Union's long-range missile forces, assessing both their military and
political significance. Khrushchev's statements on ICBMs in the
period 1957 to I960 expressed increasing confidence in both the
deterrent and war-waging capabilities of missile-nuclear power. In
1957 he publicly declared strategic bombers 'obsolete' in the missile
age. Py I960 Khrushchev's public assessment of the significance
of the missile-nuclear combination reached such proportions as to mark
a major revision of Soviet strategic doctrine. After generations in
which the ground armies had been assigned the pre-eminent position in
Russian thinking, Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet: 'total firepower
and means of delivery' in other words nuclear weapons and
(5) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp. 227-228; also on the role of missiles in
Soviet strategic doctrine during this period see, Robert L. Garthoff,
Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear .ftge. London : Atlantic Books, 1958,
pp. 221-235.
(6) Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 222-223.
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intercontinental ballistic missiles, had become the critical factors
(7 )
in modern warfare. A future war would develop as a relatively
brief struggle in which an initial nuclear exchange, devasting the
whole of an enemy's territory, would decide ths conflict. Further,
the possibility of a successful enemy surprise attack had been
eliminated ty the Soviet Union's great missile nuclear power: 'modern
means of waging war do not give any country the advantage of surprise
/ Q\
attack'. Any such assault upon the USSR would be met with 'a due
(9)
rebuff. Kyj
ks a result of the Soviet Union's strategic capabilities,
Khrushchev explained: 'never in the whole history of the Soviet state
has the defence of our country been so reliably secured'. With such
strength in Soviet hands: 'war is no lcnger completely inevitable' and
the trend was 'toward reduction of tension in international relations'.
Further, the revolutionary capabilities of modern weapons, technology
and the nature of modern war were said to have greatly reduced the
(7) M.P. Gehlen, The Politics of Coexistence. KLoomington, Ihd. s
University of Indiana Press, 1967, p.73.
(8) Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Army and the Communist Party :
Institutions in Conflict. Santa Monica, Cal : The Rand Corporations,
R-14j.6-FR, August 1966, p. 2iil.
(9) A, Horelick and M. Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy.
Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 67; On the Soviet
assessment of surprise in the late 1950s, see Dinerstein, op« cit.,
pp. 167-212, 216-221; Garthoff, op. oit., pp. 82-83, 8h - 87
(10) Kolkowicz, The Soviet Army and the Communist Party, op. cit.,
p. 2ll.
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significance of the established armed services: 'In our time the
defence potential of the country is determined, not by the number of
our soldiers under arms (and) the number of persons in naval uniform
... (but) by the total firepower and the means of deliveiy
available As a consequence the Premier announced a
reduction in total military manpower from 3,623*000 to 2,li23,000.
These reductions would make available additional funds: 'for the
(13)
fulfilment and overfulfilment of our economic plans'. In
short, Khrushchev's January I960 speech before Soviet legislature
shifted the basis of Soviet strategic doctrine from its long
established stress on massive ground armies to a primary reliance
upon the ICBM and the nuclear warhead. It further delivered a strong
vote of confidence to the concept of nuclear deterrence.
Strategic Aviation
In 1955 there appeared to be a Soviet re-evaluation of the long-
range bomber which significantly enhanced its doctrinal status.
Articles appeared in the press discussing the importance of aerial
refueling and described strategic aircraft as the basic delivery vehicle
for nuclear weapons. They were said to be the most reliable means for
destroying targets of both a tactical and strategic nature. By 1957
strategic aviation was charged, along with long-range missiles, with
(11) Kolkowicz, The Soviet Arrgy .and the Communist Party, op.«- cit., p. 2li2
(12) Ibid., p. 2i|l.
(13) Ibid., p. 2h2.
(lit) Dinerstein, op. cit., p. 216.
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striking the decisive first blow in a future war.
However, the launch of Sputnik in August began an apparent
decline in the doctrinal fortunes of strategic aviation. In 1957
Premier Khrushchev told James Reston of the Hew York Times: 'A
revolution of a certain kind is taking place at the present time.
Military specialists believe that both bomber aircraft and fighters
are in the twilight of their existence. The speed and ceiling of
bombers is such that modem missiles can destroy them1.
his I960 SApreme Soviet speech Khrushchev also explained that air
power had lost its 1previous importance in view of modern developments
(17)
of military equipment1.
Nevertheless, Mr Khrushchev's judgement on the manned bomber
was seemingly qualified by other less pessimistic statements issued by
/■J O \
the party chief in the late 1950s, as well as by the views of
professional air officers who argued! 'The results already achieved in
the development of aircraft and in the means of destruction employed
by them and also the ceaseless qualitative improvement of aircraft
equipment, give a basis far supposing that aircraft will play a very
(19)
important role in future war'.
(15) Dinerstein, op. oit., pp. 230-232.
(16) Ibid., p. 233.
(17) Kolkowicz, The Soviet Arty and the Communist Party,
, p. .
(18) Dinerstein, op. cit., p. 23k.
(19) Dinerstein, op. ext.. p. 235; also see Garthoff, op. cit.,
pp. 179-188.
Strategic Defence
Even before the Russians had come to a full public awareness of
the importance of air-nuclear power, air defence was recognised as an
important strategic mission. With the growth of that awareness and
the development of effective fighter aircraft and surface-to-air
missiles in 1955* the significance of air defence was seen to increase.
In that year, the press warned that not a single attacking aircraft
would be allowed to reach its target. It was admitted that;
•the slightest mistake of an anti-aircraft unit in conditions of atomic
(21)warfare can lead to very serious consequences1. As a result,
the air defence forces were acknowledged in 1955-1956 as one of the
most important aspects of air power and reorganised as an independent
armed service. The militaiy press published a number of articles
reiterating the need for a fully effective active defence against air
attack, a call whih continued into the later 1950s. In 1957 Marshal
Zhukov advised that the enemy's nuclear weapons and delivery systems:
•requires our armed forces, especially ... the air forces, to be
always in readiness to frustrate any aggressor's attempt to accomplish
(23)
a surprise attack on our country'. Readiness was to be assured
by a radar warning system, supersonic fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft
artillery end surface-to-air missiles. Mr Khrushchev's
occasional forecasts of aircraft obsolescence during the later 1950s
(20) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp. 238-239.
(21) Ibid., p. 2lfl.
(22) Gehlen, op, cit., p. 71? On the organisational changes in air
defence, see Section II Chapter 2
(23) Dinerstein, op. cit., p. 2it2.
(2U) Ibid., pp. 2h2-2h3.
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predicted their replacement by anti-aircraft missiles.
As for the problem of defence against missile attack, Soviet
statements during the late 1950s generally lauded the invincible
capabilities of the ICBM and did not anticipate the development of
an anti-missile weapon in the near future. Nevertheless, there was
public speculation on possible solutions to the missile defence
problem as well as the judgement from Major General G.I. Pokrovsky
that? 'in principle an anti-missile missile campaign and defence are
possible ... '
In the burst of Khrushchev's optimism about the capabilities of
missile-nuclear forces, a ruinous decline in the strategic role, as
well as the size of the ground forces may have appeared imminent.
Mr Khrushchev, in fact, reduced the level of military manpower, a
measure justified by developments in weapons technology and publicly
devalued the doctrinal status and strategic mission of the ground forces.
However, despite Khrushchev's public views, the Army was clearly not
written off by Soviet strategists in the late 1950s. The much heralded
power of nuclear weapons in the last half of the decade did not eliminate
the professional military view that the initial strategic nuclear
exchange might well prove indecisive, preserving a critical role for
( 26 )
ground troops in western Europe.
Far from condemning ground armies to obsolescence, Colonel I.S. Baz
argued in 1958 thst the introduction of nuclear weapons to land warfare
(27)
required larger active and reserve ground forces. These forces
(25) Albert Parry, Russian Rockets and Missiles. London ; Macmillan, I960
pp. 151-152; Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 228-231.
(26) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp. 252-253.
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would, of course, have to be trained and equipped to deal with the
special problem of the nuclear battlefield. They would, for example,
have to avoid large troop concentrations of the World War II type in
order to diminish their vulnerability to nuclear attack. Mobility
was now of greAt importance, requiring the Army to be more fully
motorised and mechanised, along with increased airlift capability and
firepower. A high degree of Amy mobility, added to its advantage in
manpower over western armies, promised to preserve an extremely
important role for conventional forces in the nuslear age.
The Navy
The development of the missile and the nuclear warhead raised the
Soviet Navy, with its missile capability, to a newly heightened status,
improving the position of submarine forces, while reducing the role of
conventional surface units. Admiral N. Favlovick, writing in 19f>7,
explained that the nuclear armed missile had provided the Navy with new
strategic significance. With improvements in the range, accuracy and
blast affect of submarine launched missiles and the development of an
underwater launch capability it would be possible to destroy urban-
(29)
industrial targets from submarines submerged off enemy coasts.
Convinced of the growing significance of subsurface warships, the
Soviet view of large surface fleets in these years remained much less
admiring. The Russians argued that nuclear weapons, with their
tremendous destructive capability, made it impossible for an enemy to
concentrate bask forces, as such concentrations were virtually
(28) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp. 2f>3-?5>5>° Garthoff, op. cit., pp. Ih9-l66.
(29) Dinerstein, op. cit., p. 237.
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indefensible against nuclear attack. This development was seen
as a serious blow to American basically surface oriented strategy and
its trans-Atlantic support and supply missions. It was further
asserted that nuclear weapons had also made any American troop landings
on Soviet territory extremely difficult, landings which many Soviet
(31)
commanders continued to regard as essential to any western victory.
Touching upon the role of the modern Soviet Navy in his famous I960
speech to the Supreme Soviet, Mr Khrushchev said; 'the submarine fleet




Despite Mr Khrushchev's rather erratic public judgements on the
utility of manned aircraft, during the late 1950s, as in the early and
middle years of the decade, tactical air power was said to command a
valuable role in supporting ground army operations. Indeed, the
tactical air farces retained particularly important missions on the
nuclear battlefield, contributing to the now much needed requirement
for increased theatre forces mobility through its transport units and
providing an additional means for the delivery of tactical nuclear
weapons on enemy airfields, troop and supply concentrations, bridges
(33)
and command and control centres. '
(30) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp. 2)>7-2)j.8.
(31) Ibid., pp. 2lj8-250.
(32) Kolkowicz. The Soviet Army and The Communist Party, op. cit.,
p. 2i*2; also on naval doctrine, see Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 196-216.
(33) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 175-176; Garthoff, op. cit., p. 163>
Asher Lee, The Soviet Air Force. London ; Duckworth, 1961, p. 163.
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Limited Warfare
The declaratory view of limited war established in the early
and mid-1950s nemained largely unchanged in the closing years of the
decade. ^ The possibility of a limited or purely conventional war
in Europe was only hinted at in the late 1950s, with no indication of
real change in the Soviet view appearing until the early 1960s. The
entirely negative assessment of the feasibility of limited nuclear war
(35)
was to remain intact throughout the Khrushchev period.
Military Policy
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Khrushchev and the THEM
During the last of the 1950s Party Chairman Khrushchev issued a
number of public statements reporting the state of the Soviet ICBM
capability and interpreting its significance for the Soviet-American
strategic relationship. Fran August of 1957 to October of 1958
Khrushchev offered the USSRs development of the ICBM in refutation of
any assertions of U.S. strategic superiority, warning that American
invulnerability to attack had ended. ^6) Jn November of the same year
Mr Khrushchev - now Premier as well as Party Chairman - announced that
the Soviet Union had entered ICBM production, going on to claim an
ICBM 'assembly line' in the following year.
(38) Also on the status of limited war in Soviet doctrine, see above
Section II Chapter 2
(35) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 208-212; Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 97-115.
(36) Horelick and Rush, op, cit., p. 88.
(37) Horelick and Rush, op. cit., p. 50.
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The Soviet Union's allegedly established status as America's
strategic nuclear peer was employed by the Premier in the Twenty-
First Communist Party Conference, in January of 1959, to support the
judgement that any possibility of a capitalist restoration had been
eliminated, permitting Khrushchev increased public confidence in the
likelihood of a peaceful future. Although no specific claims of an
operational ICBM capability were yet heard from the Soviet Union, the
undeniable reality of Russian capabilities, as expressed in Khrushchev's
( ift ^
ICBM production claims, was said to caution the west against adventurism.
In November of 1959 Premier Khrushchev's ICBM statements escalated to
(39)include the assertion of an operational long-range missile capability.
Early in I960 he publicly established the intercontinental missile as
the key factor in Soviet planning. In the same year he also created
an independent strategic missile service and announced that the USSR
commanded an ICBM arsenal fully adequate to destrqy the United States.
XVhile Khrushchev was never to retreat from his basic commitment
to the deterrent and war-waging capabilities of missile-nuclear forces,
I960 marked something of a high point in his claims for Soviet missile
strength. Following the U-2 over-flight incident of I960 a gradual
moderation of Khrushchev's missile claims can be detected, with only
occasional reversions to the earlier more confident posture. After
the destruction of the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, Khrushchev
(38) Hor-elick and Rush., op. cit.» pp. 53—5'i«
(39) Horelick and Rush, cvbp. 58.
(U°) Ibid., p. 68.
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tended to stress the readiness of the USSR's strategic missile forces
rather than their size or capabilities. Later in the year, the
Russians re-asserted their alleged superiority over the United States
in ICEMs but never returned to the highly optimistic views of 1959 or
early I960, eventually retresting to no more than assertions of
strategic parity with the United States. Mr Khrushchev continued to
warn that the Soviet Union possessed thermonuclear warheads in quantity
but did not discuss delivery systems in detail. Par from claiming
superiority over the USA in missile-nuclear power, the Russians
reverted to the now dated reminder that America was no longer invulnerable
to attack. ^3)
Missile development
During the second half of the 1950s the T-2 IREM entered its
production and deployment phases. ^ Experimental- work also proceeded
on another TRIM, the T-li, a two-stage liquid-fueled weapon of improved
accuracy capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over a range of perhaps
1000 miles. Reports of a T-.'y appeared in the west, supposedly a
boost-glide winged vehicle of either intermediate or intercontinental
range. The first Soviet ICBM tests in 1957 were pert of a long
(ill) Horelick and Rush, op. clt., pp. 71.-72.
(IiP) Ibid., p. 73-
(U3) Ibid., p. 81.
(1Ui) Asher Lee and Richard F, Stockwell, 'Soviet Missiles', in Asher Lee, ed.,
The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. London! Trfeidenfeld 4 Nicholson,
1959, p. 15-'js Parry, op. c:lt.,~"pp. 132-133? Lee, The Soviet Air Force,
op. cit., pp. 139, liiO. •
(li5) Parry, op. cit., pp. 133-13li.
(U6) Ibid., p. ii2? Lee and Stockwell, op. cit., p. 156.
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established programme of ICBM development which involved the T-3,
T-3A and T-3B systems. The first of these was estimated to have two
or three stages fueled by oxygen a.nd kerosene over a 5000 mile range.
The two-stage T-3 A. was thought to have a range of 6000 miles and was
said to be fueled by hydrogen and oxygen. ^*7) Finally, the T-3B was
also under development as a three stage weapon, with a range of 7,500
miles. ^8)
Clearly underlining the new status of strategic missiles, in May
of I960 Premier Khrushchev established the strategic missile forces as
an independent armed service - raketnye voiska strategicheskogo
naznacheniia - or Rocket Troops of Strategic Designation. ^9) However,
the new doctrinal stature of long-range missiles and Khrushchev's
assertions of massive missile strength contrasted very sharply with the
operational ICEM force levels actually achieved in the late 1950s.
Despite the doctrinal fanfare, and evidence of an intensive acceleration
of missile development in 1955 or 1956, during the period 1957 to 1961 the
Soviet Union deployed no more than a very few of its first generation
until the early 1960s. If any operational 'missile gap' between
the United States and the Soviet Union ever existed it survived only
from late 1959 into early I960 and was of no great significance in terms
(51)
of the overall balance or imbalance of power. ' Some years liter
(li7) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit., p. 155} Parry, op. cit., pp. lUl,lli2,lU3;
Lee, op, cit., pp. 139, Ihl.
(1|8) Parry, op. cit., p. lid.
(U9) Wolfe, op. cit., p. 181 Fn. 8ln
(50) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 85 and Fn.55, 182-183; Lincoln P. ELoomfield,
Walter C. Clemens, Jn, and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the
Arms Race. Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, 1966, pp. Id-h3.
(51) Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 93-96.
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Colonel Oleg Penkovsky claimed: 'many of our big missiles are still
on the drawing-boards, in the prototype stage, or are still undergoing
tests. There are altogether not more than a few dozen of these, instead
of the "shower" of missiles with which Khrushchev has been threatening
(52)
the west.'
The only Soviet missile systems deployed in strength were those of
medium and intermediate range - suitable for use against western Europe.
(Ca\
MRBMs went into series production in the mid-1950s and the T-2
IRBM was reported operational in the latter half of the decade.
Clearly Mr Khrushchev chose to make his major missile investment in
weapons of less than intercontinental range, with the total Soviet MRBM-
(55)IRBM force reaching some 750 weapons by the end of the Khrushchev period.
Submarines and submarine launched missiles
During the late 1950s Soviet naval policy continued its
concentration on ocean-going submarines as an effective means of
destroying enerry carriers, as well as delivering strategic nuclear
strikes, with the former objective established in 1957-1958 as the top
(52) Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkov3ky Papers. London: Collins, 1965, p. 2lil.
(53) Wolfe, op. cit., p. 183; Bloomington, op. ext., pp. 93-96.
(5U) Lee and Stockwell, op. cit., p. 15k;
Parry, op. cit., p. 133.
(55) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 183-lou; For a discussion of the possible
motives behind Khrushchev's missile deployment policy, see below pp,32P332..
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short-tern naval priority. Tn his famous ln60 speech Khrushchev
specifically noted that in the missile-nuclear age, while ground forces
had declined in strategic significance, 'the submarine f1.eet assumes
(57)
great importance'. Its great importance was reflected in the
programme for the development of improved ocean-going submarine types,
both diesel and nuclear, as well as submarine launched ballistic
missile systems - a programme spurred in 195^ by a decision to close
the considerable qualitative gap between Soviet and American
submarines. Of the several classes of missile-firing submarine
udder development in the 1950s, three began to join the fleet in this
(tq \
period. " ' The diesel-powered G-Class first appeared in 1958 armed
with the SS-N-u ballistic missile. H-Class nuclear powered
submarines, originally equipped with SS-N-l; and later SS-N-5 missiles,
also first appeared in the same year. In I960 the F-l Class debuted,
mounting the SS-N-3 cruise missile system. As well as further
pursuing the programme of submarine development, work also continued
on the development of both cruise and ballistic missiles for submarine
launch. Of the various systems under development only the SS-N-1;
ballistic missile - first appearing in 1958 - was ready for fleet
service in this period.
(56) Michael MecGwire, 'Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy', in
Michael MecGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and
Context. Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign
Policy Studies, p. 175.
(5?) Kolkowicz, The Soviet Army and the Communist Party, op. cit., p. 2li2,
(58) Donald ¥. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power.
New York: Macmillan, 197^, pp. Ii92-h93«
(59) On the types of submarine under development see above, Section II
Chapter 2
(60) Michael MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy' in
KccGwire, ed., op. cit., pp. 133-13ii.
(61) MccGwire, 'The Structure of the Soviet Navy' in MacGwire, ed.,
op. cit., p. llil; Also on the development of Soviet submarine
.Strategic aviation
The very considerable disparity between Soviet doctrine and
operational missile strength was also accompanied by something of a
divergence between at least some of Premier Khrushchev's public
pronouncements on strategic aviation and the course of policy
affecting the nation's Long-Range Air Force. Khrushchev's
predictions that manned aircraft generally would soon disappear
might have been taken to imply an intention to reduce the number of
Soviet bombers dramatically. Instead, during the late 1950s, the
Russians adhered to the policy apparently adopted a few years earlier,
namely the retention of an intercontinental bombing capability
against the United States, while emphasising the development of
forces designed to strike against western Europe and American overseas
bases. Far from consigning bombers to 'museums' as Khrushchev
once declared, (^3) the Soviet heavy bomber force of Bear and Bison
aircraft reached a total of some 150-200 planes by the end of the 1950s,
while approximately 1000 Badger medium jet bombers were added to the
Air Force as a replacement for the TU-Ij piston aircraft. A third
heavy bomber type, the delta-wing Bounder was also under development
in the late 1950s, although it did not enter production.
The additions to the nation's airpower brought the Soviet Long-
Range Air Force to something near equality with SAC in numerical
terras, the Russian strategic Air Force commanding some 1500 aircraft
by I960 as opposed to SAC's 1800 planes. The rough quantitative
parity did not, however, imply equality in strategic capabilities, as
(62) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 178-179.
(63) Ibid., p. 180 Fn. 79; Lee op. cit., p. 138.
SAC heavily outnumbered the Russian force in bombers of intercontinental
range. Finally, beyond increasing aircraft numbers, the Soviet
Union also expanded its basing facilities. In short, although
Mr Khrushchev obviously did not attempt to challenge American
strategic superiority in the air or to duplicate SAC, he maintained
and improved his own air options. Indeed, by I960 so far as the
Russians actually commanded a. nuclear strike capability against the
United States that capability largely rested with the long-range Air
Force. In any case, it was clear that despite the talk of *museums',
the strategic Air Force was not being prepared for a glass case.
Strategic defence
During the later years of the 1950s certain of Mr Khrushchev's
public prophecies of aircraft obsolescence applied not only to long-
range bombers but to other aircraft types as well, with aircraft
generally expected to yield their missions to missiles of several
varieties. However, during the final years of the decade air defence
retained a very important role in Soviet declaratory doctrine, as
efforts to improve its operational effectiveness were continued.
Improvements Included the development and delivery of new aircraft to
the nation's ai.r defence forces (PtO). Among these were the KiG-21,
(6h) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 178-181 and Fn. 77.
(65) Lee, op. clt., pp. 137-139.
(66) Also on the Soviet Air Force, see Robert A. Kilmarx, A History
of Soviet Air Power. London : Faber and Faber, 1962.
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SU-7 and SU-9 fighters. In the late 1950s the total PVQ aircraft
r to \
inventory was estimated at something like U,GGG aircraft. Beyond
the modernisation of the FVD' s fighter inventory - a programs underway
since the early post-Stalin period - during the late 1950s the Russians
began the deployment of a system of anti-aircraft missiles. In the
mid-1950s a system of first generation air defence missiles - SAM-1 -
was deployed around Moscow. Later in the decade the improved SAH-2
(£q)
appeared for general deployment. 1 ' As for the problem of missile
defence, research was continued into this very difficult technical
problem. However, no ABM deployment was begun, nor were any confident
assertions of a missile defence capability made until the early 1960s. (70)
General Purpose Forces
Ground Forces
The late 1950s witnessed a dramatically favourable reassessment of
strategic nuclear forces which ended with Premier Khrushchev's public
declaration in I960 that missile-nuclear forces had become the decisive
element in modern warfare, displacing ground armies from their traditional
position of primacy in Soviet doctrine. However, although the years
preceding this judgement recorded the steadily increasing status of
(67) William Gx-een, 'The Development of Jet Fighters and Fighter Bombers'
in Lee, ed., op. cit., pp. lU2-lii5? Lee# op. cit., pp. 122, 159, 168;
Wolfe, op. cit., p. 185.
(68) Garthoff, op. cit., p. 5?' Lee, op. cit., p. 122.
(6$) Asher Lee, 'Strategic Defence' in Le^, ed., op. cit., p. 128.;
Wolfe, op. cit., p. 185.
(70) Lee, op. cit., pp. 12U-125; Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 186-187•
ICBMs and a reduction in the manpower levels of general purpose
forces, during the period 1957 to I960 ground armies preserved an
important place in Soviet doctrine and policy. The first troop cut
in 1955-1957 was followed by a second in 1958-195^^^ It reportedly
involved some 300,000 men, reducing the overall military manpower
level to 3.6 million by January of I960. The precise affect of this
reduction on the ground forces is difficult to determine as detailed
figires were never given, but the reduction appears to have been aimed
( 72 )
at achieving a total Army strength of approximately lUO divisions.
3n contrast to any appearance of declining Army capabilities
the late 1950s brought a continuation of the programme of Army
modernisation. This programme was primarily designed to prepare
the Soviet Army for the conduct of operations on a nuclear battlefield
and consequently brought a move from the tradition of massive troop
concentrations to an emphasis on troop dispersal and mobility, as well
(73)
as reconnaissance and rapid offensive operations and increased firepower.
Additional firepower was provided by the progressive 'nuclearisation'
of the Army through the assignment of tactical nuclear weapons to
ground forces down to divisional level. Tactical nuclear weapons were
reported in Army hands in the form of a mortar-howitzer firing nuclear
shells as early as the middle of the 1950s. Tactical atomic warheads
(71) See above, Section II Chapter 2 pp.
(72) Eloomfield, op. cit.. pp. 98-99: Malcolm Mackintosh, Juggernaut.
London: Seeker and Warburg, 1967, p. 297: Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
(73) Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 156-165; Wolfe, op. cit., p. 173.
/
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were undergoing tests by 1956, ^) Later in the decade these
weapons were to be delivered by rockets and tactical missiles -
such as the Frog, Scud and Shaddock systems - fixed atop tank chassis
or other tracked vehicles and capable of ranges of from 10 to 300
miles. Tactical aircraft were also to deliver tactical nuclear
weapons in support of Army operations. In addition to nuclear
firepower an effort was also made to improve the effectiveness of
conventional artillery. Finally, the need for greater mobility was
answered by the continuing motorisation of the ground forces
increasing the ratio of tanks and armoured personnel carriers to
troops.
Tactical airpower
As with other elements of Soviet air power during the late 1950s,
Mr Khrushchev's occasional disparagements of manned aircraft were not
reflected in the policy affecting the nation's tactical air forces.
The trends established in the middle years of the decade were continued,
bringing improved fighter aircraft to the tactical ranks including the
MiG-21. The transport section received new fixed wing transports -
the Antonov twin-and four-engined turbo-prop aircraft as well as the
Yak-2i+ and MiL-6 helicopter transports. Tactical bomber units were
strengthened by the Hyushin-liiO and a supersonic version of the Yak-25.
The total tactical aircraft inventory continued to account for more than
half of the nation's military aircraft, amounting to seme 10,000 planes. '
(7h) Garthoff, op. cit.. p. 157; Wolfe, op. cit., p. lli2 Fn. h2.
(75) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 173-175 and Fn. 52; Also on the Soviet Amy,
see Edgar O'Ballance, The Red Army. London : Faber and Faber, 1961*;
Michael Garder, The History of the Soviet Amy. Londons PallMall Press, 196<
(76) Garthoff, op. cit., p. 57.
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She Navy
The disparity between Soviet declaratory doctrine and defence
policy affecting long-range missiles was not equalled in the case
of naval doctrine and policy. Naval doctrine and policy in both
the middle and late 1950s exhibited generally consistent trends.
At the end of the decade the Russians held to the judgement that a
•balanced fleet' was undesirable, as conventionally armed surface
ships remained critically vulnerable. The emphasis on destroyer-
sized surface ships equipped with cruise missiles was therefore
retained, along with a primary stress on the development of a large
modern subsurface fleet of ocean-going diesel and nuclear submarines
armed with torpedoes and cruise as well as ballistic missiles.
Finally, the major strategic objectives of the Navy remained the
destruction of western surface ships - particularly aircraft carriers
and the development of a nuclear strike capability based upon the
(77)
submarine fleet.
In the final years of the 1950s the policy of modernisation
affecting the surface fleet proceeded on the basis of a policy
(78}
decision adopted in 1957-1958. The fleet was to/modernised by
the application of the latest weapons technology to the surface Navy
producing a force of relatively light warships - including both
modified older types as well as new classes - armed with surface-to-
surface missiles. The Krupnyi and Kildin cruisers, with the latter
derived from the Kotlin class destroyer, represented the Khrushchev
(79}
trend in surface ship policy. Although any suggestion of
(77) Wolfe, op. cit.. pp.188-190.
(78) Michael MccGwire, *Current Soviet Warship Construction*, in
MccGwire, ed., op. cit.. pp.121-122; and by the same author,
•The Structure of the Soviet Navy' in Ibid., pp.136-138, 140.
(79) Ibid.
producing strike aircraft carriers was permanently ruled out, the
effort to improve the effectiveness of naval aviation was also
continued. The Naval Air Force, while considerably reduced in
size, benefited from the introduction of new aircraft - including
the MiG-21 fighter, the TTJ-16 Badger and TU-95 Bear bombers - and
generally increased its offensive and reconnaissance capabilities.
Further, it was also decided to develop the Moskva Class anti¬
submarine cruiser, designed to employ helicopters in an anti-
/ O-i \
submarine role over the Barents Sea.
The major concern of naval policy consistently remained the
development of submarine strength, with Khrushchev constructing a
submarine force reduced inits numbers but much increased in its
capabilities. Conventionally powered and conventionally armed
additions to the subsurface fleet in the late 1950s included the
R-Class, a second post-war generation medium-type submarine, diesel
powered, torpedo armed and assigned to anti-surface fleet-area defence.
The F-Class. a second post-war generation large-type, diesel
powered and torpedo armed, also joined the fleet in this period. In
1958 the ranks of non-missile firing submarines were expanded by the
torpedo-armed, nuclear-powered N-Class submarine serving in an anti-
/ Ot \
carrier role. v ^
(80) Lee, op. cit.» pp. 151-155* Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 191-192;
Mitchell, op. cit., pp. U96-I4.98.
(81) MecGwire, 'Current Soviet Warship Construction* in Mb cGwire, ed.,
op. cit., p. 121.
(82) Wolfe, op. cit., p. 189* Mitchell, op. cit., p. h93-
(83) MccGwire, 'The Structure of the .Soviet Navy', in MccGwire, ed.,
op. cit., p. 135; On missile firing submarines, see above pp.3'8-3/?.
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V'arsaw Fact
Soviet policy with regard to the Warsaw Pact in the late
1950s remained unchanged from the attitudes adopted at its
foundation. hot until the early 1960s was the Pact to emerge as
much more than a political response to West Germany's NATO member-
Ihe Role of Action-Reaction : 1957-1960
Evidence of Reaction;
Land-Based Missiles
By the later 1950s the United States had amassed a tremendous
strategic nuclear capability in support of its 'New Look'
retaliation policy. It was therefore clearly essential that the
Soviet Union urgently deploy a major intercontinental strike force.
Khrushchev's approval of a rapid acceleration of IC3M development
in the middle and late 1950s represented the Soviet bid for some¬
thing like strategic equality with the United States and as such was
fundamentally responsive to the build-up in American air-nuclear
strength. While the drive to acquire an operational ICBM force can
fairly be considered a reaction to US policy and deployments,
Khrushchev's decision to award long-range missiles a position of
towering primacy within Soviet doctrine was not the necessary or
inevitable result of American actions, but was instead born of the
Soviet assessment of the strategic significance of the ballistic
Missile.
(84) Garthoff. op. cit.. pp.149-152; Roman Kolkowicz, •The
Warsaw Pacts Entangling Alliance', Survey. Spring 1969,
pp.86-101} Wolfe, op. cit.. pp.148-149} Also see above
Section II Chapter 4^
A
The ICBM was thought to have greatly reduced the role of the long-
range bomber - still much revered in the United States as part of
the American 'triad1 of delivery systems, and also to have diminished
the value of all other armed forces. The position of ICEMs in
Soviet doctuine was also advanced by the desire for a relatively
economical solution to the nation's security problems and the obvious
wisdom of exploiting the only area of weapons technology in which
the USSR enjoyed a dramatic lead over the United States.
The decision to restrict the number of operational ICBMs to a
mere handful of weapons, despite their lofty doctrinal status, was the
product of both responsive elements and domestic factors in Soviet
policy-making. Among the responsive elements determining the size of
Soviet missile forces was the apparent judgement that war with the
United States was unlikely. After a number of Cold War crises which
had failed to trigger an American attack, even in the early post-war
years of very marked Soviet strategic inferiority, Mr Khrushchev and
his Party colleagues were evidently persuaded that an entirely
unprovoked U.S. attack was most improbable. ^ However, this
assessment of the likelihood of war was significantly strengthened ty
the prevailing Soviet view of nuclear power as an effective deterrent,
whatever the nature of U.S. intentions. In such circumstances,
Premier Khrushchev may reasonably have argued that little more than a
low level ICEM capability was strictly necessary, regardless of what
might have been ideally desirable. If the USSR was chiefly to rely
upon her lang-ragge missiles for political and prestige value then
there was perhaps no need to undertake a heavy deployment or certainly
(85) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 88-89, 156-159.
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to await its completion before beginning the harvest of propaganda
and diplomatic advantages already produced by the first dramatic
missile tests in 19S>7*
Among those essentially ♦non-responsive' factors influencing
Khrushchev's minimal missile deployment may have been the quality of
the Soviet Union's first generation ICBMs. With weapons which were
perhaps insufficiently reliable and which could only be deployed in
the most vulnerable above ground mode, it may well have appeared
prudent to await the full development of an improved second generation
/ \
system before constructing a major operational force.
Regardless of the quality of the Soviet Union's early ICEMs,
the idea of a heavy deployment was surely not advanced by yet another
domestic factor - the enormous resources which such a deployment would
have required. The expenditure - unwelcome at any time under
leadership interested in expanding the civilian sector of the economy -
was perhaps particularly unattractive after 1958 when a decline in the
USSR's industrial growth rate had already increased the burden of
defence expenditure even without any rapid acceleration of ICBK
deployment and when the expense already incurred in ICBM development
and IREM deployment was rapidly devouring - perhaps entirely exceeding -
the savings earned in reducing general purpose forces. The economic
constraints influencing the Soviet leadership may have persuaded
Mr Khrushchev that there was nothing to be gained in entering a missile
contest with an adversary enjoying far greater resources and industrial
capacity.
(86) Wolfe, op. cit., p. 182.
(87) Dinerstein, op. cit., p. xvii; Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 106-110,
177-178; Roman Kolkowicz, The Dilemma of Superpower ; Soviet Policy
and Strategy in Transition. Arlington, 7a: Institute for Defence
Analyses, Research Paper P-383, October 1967, pp. 7-9.
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In addition to the competing demands of the civilian economy,
ICBM deployment also had to compete with the expenditure requirements
of I/MRBM deployments, Army and Navy modernisation, strategic aviation
and air defence. The failure to invest heavily in a system of
intercontinental range may also have been influenced by the still
surviving Soviet concentration on the Enropean theatre where the USSR's
( 88^
adversaries maintained forces directly threatening Russian territory.
The very different course of Soviet policy affecting M/lRBMs -
producing a large number of operational medium and intermediate range
missiles - was also the result of a mix of internal and external
influences. The origins of the W/IRRM programme were clearly internal
and did not represent a direct response to the United States. Their
development began immediately after World War II and proceeded rapidly
to operational status. The high level of medium-range missile force
levels as compared to the number of intercontinental weapons in part
reflected the still potent influence of the European theatre an Soviet
thinking, despite the emergence of the United States as a dangerous
adversary. Finally, the Russians were also encouraged to invest heavily
in M/lRBMs by serious problems of ICBM reliability and performance
which were to remain a contributing factor in the USSR's minimal ICBM
deployments until the 1960s.
However, while the origins of the Soviet fj/IRBM capability and
subsequent deployment decisions were significantly affected by factors
not directly related to the united States, their deployment in large
numbers under Khrushchev found important additional purpose in several
(88) Dinerstein, op. cit., pp. xv-xvi.
(89) Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
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US, as well as broadly western actions. The growing, and for the
time being likely unchallengeable margin of US strategic nuclear
superiority, further extended the utility of the old 'hostage
Europe* policy. A large M/IRBM force threatening America's western
allies further assured their position as hostages to Soviet attack.
Other US or western actions encouraging a heavy deployment of medium
and intermediate range missiles included the maintenance of American
military bases ringing Soviet territory, the introduction of US
tactical nuclear weapons into NATO's arsenals - a move specifically
designed to reduce the USSR's manpower advantages and the gradual
strengthening of NATO made particularly disturbing by West
Germany's admission to the alliance.
A counterbalancing Soviet increase in conventional strength
would have eliminated any possibility of economy in defence spending
and drained badly needed resources from the programme of strategic
weapons development. Attempting to throw a large ICBM deployment
into the overall balance would have required far greater exnenditures
and may have involved technical problems which did not prohibit a
major deployment of the less sophisticated MRBM and IRBM systems.
Further, a large force of M/IRBMs reinforced the USSR's still high
proprity European defences at what would hopefully prove an economical
price, while also increasing Soviet political leverage in western
Europe and offering a ready response to any future national
nuclear developments in the NATO area.^0^
(90) Wolfe, op. cit,. pp.140-144, 154-155, 180 Pn.78
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In conclusion, the course and character of the Soviet
missile programme during the 1950s represented a blend of
Mr. Khrushchev*s personal strategic judgements, domestic and
internal objectives and priorities, as well as the economic and
technological constraints affecting defence policy, with the
result that the emerging Soviet missile forces completely failed
to conform to American expectations.
Strategic Defence
Perhaps one of the most unqualifiedly direct Soviet reaction
in this period occurred in air defence policy. Despite Khrushchev's
occasional criticisms of manned aircraft, born perhaps of an over-
enthusiastic appreciation of anti-aircraft missiles, the American
stress on long-range bombers and the consistent improvements in US
air power, stimulated the organisation of the nation*s air defences
as an independent armed service and maintained the significance of
the PVQ thereafter, as the on-going effort to strengthen Soviet air
defences by the production of advanced fighter aircraft and the
introduction of surface-to-air missiles was continued. It is
probable that the acceleration of the American ballistic missile
development also lent increased significance to the USSR's
programme of anti-missile research, an effort which the Russians
apparently initiated long before the United States became deeply
concerned with the ballistic missile as a delivery system.
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The Navy
Soviet naval doctrine and policy in this period, as in the
mid-1950s, revealed considerable responsiveness to American actions.
However, the reactions stimulated by U.S. policy remained of a
distinctly Soviet kind, little resembling the form of American naval
strategy. Many of the measures adopted were clearly influenced by
the growing threat posed by American aircraft carriers. Seven new
U.S. carriers were laid down by 1958 and three others modernised, as
aircraft with ranges capable of penetrating into industrial Russia
joined the fleet. The United States also continued its development
(91)
of nuclear submarines and submarine launched ballistic missiles.
In the face of the carrier threat the Russians held to the view
that large surface ships had become fatally vulnerable. Their response
to the American challenge was therefore to extend their own operational
capability at sea, not through the construction of a 'balanced' navy
of the American type but through destroyer-sized surface ships armed
with surface-to-surface missiles and a large force of ocean-going
submarines. While the decision against a great surface fleet was no
doubt influenced by the limitations affecting Soviet resources, it at
least in part represented an independent and 'un-American' judgement of
the nature and requirements of modern naval warfare.
(91) Wolfe, 'Soviet Interaction with the United States and its
Influence on Soviet Naval Development' in JfccGwire, ed.,
op. cit., p. 221.
As well as significantly affecting the structure of the Soviet
surface flee£, the advanced state of American nuclear submarine
development - producing the nuclear powered Nautilus in 19$h - may
well have spurred the development of a Soviet nuclear submarine and
a later decision to close the general qualitative 'gap' between Soviet
and American submarines. However, the United States cannot be credited
wioh initiating the Soviet development of submarine launched missile
systems. Russian R and D in this field began very soon after the
Second World War as part of the early Soviet interest in missile research,
although the Soviet SLBK effort may also have received additional
impetus from the advanced state of the American SLUM effort at the end
of the 1950s. The development of the USSR,s missile submarine fleet -
unlike its American equivalent - produced both cruise and ballistic
missiles, with the former receiving further stimulus from U.S. carrier
(92)
deployments. Finally, the effort to improve naval aviation can
also be regarded as another aspect of the general commitment to extended
naval capabilities in response to the large ocean-going navies of the
west.
The ground forces
In the first few years after Stalin's death the doctrinal positinn
of the ground forces experienced something of a decline implicit in the
concession of major, in some circumstances even decisive, capabilities
to strategic nuclear systems. This early evidence of a changing
(92) Wolfe, 'Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its
Influence on Soviet Naval Development' in MbcGwire, ed.,
op. cit., pp. 222-226 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. h92-h93-
strategic emphasis was reflected in defence spending, manpower levels
and weapons research. During the closing years of the decade the
implicit decline in the status of the ground farces continued, as did
the newly established trends in spending, manpower and research. This
gradual process reached a climax in I960 when the ICBM was publicly-
established as the decisive factor in Soviet doctrine and the ground
forces explicitly credited, with a less than decisive role, as
Mr Khrushchev appeared to be adopting a policy resembling the American
'Hew' look.'.
It is reasonable to suggest that in so doing the USSR was
essentially reacting to the United States which had same time before
adopted a heavily nuclearised strategy at the expense of its
conventional forces, encouraging a roughly similar realignment in
•Soviet doctrine and. policy. In addition to the stimulating American
example, in steadily moving towards a nuclear emphasis during the late
19£0s, Khrushchev was also influenced by a number of factors not unlike
those which accounted for the "Rg-w .Lodk" in the United States. These
included the Premier's personal conviction that nuclear power had
radically altered the nature of modern warfare, diminishing the utility
of ground troops and thrusting strategic nuclear weapons into the
decisive position. The move to redu.ce ground forces was also the
consequence of Khrushchev's domestic economic problems and priorities.
He was committed to an expansion of the civilian economy which demanded
a firm grip cn defence spending. At the same time the development of
the new critical strategic nuclear forces required a heavy investment of
national resources. If both the civilian sector and the USSR's nuclear
capabilities were to be strengthened - particularly in a time of
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declining industrial growth after 1958 - cuts in seme araa of
expenditure were clearly advisable. In the 'nuclear age' conventional
forces appeared a very appropriate area for savings, freeing both
additional budgetary and manpower resources.
However, before accepting Khrushchev's intensifying stress on
strategic nuclear systems as a painstaking emulation of America's
flew Lock" it is important to recall that, despite the Fremier's
pronouncements on nuclear weapons, Soviet ground forces maintained
high force levels and continued to undergo an extensive programme of
modernisation. Khrushchev clearly did not dismantle or even
significantly reduce his European ground forces, but, instead joined
a missile-nuclear capability (Fi/UUMs) to major conventional
deployments in Europe. The maintenance of large ground forces was the
product of both internal or 'non-responsive' factors, as well as the
actions and policy of the Unload States.
Although nuclear weapons load been declared decisive in a future
war, the USSR's geographical location had not changed. The geographical
or geopolitical realities required provision for the defence of Soviet
frontiers against still powerful neighbours who together preserved a
deep Russian interest in the European theatre long pre-dating the
emergence of the U.S.A. as the major Soviet adversary. The ground
forces' cause was also supported by the politically influential Soviet
Army itself which continued to advance the 'combined arms principle'
and the firm belief that powerful ground forces remained essential for
victory in a future war. The Soviet desire to represent the USSR's
interests among Warsaw Fact members may also have provided further
encouragement for large-scale Army deployments in eastern Europe.
Beyond eastern Europe, the Army was also useful in supporting Soviet
political influence on the continent as a whole.
These factors alone would probably" have proved more than enough
to assure the survival of large ground forces. However, the
maintenance of large numbers of ground troops and the character of the
Arrry modernisation effort was very significantly affected by developments
in the west, developments which also influenced other aspects of Soviet
policy including N/IRBM deployments. The growing American strategic
nuclear superiority and Khrushchev's awareness that even approximate
nuclear parity would not be achieved for several years continued to breath
life into the old 'hostage Europe' strategy, recommending a still highly
visible Soviet ground threat to western Europe, bolstered by E/lRlMs, as
a response to America's great nuclear advantage. U.S. mJLlitaiy bases in
Enrope may also have provided seme degree of justification for conventional
forces.
The increasing capabilities of NATO strengthened by the distressing
addition of West Germany to the Atlantic fold also continued to argue against
any dramatic reduction in conventional force levels. The MTO shift to a
tactical nuclear emphasis in the late 1950s further urged the support of
large ground armies, especially the Soviet Union would be unable to equal
the west's tactical nuclear capability for some years. The growing
nuclearisation of MTO also stimulated, although It did not initiate, a
number of changes in Soviet Army training, tactics and equipment in a
continuation of the Stalinist programme of Army modernisation designed to
increase armoured strength, mobility and firepower, with the latter
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objective including tbe introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into
(93)
tbe ground forces.
Evidence of other factors influencing the development of
Soviet doctrine and policy
Strategic aviation
The Soviet declaratory view of strategic aviation during the late 1950s
generally marked a decline in the significance officially attributed to
long-range bombers, reflecting a judgement at odds with the American
•strategic triad1 doctrine. Khrushchev in particular went cn public record
with predictions of a limited future for manned delivery systems. Although
these were obvious propaganda and international political advantages to be
had from a devaluation of the weapons system which occupied the central place
in U.S. strategy, the change in the doctrinal status of strategic aircraft
must at least in part be credited to the Soviet conviction that the ballistic
missile represented the strategic weapons systems of the future. The
sincerity of this judgement was reflected during the second half of the 1930s
in the evidence of a marked shift in budgetary and research resources away
from the traditional services and weapons to the missile programme.
The clear movement in the direction of missiles did not, however,
signal the demise of the Long-Range Air Force. Instead, the air doctrine
end force structures of the early and middle 1930s remained largely intact.
(93) Kolkowicz, The Soviet Army arid the Communist Party, op. cit.,
pp. 2h3-2hh» Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, op. cit., pp. lUO-lit.8,
132-136.
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Confounding the predictions of American analysts, the Russians
accumulated no more than a relatively small force of long-range aircraft,
while deploying a large number of medium-range bombers. The motivations
behind the shape of Soviet air power were still those of a few years before.
A heavy bomber force was deployed and bomber R and I) continued, perhaps as a
hedge against the development of insoluable technical problems in the ICBM
field and as a stop-gap strategic capability in the period before the
acquisition of an effective missile force. The strong emphasis on medium-
range aircraft was based upon the judgement that the ICBM represented the
most effective strategic delivery system, making the construction of a
large bomber force unnecessary and wasteful. The high priority always
attached to the European theatre, now reinforced by NATO's substantial
nuclear as well as conventional forces, also explains the large deployment
of medium-range bombers.
Tactical aviation
Tactical aviation suffered a decline in its status which was implied
in the forecasts of aircraft obsolescence issued by Mr Khrushchev and other
commentators. This implicit devaluation of tactical airpower was the
result of Khrushchev's assessment of the revolutionary implications of missile
for modern warfare at all levels of conflict. However, during the late 1950s
the improvement of tactical aviation begun in the early post-war period was
further advanced. Tactical air strength continued to benefit from the
delivery of new aircraft and maintained a total force of some 10,000 planes.
(9li) Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 178-180.
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The tactical air aspect of conventional theatre forces policy was
probably motivated by the same factors which inspired the maintenance
of large conventional ground armies. Among these, the need to
develop the capability to donduct ground operations on a European
nuclear battlefield - made particularly essential by the nuclear
shift in NATO strategy - provided Soviet tactical aviation with
(95)
a role in the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
During the 1950s, as earlier in the decade, Soviet responsive¬
ness to American actions was substantial. The continuing development
of massive American nuclear forces all but compelled the Russians to
acquire u similar capability, resulting in a general decline in the
role of the ground forces and a dramatic increase in the status of
those forces designed either to launch or resist a nuclear attack.
Nevertheless, as in the early and middle 1950s, the character of
Soviet reactions retained a strongly indigenous quality, determined
by independent strategic judgements and preferences, economic and
technological constraints, geopolitical realities and other factors.
The on-going effort to develop a major strategic nuclear
capability at the expense of the nation's conventional forces, while
certainly encouraged by the policy of the United States, produced
subsequent readjustments in Soviet doctrine affecting manned aircraft -
strategic and tactical - as well as tactical and strategic missiles
which were not inevitably fated by the character of American policy.
Indeed, these readjustments conflicted with the principles of
the 'New Look' and were chiefly the product of independent
(95) Lee, op, cit.. p.l66j Wolfe, Soviet Power ana Europe.
op. cit.. pp.169, 205-207.
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Soviet .-judgements and domestic circumstances. Similarly, the Navy held
to an 'un-American' stress on ocean-going submarines and light surface
ships, as the Army retained high force levels and was extensively
modernised. In short, the USSR during this period continued to react to
American actions in its own largely unemulative manner.
Khrushchev and Deterrence
Declaratory and Operational Concepts
After several years in which Soviet strategic doctrine remained
'frozen' in its wartime form and the concept of 'deterrence' found no
expression beyond that vaguely implied in the 'hostage Europe' policy, the
middle and late 1950s witnessed the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the
USSR, leading to its public acceptance as the dominant feature in Soviet
doctrine by I960. In moving to a strong nuclear emphasis and in fully
accepting the nuclear deterrence principle, Khrushchev accomplished a
radical shift in Soviet declaratory doctrine, adopting a policy apparently
bearing a close resemblance to the American deterrence concept evolved
during the late 19it0s and early 1950s. The belated Soviet move to
deterrence might be seen as a consequence of the 'lag' between Soviet and
American doctrines introduced by the Stalinist 'freeze' on strategic thought,
perhaps providing an example of the 'educative' function of U.S. strategy.
However, an examination of the nature and origins of Soviet deterrence does
not entirely confirm the assertion of an intimate doctrinal relationship
between the two countries in which the USSR is cast as America's faithful,
if unimaginative student.
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3h declaratory terms Soviet deterrence, and if need be defence,
essentially rested upon an obliterating missile-nuclear capability,
threatening a massive blow, destroying and disarming any aggressor. In
its declaratory- form, therefore, Khrushchev's doctrine was not unlike
the Eisenhower policy of 'massive retaliation'. However, despite the
doctrinal bravado, Soviet deterrence in strategic nuclear terms was backed
by only a relatively small force of intercontinental bombers, a
demonstrated capability to produce long-range missiles and the most
embryonic of ICBM forces reinforced by the power of the Premier's
rhetorical deployments. In short, while attempting, with steadily
diminishing success, to preserve a declaratory doctrine based upon a
•massive retaliation' capability, Khrushchev actually settled for a policy
of 'minimum deterrence' implemented by nuclear forces much inferior to
those of his great adversary. This inferior force was capable of
supporting only a highly negative variety of deterrence, threatening a
number of American cities but unable to wage nuclear war by effectively
assaulting U.S. strategic forces and smashing the urban-industrial
foundations of American society.
In adopting a 'minimum deterrence' or 'deterrence only' strategy,
Khrushchev assumed a posture strikingly similar to that recommended by
Gheorghi Malenkov before 1955 but clearly at odds with American doctrine
throughout the Eisenhower Administration. Khrushchev's declaratory
concentration on nuclear weapons and a 'massive retaliation' capability,
as well as his genuine acceptance of nuclear deterrence, sounded themes
already long familiar in Washington. However, Khrushchev's apparent
belief that low level nuclear deployments could satisfy the requirements
of effective deterrence had no place in American policy. Indeed, even
after the adoption of 'sufficiency', the United States remained committed
to overall strategic superiority as a short-term objective and the
maintenance of a nuclear war-waging capability, crushing the enemy-' s
urban-industrial areas and destroying as much of his military
establishment as possible, thereby providing both a positive expression
of deterrence and an adequate defence should deterrence fail. kliatever
the 'New Newlook* may have been, it was not 'minimum deterrence'.
The nuclear forces deployed by the Soviet Union and the United
States differed not only in size but also in structure. American forces
clearly reflected an emphasis on the ability to launch a direct attack
upon the USSR from bases in the United States, requiring weapons systems
capable of striking over an intercontinental range. In sharp contrast,
both the USSR's bomber and missile forces were heavily weighted in the
direction of medium range systems.
The divergence between Khrushchev's 'New. 5..-* 1 and the Eisenhower
deterrence policy also extended to the status of conventional forces.
In the Soviet Union, as in the United States, declaratory doctrine argued
that modem weapons technology had significantly reduced the need for
large ground armies5 and in fact in both countries these forces were
reduced without being abolished. During the 19J?0s Washington and Moscow
were persuaded that the new technology offered the answer to security -
perhaps even superiority - with economy in defence spending, a hope which
each discovered to be false within the same decade. However, in the Soviet
case, only marginal reductions in the size of ground forces were actually
accomplished, while the USSR maintained large conventional deployments in
Europe and pursued a major programme of Army modernisation. The Soviet
Army continued to account for a veiy large proportion of the USSR'3 total
capability to wage war.
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In short, despite an apparent similarity, the Soviet and American
definitions of strategic effectiveness and credible deterrence remained
significantly different. The American view demanded a tremendous -
and for so long as possible, superior - intercontinental strike force
designed essentially for deterrence positively expressed in a demonstrated
capability to wage nuclear war successfully. Although the late 1950s
brought a growing official awareness that deterrence mid defence in a world
of two nuclear powers also required provision for conflicts below the full-
scale strategic level, the emphasis of Eisenhower doctrine and policy
remained fixed upon intercontinental nuclear warfare. At the same time the
Soviet leadership was apparently convinced that the cause of deterrence
was effectively - if not ideally - served by a minimal nuclear force, a
force unable to wage war or actually defend the Soviet Union but capable of
launching seme kind of punitive strike against America's largest cities.
Strategic effectiveness and deterrence were also seen to require large
conventional farces and a major nuclear capability at medium range.
Origins
It is not possible to determine with certainty uhe full range end
precise balance of factors which moved Premier Khrushchev to shift Soviet
declaratory doctrine from its ground forces tradition to a heavy stress on
nuclear weapons and a firm attachment to the concept of nuclear deterrence.
However, it is possible to suggest a number of external and Internal
influences upon Soviet policy - making which may explain the dramatic
revision of the USSR's declaratory strategic doctrine in this period.
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It can be argued that the acceptance of nuclear deterrence by
the United States played a major pwer in its subsequent appearance
in Soviet declaratory doctrine. Indeed, the example of the United
States, already settled upon nuclear weapons and a strategy of
nuclear deterrence, as the Soviet Union was in the process of
revising its strategic doctrine, may well have spurred the Russians
to adopt the deterrence concept. However, it is equally possible
that the origins of Khrushchev's declaratory 'New Look* policy -
like the origins of Malenkov's unsuccessful proposal of 'deterrence*
in the mid-1950s - were similar to those domestic influences and
independent judgements which had earlier brought the United States
first to the 'discovery* of deterrence and then to the adoption of
a policy of deterrence through massive nuclear power.
In the Soviet case, as in the American, these judgements and
influences probably Included the sincere conviction that nuclear
weapons had, indeed, revolutionised the nature of warfare, reducing
the utility of conventional forces, a judgement which extensive
experience with nuclear weapons testing and the development of
strategic delivery systems alone might reasonably have suggested to
any nuclear power. The experience of modern weapons development may
also have inspired Khrushchev's confidence that nuclear power could
provide the basis for an effective deterrent. The shift to nuclear
weapons and deterrence was also encouraged in the USSR - as in the
United States - by economic problems and priorities which strongly
urged restraint in defence spending at a time when modern weapons
technology briefly appeared to provide an excellent opportunity
for reducing the cost of security. Technology further
prompted the Russians to a missile-nuclear
(96) On the Malenkov 'deterrence• proposal and the origins of
Soviet deterrence, see Section II Chapter 2
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policy by presenting the Soviet leadership with an unmatched technological
capability promising major strategic and political advantages. These
advantages were fully exploited in Khrushchev's public assessment of the
ICBM and its consequences for the Soviet-American, power balance. The
Soviet decision to invest the deterrent mission primarily in the ICBM was
clearly an independent Soviet judgement proceeding frcm a pioneering
commitment to missile research and leading to a strategic force structure
which the United States with, its emerging 'triad' of delivery systems was
never to accept.
Beyond the declaratory doctrine, the origins of Khrushchev's
operational doctrine of 'minimum deterrence' were largely those already
stated in explaining his meagre ICBM deployment - a blend of independent
Soviet judgements and domestic factors with a consideration of American
(97 )
actions and capabilities. Minimum deterrence was in part the
product of the strategic nuclear convictions of Khrushchev and his
colleagues, arguing that nuclear power had so changed the nature of modern
warfare as to modify earlier conceptions of 'war-waging' and 'victory'.
If, as the Soviet Premier apparently came to believe, the devastating
destructiveness of nuclear power had greatly devalued any traditional
concept of 'victory' then even a minimal nuclear force was adequate for
purposes of deterring any rationally minded opponent, as well as assuring
adequate international political leverage, making a vastly expensive
deployment of strategic nuclear systems unnecessary.
Confidence in the effectiveness of minimum deterrence was also
importantly strengthened by the view that an unprovoked American nuclear
strike was urilikeljr, an opinion based upon Khrushchev's experience of
(97) See above, pp-. 327-332.
several Cold War crises, as well as his assessment of the significance of
nuclear weapons for modem warfare. Domestic economic circumstances not
only encouraged a general shift in the deterrence direction but also urged
a policy of minimum deterrence. As Khrushchev struggled with the
resource requirements of the civilian economy, strategic nudLear
development and the conventional armed services, the prospect of an
unrestricted ICBM competition in a period of declining Soviet industrial
growth with an adversary commanding a far superior economic, technological
and industrial capacity could not have appeared especially inviting. Any
headlong dash for strategic equality with the United States would also have been
inhibited by the USSRs still firm commitment to the European theatre where a
costly X/MRBM deployment was underway.
However, even had Khrushchev decided to authorise a massive ICHM
deployment, despite the cost, it is probable that he would have been all but
prohibited from doing so by the technical limitations of Soviet missile
technology. It is difficult to believe that the USSR would have been quite
so severely sparing in its ICBM deployments had the quality of its first
generation system warranted a major investment.
FinajJ_y, the retention of large general purpose forces in the Soviet
definition of strategic effectiveness and credible deterrence stemmed from those
factors noted above in explaining the motivation for maintaining powerful
ground armies: geopolitics, the traditional concentration in Europe and
large ground forces, the professional judgements and political weight of the
Soviet Army and the USSR's political interests in both eastern and western
(?8) See above, pp. 33V-338
Europe. Nevertheless, the character of Khrushchev's modernisation
policy affecting the general purpose forces was also importantly
influenced by such U.S. or broadly western actions as; America's
massive nuclear superiority, the maintenance of U.S. bases abroad, the
American commitment of tactical nuclear weapons to NATO and West Germany's
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In summary, the deterrence doctrine adopted by Khrushchev in its
declaratory form bore an apparently close resemblance to that of the United
States in its 'New; Look? period, suggesting a close relationship between the
Soviet and American strategic doctrines in which the United States had
slowly managed to instruct the USSR in the ways of deterrence. In fact,
the example of the United States, already drawn up in a deterrence posture
by the mid-1950s, may well have influenced the USSR to assume a similar
position. Precisely how influential the American example may have been is
impossible to say with certainty, but, regardless of its affect, it is
entirely possible that the USSR was brought to accept the nuclear deterrence
principle both by the American strategic example as well as by the same
technological and economic factors which earlier moved the USA to nuclear
deterrence without the aid of foreign assistance.
Declaratory appearances aside, however, the operational substance of
Soviet deterrence in this period indicates that if U.S. doctrine had
performed an 'educative* function, the Soviet Union had proven either a
seriously inattentive or highly sceptical 'student'. Rather than imitate
the Eisenhower deterrence thesis, the Russians developed a doctrine of
'minimum deterrence' which had little in common with American 'massive
retaliation' policy even in its modified 'New New: I©old form. The Soviet
conception of deterrence, although undoubtedly influenced by U.S. doctrine
and military-political actions, had shown itself to be sharply sensitive
to a host of factors not directly related to the United States -
geographical, historical, political, technological and economic -
producing a deterrence doctrine which differed dramatically from that of the
TJ.S»A. and firmly maintained the two countries in a basically asymmetrical
strategic relationship.
